The Blame Reflex — Why Trust Breaks in Complex Societies

November 22, 2026
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The evidence says this happens to people who have lost status, voice and control, not to people who lack intelligence. The loop it sets off can be named, graded and broken.

ENSI Research · Built on a library of 46 primary documents · Compiled 2026-10-20


The argument, before the list

Most writing on the “trust crisis” begins with a number and ends with a lament. The numbers are real. Only 40% of people across the OECD have high or moderately high trust in their national government (OECD 2026, p. 21). Trust in news is at 37%, the lowest since the Reuters Institute began measuring in 2015 (Reuters Institute 2026, p. 18). Seventy per cent of respondents in 28 countries are hesitant or unwilling to trust someone different from them (Edelman 2026, p. 17). The lament is familiar too: people have become irrational and tribal, and social media has made them worse.

This report starts somewhere else. It treats the trust problem as a problem of how people handle harm they cannot explain. Inflation, energy transitions, migration, pandemics and automation are systemic. Each has many causes and no single author. The moral mind, however, runs on a template of “an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient” (Gray et al. 2012, p. 101). Blame, unlike anger, needs a target. Without an agent causally linked to the harm, “blame does not arise because there is not target for it” (Malle et al. 2014, p. 151). When suffering is real and no agent is visible, people supply one (Gray et al. 2012, pp. 111–112). The mismatch between agentless harm and an agent-seeking mind is what this report calls the blame reflex.

The tempting claim is that complexity, combined with loss of control and status, pushes people toward emotional and provocative explanations, toward claiming victimhood and toward scapegoating. Here that claim is a hypothesis, and it is tested. Part of it holds. The existential threat model (van Prooijen 2020), Need for Chaos (Petersen et al. 2023), scapegoating under deprivation (Bilewicz & Krzeminski 2010) and competitive victimhood (Noor et al. 2012) all trace a path from threat to agent-blaming explanation. Part of it fails. Six experiments that manipulated people’s sense of control found no effect on conspiracy belief (d = −0.03; Stojanov et al. 2020, pp. 11–12). On identity-laden questions, people with more numeracy polarise more (Kahan et al. 2013, p. 24). Everyday blame tracks evidence about intentions far more than it tracks outcomes or prejudice (Malle et al. 2014, pp. 160–162).

What survives is sharper than the original. Complexity does not produce scapegoating by itself. It creates latitude, room in which identity, grievance and status loss decide which explanation feels right. The people most prone to share hostile rumours are not the least able. They are those who have personally lost status, feel lonely and feel abandoned by elites (Petersen et al. 2023, pp. 12–15). The evidence leaves no room for the “dumb people” framing. It points to identity protection, marginalisation, status loss and powerlessness, which are conditions that societies create and can change.

That changes who must act. Rothstein and Stolle put it plainly: governments “cannot put the blame on their citizens for the lack of social capital”, because that lack “is caused by dysfunctional government institutions” (Rothstein & Stolle 2007, p. 30). Read this way, the blame reflex is a diagnostic. It shows where people bear harm without an accountable agent and without a say. The report builds toward a seven-move loop through which blame is generated, aimed, returned and locked into insular trust, and it grades every link.

Summary of the main points

  • Trust is a willingness to be vulnerable where one cannot monitor. It rests on ability, benevolence and integrity, and it is how societies reduce complexity (Mayer et al. 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998; Luhmann in Gambetta 1988).

  • Trust has forms that behave differently. Particularised, strategic and generalised (moralistic) trust follow different rules. Political trust fell in the Great Recession while generalised trust barely moved (Algan et al. 2017).

  • Institutions dominate the determinants. Impartiality and low corruption correlate with generalised trust at about r = .64–.68 (Delhey & Newton 2004; Rothstein & Stolle 2007). Economic loss matters. Ethnic diversity has a real but small effect, a partial correlation of −0.026 (Dinesen et al. 2020).

  • Voice is the steepest gradient. 69% of those who feel they have a say trust their government, against 22% of those who do not (OECD 2026, p. 50).

  • Trust is re-sorting rather than collapsing. It is draining from distant institutions and pooling in near circles (Edelman 2026, p. 15).

  • The blame hypothesis is half right. Threat, deprivation and status loss are linked to conspiracy, hostile rumours, scapegoating and competitive victimhood. But acute loss of control does not cause conspiracy belief, and skill amplifies identity bias.

  • “Dumb people” is the wrong diagnosis. Identity, marginalisation and powerlessness are the drivers.

  • Blame moves in seven steps: comprehension gap, loss of control, grievance, search for an agent, target selection, reciprocal victimhood, insular trust. The control link is the weakest.

  • The breakers are institutional: real voice, fair process, buffers against loss, and bridging-based ranking.

How this report is organised

Section 1 defines trust in seven propositions. Section 2 sets out nine factors behind social and institutional trust. Section 3 reads the 2025–26 OECD, Edelman and Reuters surveys. Section 4 states the hypothesis. Section 5 gives eight lines of support and Section 6 six counter-findings. Section 7 sets aside the “dumb people” story. Section 8 assembles and grades the seven moves of the blame loop. Section 9 draws six reframes. Online amplifiers (angles 06–08 of the library) and remedies (angles 09–10) appear only where they show which link can be cut.


1. What trust is: seven propositions

1. Trust is a willingness to be vulnerable. The field’s most-cited definition is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al. 1995, p. 5). A twelve-paper cross-disciplinary forum converged on “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another”. It needs two conditions, risk and interdependence. “Trust would not be needed if actions could be undertaken with complete certainty and no risk” (Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 4). Gambetta defines it as a subjective probability, centred on a mid-point of uncertainty, assessed before one can monitor (Gambetta 1988, pp. 230–231). Trust is needed exactly where people cannot check, so as issues become harder to monitor, the demand for trust rises.

2. Trustworthiness rests on ability, benevolence and integrity. Mayer and colleagues distilled 22 earlier lists of antecedents into three (Mayer et al. 1995, p. 11). Ability is domain competence. Benevolence is wanting to do good to the trustor “aside from an egocentric profit motive”. Integrity is adherence to acceptable principles (pp. 10–12). A lack of any one can undermine trust (p. 14). In public life these become competence on hard problems, care for “people like me” and even-handed rules. The OECD’s drivers (reliability, responsiveness, integrity, openness, fairness) translate them closely (OECD 2026, p. 12). Attribution matters too. When a bad act is traced to orders from above, the agent’s integrity survives, because the acts “are not deemed to be his or her fault” (Mayer et al. 1995, p. 20). Who is blamed decides whose trustworthiness falls.

3. Trust reduces complexity, and complexity raises its price. Luhmann separates confidence (alternatives not considered) from trust (chosen despite possible disappointment). The distinction predicts where blame goes: “In the case of confidence you will react to disappointment by external attribution. In the case of trust you will have to consider an internal attribution” (Luhmann in Gambetta 1988, pp. 110–111). Increasingly complex societies “may in fact generate systems which require more confidence as a prerequisite of participation and more trust as a condition of the best utilization of chances” (p. 112 [99]). Yet testing trust “require[s] a relatively concrete setting” and “a previous structural reduction of complexity” (p. 116 [103]). Where systems are too complex to test trust concretely, people fall back on confidence. When confidence fails, disappointment is attributed outward.

4. Trust comes in three forms. Delhey and Newton set out the standard typology (Delhey & Newton 2004, p. 5 [3]). Particularised (”thick”) trust lives in small face-to-face communities with close sanctions. Instrumental or calculating trust, also called strategic or tit-for-tat trust, is a cost-benefit judgment based on track record. Generalised (”thin”) trust in strangers marks large, mobile, heterogeneous societies. Uslaner’s moral reading, quoted by Algan and colleagues, is that “moralistic trust is a commandment to treat people as if they were trustworthy … [and] the belief that others share your fundamental moral values” (Algan et al. 2017, p. 66 [374]). The distinction explains a key result. Unemployment shocks damaged political trust far more than generalised trust, “consistent with the argument that general trust has a moral component inherited through education and socialization” (p. 61 [369]). Strategic trust breaks at the first violation (Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 9). Moralistic trust moves slowly.

5. Particularised trust is double-edged. In-group reciprocity sustains cooperation. It can also create in-groups “embedded in a matrix of hostile relationships with outsiders”, with feuds and discrimination “against anyone of a different color, religion, or ethnicity” (Ostrom 1998, p. 17). Generalised trust “may not extend easily to all others in general, as opposed to others who are like us” (Delhey & Newton 2004, p. 30). A society can therefore lose generalised trust while particularised trust rises. The result is not low trust but insular trust, the endpoint of the loop in Section 8.

6. Trust is self-reinforcing and asymmetric. Trust, reciprocity and reputation are “positively reinforcing”, so “a decrease in any one of these can lead to a downward spiral” (Ostrom 1998, p. 13). “Everyone honest” and “everyone cheats a little” are both stable, self-fulfilling states (Dasgupta in Gambetta 1988, pp. 70–72). Destruction is easier than repair. “While it is never that difficult to find evidence of untrustworthy behaviour, it is virtually impossible to prove its positive mirror image”. Trust rests “not on evidence but on the lack of contrary evidence”, which “makes it vulnerable to deliberate destruction” (Gambetta 1988, pp. 246–247). The data agree. In 20 countries a 10-point fall in police confidence went with a 6-point fall in generalised trust, while rises brought no significant gain (Rothstein & Stolle 2007, p. 23). Greek trust in government fell from above 50% in 2004 to 7% in 2012 and never exceeded 37% afterwards, even as services improved (OECD 2026, pp. 24–26). Fast decay and slow rebuild is a parameter every model of trust must carry.

7. Imposed control crowds trust out, and voice builds it. “Trust is not a control mechanism but a substitute for control … Some controls actually appear to signal the absence of trust” (Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 8). Too much monitoring can make people “feel they are not trusted and thus become less trustworthy” (Ostrom 1998, p. 17). Coercion breeds “power and resentment” (Gambetta 1988, p. 233). The mirror image is voice. Groups that met face to face and voted on their own sanctioning system reached 93% of optimal yield with only 4% defection (Ostrom 1998, p. 8). Political trust reverts to “mere confidence when the opinion spreads that you cannot really influence political behaviour through the ballot” (Luhmann in Gambetta 1988, p. 111). Together the seven propositions set the frame. Trust is needed where people cannot monitor, it is cheaper to destroy than to build, and it rests on a felt capacity to influence. Complex, distant governance strains all three.

2. Nine factors of social and institutional trust

Four studies in the library explain why trust is high in some places and low in others: a 60-country analysis (Delhey & Newton 2004), an institutional theory with macro and micro tests (Rothstein & Stolle 2007), a regional panel with an instrumental-variables design (Algan et al. 2017) and a meta-analysis of 1,001 estimates (Dinesen et al. 2020). The OECD’s 2026 survey adds driver estimates. Two outcomes must be kept apart. Generalised trust in “most people” is slow-moving and largely a property of the society. Political trust in parliaments, parties and governments is fast-moving and partisan. The factors run roughly from the strongest evidence to the weakest.

Factor 1: Impartial, effective institutions. This is the strongest and most consistent correlate. Generalised trust correlates with rule of law at .683, government effectiveness at .641 and corruption at −.665 across countries (Delhey & Newton 2004, p. 20). The figures are .6457 for impartiality and .6455 for efficiency in Rothstein and Stolle (2007, p. 35). Their thesis is that “trust thrives most in societies with effective, impartial and fair street-level bureaucracies” (p. 2), through four mechanisms: safety; inference from officials to everyone else (”if those in position of responsibility cannot be trusted, then ‘most other people’ can surely not be trusted”); watching fellow citizens; and direct experience of fair or biased treatment (p. 18). In Canada, each point on a 0–100 court rating raises the odds of generalised trust by about 10% (p. 28). The authors admit causality is not identified and call for quasi-experiments around institutional reform (pp. 29–30).

Factor 2: Which institutions. Citizens separate political institutions (parliament, parties, government), order institutions (army, police, courts) and power-checking institutions (press, TV). The split appears in 56 countries and 64,997 respondents (Rothstein & Stolle 2007, p. 32). Political institutions are trusted on partisan grounds, while order institutions are trusted for “even-handedness and/or impartiality” (p. 13). Hence the 2025 OECD ranking: armed forces 66%, police 63%, courts 54%, local government 46%, news media 40%, parliament 37% and parties 26% (OECD 2026, pp. 35–36). The OECD calls the ordering a possible “sign of ‘skeptical trust’” (p. 34). For blame, the split means that a shock can drain political trust without touching the institutions people meet every day.

Factor 3: Economic shocks, measured as change. Algan and colleagues give the best-identified evidence in the library. EU unemployment rose from 7% in 2007 to 11% in 2013 (Algan et al. 2017, p. 2). Instrumenting with the pre-crisis share of construction, each extra point of unemployment raised the anti-establishment vote by 2 to 4.4 points (p. 37). Five extra points of unemployment cut trust in the national parliament by 3.65 points in 2SLS (p. 55). “It is the change in unemployment—rather than its level—that correlates with voting for nonmainstream parties” (p. 4). In the Brexit vote, a one-standard-deviation larger rise in unemployment raised Leave by 4 to 5.5 points, against about 1 point for the level (p. 41). Loss, not deprivation as such, moves people. The authors concede that their instrument “is not fully exogenous” (p. 4).

Factor 4: Shocks hit political trust, not generalised trust. Interpersonal trust did not fall after the crisis (”if anything … increased somewhat”; Algan et al. 2017, p. 18). The standardised effect of unemployment on political trust was about twice its effect on interpersonal trust, and on satisfaction with democracy almost five times (pp. 45, 49–50). The effects were stronger among people without a degree and among older cohorts (p. 5). Distrust rose toward national and EU politicians but not toward the police or the UN. The authors read this as citizens having “assigned the blame for the rise in unemployment to the inefficient national and European institutions” (p. 66). This is inferred from patterns, not measured. It is still the clearest sign in the library that blame for systemic harm is routed to whoever seems responsible.

Factor 5: Inequality and insecurity. Inequality correlates with generalised trust at −.466, with a multivariate β of −.25 (Delhey & Newton 2004, pp. 20, 23). Rich, egalitarian countries average 38% trusting, against 20% for poor, unequal ones, though the middle categories carry large errors (p. 21). Within countries, people with financial concerns trust their government 18 points less (OECD 2026, p. 48). Edelman’s gap between high- and low-income trust grew from 6 points in 2012 to 15–16 in later waves, and reaches 29 in the US (Edelman 2026, p. 7). Only 32% expect the next generation to be better off (p. 10).

Factor 6: Ethnic diversity, at its true size. Precision matters most for this factor. A meta-analysis of 1,001 estimates from 87 studies finds “a statistically significant negative relationship”, a partial correlation of −0.0256, called “rather modest” (Dinesen et al. 2020, p. 10). A best-practice subset gives −0.0283 (p. 18). The effect is strongest for trust in neighbours and at neighbourhood level, almost three times the country-level effect, which is not significantly different from zero (pp. 11–12). Because in-group trust falls too, the pattern fits “hunkering down” better than group threat (pp. 11–12). The authors conclude that “apocalyptic claims regarding the severe threat of ethnic diversity for social trust … are exaggerated” (p. 17). Diversity is a weak cause of distrust but a convenient explanation for it. That gap between effect and salience is the fingerprint of scapegoating.

Factor 7: Voice, the steepest gradient. In the OECD survey, 69% of people who feel “people like them have a say” trust the national government, against 22% of those who do not. The gap is 47 points, ranging from 60 in Australia to 36 in Chile (OECD 2026, p. 50). Only 31% feel they have a say, unchanged since 2021 (pp. 48, 51). The barrier is attitudinal. Forty per cent think officials “do not care about people like me”, and “voting is not sufficient anymore for citizens to feel heard” (p. 131). This is Luhmann’s warning in survey form, and it makes voice the natural lever against the second move of the blame loop.

Factor 8: Competence on complex problems. The OECD’s strongest driver of trust in government is whether decisions use “the best available evidence”. It is “by far most strongly associated”, followed “at a distance” by balancing current and future generations (OECD 2026, pp. 30–32). Only 42% think evidence is used (p. 29). Where trust moved by at least 4 points, governance perceptions explain “at least forty percent” of the change, and responsiveness and reliability on complex issues outweigh fairness or integrity (pp. 32–34). Service satisfaction is high, at 67%, but it mostly drives trust in local government and the civil service (pp. 13, 15). This is the most direct support in the library for the premise of this report. National trust is won or lost on the problems people find hardest to judge for themselves.

Factor 9: The interpersonal baseline and partisanship. High interpersonal trusters are about twice as likely to trust the police (75% vs 38%) and four times as likely to trust the government (54% vs 14%) (OECD 2026, p. 59). Supporters of governing parties trust the government 26 points more, a gap that has widened. Gender and age gaps are only 7 and 5 points (p. 48). One expected factor does not make the list. Voluntary membership fails once other variables are controlled (β = .05; Delhey & Newton 2004, pp. 23, 29), and joiners’ higher trust “seems to be an effect of self-selection”. “Many associations are in fact established to create distrust” (Rothstein & Stolle 2007, pp. 6–7). Belonging to groups, online or offline, does not by itself build bridging trust.

The pattern across the nine is clear. The large effects are relational and institutional: impartiality, voice, competence, partisanship and the interpersonal baseline. Economic effects are real and work through loss. Compositional effects are small. An account of distrust that leads with the small effects deserves suspicion, and so does any blame narrative built on them.


3. Where trust stands: five readings of the 2025–26 surveys

The three largest current surveys in the library are OECD (about 2,000 per country in 38 countries, fieldwork September–November 2025; OECD 2026, p. 17), Edelman (33,938 respondents in 28 countries, fieldwork October–November 2025; Edelman 2026, p. 2) and Reuters (97,520 respondents in 48 markets, fieldwork January–February 2026; Reuters Institute 2026, p. 5). All three are online, quota-weighted, non-probability panels. Levels cannot be compared across instruments: “trust in media” is 54 in Edelman, 40% in the OECD and 37% in Reuters. Directions and gradients can be compared.

Reading 1: stable at a low level. Across 29 countries in both waves, OECD trust in national government went from 40.0% to 40.7% (OECD 2026, p. 22). The Edelman Trust Index rose from 56 to 57 (Edelman 2026, p. 5). The “collapse” story fits parties (26%), parliaments (37%) and news (37%), not institutions in general.

Reading 2: news is still falling, partly by composition. Trust in news fell 3 points, dropping in 29 of 48 markets (Reuters Institute 2026, pp. 10, 18). News met on social media is trusted by 22% and AI chatbot answers by 20%, so “trust overall is prone to go down” as consumption moves there (pp. 10, 20). Social and video networks are now the leading gateway to online news, at 54% (p. 9).

Reading 3: trust is retreating inward. Net trust shifts after societal events were −16 for government leaders and −11 for major news organisations, against +11 for neighbours, family and friends and +11 for coworkers (Edelman 2026, p. 15). Local government is trusted 6 points above national (OECD 2026, p. 36). Weekly exposure to sources of a different political leaning fell 6 points to 39% (Edelman 2026, p. 14).

Reading 4: insularity and grievance travel together. Seventy per cent are insular: 30% unwilling and 40% hesitant to trust someone who differs (Edelman 2026, p. 17). Majorities are insular in 25 of 28 markets and across left, centre and right (pp. 48–49). Among the insular, 61% report moderate or high grievance, against 45% of the open (p. 20). The insular would trust an institution led by “someone different” 28–30 points less (p. 21). These are proprietary, cross-sectional constructs whose appendix is not in the library.

Reading 5: majorities want less blame, and the engaged minority rewards more. Eighty per cent rate a government that “avoid[s] rhetoric that blames or vilifies particular groups” as effective. Eighty-one per cent want “accurate headlines instead of exaggerated or fear-inducing ones” (Edelman 2026, p. 30). Encouraging cooperation “without taking a side” earns trust from 35%, and backing the respondent’s own position from 13% (p. 26). Yet the minority that prefers like-minded news shares, comments and pays more, rewarding “the production of partisan news that an important and highly engaged minority may want” (Reuters Institute 2026, pp. 61, 63). Angles 06 and 08 of the library show that the feed usually follows the minority.

The measured landscape is less a collapse than a re-sorting. Trust is draining from distant, representative and mediated institutions and pooling in near circles. Grievance concentrates among the unheard and the economically exposed. This is the terrain on which the blame hypothesis must be tested.

4. The hypothesis, stated so it can fail

The working hypothesis has four links, each to be checked separately:

  1. Complexity. As public issues grow more systemic, technical and distant, more people face harm they cannot trace to a cause.

  2. Control and status. That comprehension gap, especially with loss of control and status, is felt as threat.

  3. Explanation style. Threat pushes people toward emotional, provocative, agent-centred explanations such as conspiracy theories, hostile rumours and moralised outrage.

  4. Blame and victimhood. Those explanations select a culprit (institutions or an out-group), cast one’s own group as victim, and lower trust across groups and in institutions.

One premise must be flagged first. No document in the library measures whether public issues have actually become more complex over time (digest 05). Link 1 is an assumption about the world. What can be tested is what happens when people face complexity, threat and loss.


5. The case for: eight lines of support

Support 1: the existential threat model. Existential threat, “feelings of anxiety or uncertainty, often because of distressing events that call one’s values, one’s way of life, or even one’s existence into question”, triggers sense-making through pattern perception and agency detection. That process yields conspiracy theories “only when antagonistic outgroups are salient” (van Prooijen 2020, pp. 2–3). Uncertainty favours “rigid and radical leaders, who offer simple (and therefore understandable) solutions for complex problems” (p. 8). The evidence is experimental. Belief rises when a president’s assassination leads to war and when an opposition leader dies rather than survives. Induced uncertainty and status-quo threat raise it too (p. 10). Van Prooijen himself names the out-group condition “scapegoating” (p. 5).

Support 2: Need for Chaos. Eight US surveys (combined N = 10,921) identify “a desire for a new beginning through the destruction of order and established structures” (Petersen et al. 2023, pp. 4–5). One standard deviation of it raises intentions to share hostile political rumours by about 10 points, with a range of 4–19 (p. 8). The motive is mobilisation “against disliked groups” and amusing friends. Truth is negatively related to sharing (p. 11). Need for Chaos grows from status-driven risk-taking combined with loneliness (p. 13). At its peak, partisans of both sides share rumours “to hurt both parties” out of “a feeling of being abandoned” (pp. 11–12). This finding covers links 2–4 at once.

Support 3: dyadic morality. Moral cognition completes its own template. Suffering demands an agent. Intentional shocks of equal voltage feel more painful, and unfair splits make people “perceive the hand of an intentional agent”. “When suffering cannot be attributed to human agents, people often blame nonhuman agents” (Gray et al. 2012, pp. 111–112). This explains why systemic harm does not stay systemic in people’s minds.

Support 4: the Path Model of Blame. Blame runs in ordered steps: a norm violation, a causal agent, intentionality, then reasons or preventability (Malle et al. 2014, p. 151). Two features open it to distortion. Values can be “preset” by group membership (”the rival always intentionally harms us”; p. 158). And the usual check, that “the community can fact-check the blamer’s warrant” (p. 149), weakens among strangers. Third-person blame then “becomes akin to road rage … or hateful anonymous comments on the internet”, often “a first step toward socially excluding the offender” (p. 173). Scapegoats “can in fact increase the coherence of a group” (p. 174).

Support 5: competitive victimhood and the victimhood trait. “Framing yourself as a victim is a more effective way of escaping blame than framing yourself as a hero” (Gray et al. 2012, p. 113). Groups in conflict compete for the victim role because it brings cohesion, licence and freedom from responsibility, and recruits third parties (Noor et al. 2012, pp. 358–359). In Northern Ireland and Chile, competitive victimhood “was a unique negative predictor of inter-group forgiveness”, mediated by trust in the out-group’s intentions (p. 362). Individually, the Tendency for Interpersonal Victimhood is stable (three-week retest r = 0.77). It predicts entitlement to immoral behaviour (β = 0.27), lower dyadic trust (r = −0.18) and desire for revenge (r = 0.68) (Gabay et al. 2020, pp. 5–7). It also lowers belief in one’s ability to cope (p. 9). Victimhood and loss of agency feed each other.

Support 6: collective narcissism. Conspiracy theories “valorize the self and the in-group by allowing blame for negative outcomes to be attributed to others”, recruited “to relieve the self or in-group from a sense of culpability for their disadvantaged position”. They are predicted by collective narcissism, “a belief in the in-group’s greatness paired with a belief that other people do not appreciate it enough” (Douglas et al. 2017, p. 4). Seeing one’s group as superior makes salient out-groups look antagonistic. Collective narcissism predicts conspiracy theories about “different nations, minority groups, and competing political parties” (van Prooijen 2020, pp. 15–16). The primary studies are cited by these reviews but not held in the library, so no effect sizes are given.

Support 7: scapegoating under deprivation. In a Polish national survey (n = 1,098), deprivation predicted discriminatory intent toward Jews (β = .24) and belief in Jewish control (β = .21). Belief predicted discrimination (β = .34), giving an indirect effect of β = .07 (95% CI .05–.10) (Bilewicz & Krzeminski 2010, p. 239). Deprivation also predicted discrimination directly in Ukraine (β = .22; p. 241). This is link 4 measured in a population. Experienced loss raises hostility to a target group, partly through an ideology naming it as the hidden agent.

Support 8: the comprehension gap. The “illusion of explanatory depth”, the finding that people overrate their grasp of complex systems, comes from Sloman, Fernbach and colleagues. That work is not held in this library and is not used as evidence here. The library has proxies. On a standard covariance task, 59% of a national sample answered wrongly, and only 48% of the more numerate half solved the neutral version (Kahan et al. 2013, pp. 17–18). Citizens manage by being “experts at something else: identifying who knows what about what” (p. 32). The OECD’s top driver, perceived evidence-based decision-making (OECD 2026, pp. 30–32), is the institutional face of the same fact. Where people cannot judge for themselves, trust is their only access to the truth. A break in trust leaves an explanatory vacuum.