The B2A Economy: What It Is and How It Works

November 16, 2026
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ENSI Foresight Division. Built on a library of 147 primary documents compiled by ENSI

The argument, before the list

For twenty-five years the commercial internet was built on one assumption: a person is on the other end. Every login wall, CAPTCHA, checkout flow, fraud model, cookie banner and display advert presumes a human with eyes, a thumb and a limited attention span. The business model of the web is to win that attention: rank for it in search, buy it in an auction, keep it with a feed. The B2A economy, business-to-agent, begins where that assumption breaks. In B2A the party that discovers the product, compares it, negotiates the terms and sometimes pays is software acting for a person or a firm.

The idea is older than large language models. In 2023 Gartner defined the machine customer as “a non-human economic actor who obtains goods and/or services in exchange for payment”. Its examples were printers that reorder their own ink and cars that book their own service. What changed in 2025 and 2026 is that the machine customer became general-purpose. One assistant can now research a holiday, compare insurance, fill a basket across retailers, provision a database or buy a dataset. Because the same agent works in every category, the agent layer has become a new place in the economy where demand is allocated.

That is the reframe this report argues for. B2A is not a new sales channel. It moves the point where demand is decided. In search-era commerce, the platform ranked options and the human chose. In agent-era commerce the agent chooses, and so the agent’s biases, instructions, funding and security become the market. A merchant used to persuade a person. It must now be selected by a model that reads product feeds, tool descriptions and third-party reviews, that has measurable position and first-offer biases, and that can be manipulated by a hidden sentence on a web page. Marketing becomes partly an engineering problem, and fraud partly a linguistic one.

The second reframe is about what is actually happening. The forecasts are large and inconsistent. The library holds estimates from Morgan Stanley of $190–385 billion of US e-commerce by 2030, and from BCG of $1.3 trillion of US spending “impacted”. McKinsey’s $3–5 trillion global figure appears in the library only as quoted by Activant. Measured activity is much smaller. In HUMAN’s telemetry (vendor data), agentic traffic grew 7,851% in a year but was still 1.7% of AI-driven traffic, and only 2.3% of agent activity reached a checkout page. The French competition authority’s 2026 opinion puts agent-referred traffic to French merchants at under 5%. The honest picture is a fast-growing layer on a small base, with one exception: software development. There agents are already the majority customer for some infrastructure products.

The third reframe is that the hard problems are not about technology. The protocols exist: Google’s AP2 and UCP, OpenAI and Stripe’s ACP, Coinbase’s x402, Visa’s and Mastercard’s agent programmes. All of them tokenise a payment credential, sign a mandate and pass it to a merchant who stays the merchant of record. What remains unsettled is the set of questions those protocols leave open. Who is liable when an agent exceeds its mandate? How does a merchant tell a real customer’s agent from a carding bot? Whose interest does an agent serve when it is funded by advertising? What happens to competition when three firms operate most of the agents? Federal Reserve Governor Waller named exactly three barriers in September 2026: authentication, liability and fraud. None is solved by a faster API.

Finally, B2A matters for states, not just for retailers. Whoever operates the agent layer decides which firms are visible to buyers. They influence which payment rails carry the volume, and so where money settles and in which currency. And they set the default for whether a consumer’s agent is loyal to the consumer. These are questions of market structure, consumer protection and monetary sovereignty. Europe currently answers them with existing law: the DMA, the AI Act, consumer law and payment law. The evidence below suggests that law covers less of the agent layer than it appears to.

This report maps the machine. Report 2 turns it into a playbook for firms and states. Report 3 asks who creates and who captures value when agents buy.

Summary of the main points

  • Definition. B2A is commerce in which an AI agent, not a person, carries out some or all of discovery, evaluation, negotiation and payment on a principal’s behalf. The defining line is not “AI helps shopping”. It is who executes and who pays.

  • Demand moves to the agent. Agents concentrate demand: in one test a single product took about 89% of picks in its category. They show position and first-offer bias, with response speed giving a 10–30x advantage over quality in one simulated market. They cite third-party “earned” media almost exclusively: 93.5% of ChatGPT’s citations for well-known brands.

  • Selection is gameable text. Edited tool descriptions won over ten times more agent usage. Automated rewriting lifted selection from about 20% to 81%. One seller rewrite of a product description raised its market share by up to 14.9 percentage points under GPT-5.1.

  • The protocols agree on a pattern. The user grants a scoped mandate. The agent carries a one-time, limited token. The merchant stays the merchant of record and keeps the fraud and chargeback risk. No major protocol defines dispute rules.

  • Two rails compete. Agent-bound card tokens keep chargebacks and consumer protection. Stablecoin rails such as x402 settle in about 200 ms with near-zero fees but cannot be reversed. Stablecoins are still small: about $320 billion in market value.

  • Identity is the new perimeter. Signed agent requests (Web Bot Auth) are becoming standard, but each card network runs its own registry. Declared agent identity is unreliable, and spoofing is common.

  • Agents are easy to attack. Hidden instructions on web pages hijack shopping agents 42–69% of the time, often while the user still sees a completed purchase. Every frontier model tested in NIST’s red-teaming competition was broken at least once.

  • The law has settled who is bound, not who pays. An agent’s acts bind the person who uses it, even when the outcome is unexpected (UNCITRAL Art. 7). A business answers for its agent “as for an employee” (UK CMA). Payment liability when an agent exceeds its mandate is still open.

  • The economics cut both ways. Search costs collapse, but simulations show agents leaking their principal’s willingness to pay, steering wealthier users to dearer options, and platforms and sellers jointly removing 37% of consumer surplus without any agreement between them.

  • Coding is the first real B2A market. Over 80% of new Neon databases were created by agents. Codex opened 400,000 pull requests in under two months. Measured productivity is more mixed than perceived productivity.

  • Adoption outside coding is thin. Agentic traffic is 1.7% of AI traffic. OpenAI’s Instant Checkout pilot was reportedly withdrawn, and x402 volumes have reportedly tapered. Both claims come from secondary sources and are flagged as such.

What B2A is, and what it is not

B2A sits beside two familiar categories, and the differences are where the analysis starts.

  • B2C — a business sells to a person, who searches, decides and pays. The business competes for human attention and trust.

  • B2B — a business sells to an organisation through procurement rules, approved suppliers and contracts. Much B2B buying is already rule-bound and partly automated (EDI, punch-out catalogues, programmatic advertising).

  • B2A — a business sells to an agent that acts for a person or an organisation. The agent applies the principal’s preferences and constraints, but it also has its own biases, its own operator, and in many cases its own commercial incentives. The business competes for the agent’s selection and must satisfy the agent’s verification. The principal stays legally bound and economically exposed.

Gartner’s three-phase ladder remains a useful taxonomy:

  1. Bound customers. The machine executes rules a person set inside one ecosystem, for example a printer reordering ink.

  2. Adaptable customers. The machine chooses among options “with minimal intervention for select tasks”.

  3. Autonomous customers. The machine acts “with a high degree of discretion” and owns most of the transaction.

BCG’s four evolutions map the same ladder onto the shopping journey:

  1. Discover inside the AI interface, buy on the merchant site.

  2. Check out inside the AI interface with a stored wallet.

  3. The agent buys outside the merchant site, perhaps after asking for approval.

  4. The agent optimises the payment method and may become the merchant of record.

On BCG’s survey, 81%, 60%, 42% and 25% of US consumers would accept each rung for at least one category. Most observed activity in 2026 is still at rungs one and two. Activant, a venture investor, says frankly that at today’s “agents assist” stage, “calling this agentic commerce is generous. The agent is a better search engine” (Activant, part 2).

Two things make B2A a distinct economic object rather than a feature of e-commerce.

  • The agent is not neutral. Gartner’s early claim was that machine customers “can’t be influenced by being wined and dined”. The evidence in this library contradicts it. Agents can be influenced, only through different levers: position, phrasing, sponsorship, persona and hidden instructions. B2A is therefore not a frictionless market of perfectly rational buyers. It is a market whose buyers have new, measurable and exploitable psychology.

  • The agent is general. One operator’s agent works across travel, groceries, insurance, software and B2B supply. Concentration in the agent layer therefore spreads across sectors. The French Autorité found that OpenAI, Google and Anthropic held over 84% of the global AI-agent sector in May 2026, and that agents “tend now to become true platforms”.

The framing literature agrees on why this could be large. The held NBER chapter on the Coasean Singularity argues that agents sharply cut the transaction costs that once justified firms and intermediaries. The Agentic Web paper from Berkeley and Shanghai Jiao Tong describes three eras of the web. The PC web ran on search and pay-per-click. The mobile web ran on recommendation and the attention economy. The agentic web runs on action and “agent attention”, in which “every tool, service, or other agent essentially competes for limited ‘agent attention’”. The authors expect “a comprehensive advertising infrastructure tailored for agents”. That is the B2A economy in one line: the advertising market rebuilt with software as the audience.

How this report is organised

The core of the report treats B2A as a machine with ten moving parts, in the order a transaction passes through them:

  1. Delegation and the mandate

  2. Discovery

  3. The connector layer

  4. Checkout protocols

  5. Payment rails

  6. Identity

  7. Fraud and attack

  8. Liability

  9. Economics

  10. Measurement

For each part it sets out how the mechanism works, what the evidence shows and the weak point a reader should watch. It then examines coding agents, the one market where B2A is already the majority mode. It separates what is real from what is forecast, and closes with ten ranked shifts to watch, each with a horizon and an observable signal.

The machine, part by part

1. Delegation and the mandate: what the principal hands over

Every B2A transaction starts with a person or a firm delegating something. What is delegated determines everything downstream: how much authority the agent has, what evidence exists afterwards and who is liable.

How it works. Two models recur across the library. Governor Waller calls them agent-assisted and agent-delegated. In the assisted model the agent searches and the buyer decides and pays. In the delegated model the buyer “grants authority to an AI agent to shop and make payments on their behalf”, for example through a pre-funded virtual card for groceries. The protocols turn delegation into a signed object, the mandate. In the live AP2 specification, a user in “direct” mode sees and signs the exact checkout. In “autonomous” mode the user signs an open mandate. This is a set of constraints, such as a price limit, a category or an expiry, bound to the agent’s public key. The agent then signs the specific closed mandate itself when it finds a match.

What the evidence shows about principals.

  • Delegation stated is not delegation granted. Accenture’s survey of 25,590 consumers in 16 countries finds a steep ladder. 74% would let an agent handle routine tasks, 32% would hand over purchase decisions and 9% would accept fully autonomous shopping. Only 12% are open to agents deciding at the payment step.

  • Everyone wants a fence. 76% of Capgemini’s 12,000 respondents want “strict boundaries (e.g., spending limits, product categories)” before an agent acts. Checkout.com’s survey (vendor data) puts the average spend consumers would allow without extra approval at £177. Spending caps, instant revocation and easy cancellation are the top non-negotiables.

  • Few will pay for the agent itself. Only 11% of Capgemini respondents would pay a one-time fee and 8% a subscription for an assistant that orders for them. This is economically significant. If the principal does not pay for the agent, someone else will, and that party’s interests enter the mandate.

  • People choose control, and control costs them. In a Harvard and Google DeepMind negotiation experiment, participants preferred an AI Advisor (44%) to a Delegate (19%). Yet only the Delegate raised collective surplus, because in advisor mode people “modify, override, or ignore” proposals that were better than their own.

Weak point. Mandates are written in natural language, but they are enforced in code. A Clifford Chance roundtable recorded “mandate drift” already in practice. A user sets a £200 limit, and the agent finds the item at £202. Whatever the translation from intent to constraint gets wrong becomes the dispute of the future.

2. Discovery: from search ranking to agent selection

In search-era commerce a merchant needed to rank. In B2A it needs to be selected, and selection follows different rules.

How it works. An agent assembles candidates from retrieval (a search index, a product feed, a merchant catalogue). It reads them as text, re-ranks them by its own judgement and proposes or executes a choice. Merchants enter the candidate set through structured feeds. OpenAI’s product feed specification requires one row per purchasable variant with nine mandatory fields, and keeps organic search, paid ads and checkout as separate switches. Above the feed, generative engine optimisation (GEO) tries to shape what the agent says.

What the evidence shows.

  1. Visibility can be engineered, and the old tricks do not work. The founding GEO paper (KDD 2024) found that adding citations, quotations and statistics raised visibility in generative answers by up to 40%, while keyword stuffing failed. A source ranked fifth by the search engine gained about 115% from citing sources. The generative layer re-ranks what retrieval hands it, so incumbents’ link equity counts for less.

  2. AI search trusts third parties, not brands. A Toronto study found that, for well-known brands, 93.5% of ChatGPT’s citations were earned media, 6.5% brand-owned and 0% social. For Claude the figures were 87.3% earned, 6.8% brand-owned and 5.9% social. A vendor study by a GEO-measurement firm (vendor data) puts brand-owned domains at 2.9% of citations and finds visibility “near-binary”: 63.2% of brand–prompt–engine cells never mention the brand. Household names appear in 73% of relevant answers, small brands in 11%.

  3. Shopping agents concentrate demand, and the concentration is unstable. The Columbia ACES sandbox documents “choice homogeneity”. In some categories one product took about 89% of picks under a given model while others got none. Model updates “can drastically reshuffle market shares”. Agents show strong position bias that varies by provider and model version. They penalise “Sponsored” tags and reward “Overall Pick” endorsements. The basic rationality tests are now passed by frontier models. Bias and volatility are not solved.

  4. Seller-side agents can game buyer-side agents. In the same study, one seller’s AI rewriting a product description once raised that product’s share significantly under five of six buyer models: +14.89 percentage points under GPT-5.1 and +14.79 under Gemini 2.5 Flash, with single categories moving up to 80 points. It is the first causal evidence of agent-to-agent “AI-SEO”.

  5. Adversarial text moves rankings further. A Harvard study inserted an optimised “strategic text sequence” into one product entry. It moved a fictitious coffee machine from not recommended to top recommendation (Kumar and Lakkaraju). The CORE method promoted target products into the top five 91.4% of the time across GPT-4o, Gemini 2.5, Claude 4 and Grok 3. Cheap filters catch gibberish, but persuasive fake-review prose survives them.

  6. First-offer bias rewards speed. In Microsoft Research’s Magentic Marketplace simulation, every model showed “severe first-proposal bias, creating 10–30x advantages for response speed over quality”. More options made things worse. With 100 search results instead of 3, consumer welfare fell by up to 65% for one frontier model.

  7. Publishers lose the click. Pew found that Google users clicked a traditional result on 8% of visits with an AI summary against 15% without one, and clicked a link inside the summary on 1%. The referral bargain that funded the open web is weakening just as agents start to rely on that web.

Weak point. The competitive variable is moving from price and quality to legibility to a model: structured data, third-party coverage, response latency and phrasing. That favours firms with large earned-media footprints and fast APIs. It also creates a market for manipulation that the French Autorité lists as a theory of harm: opaque visibility criteria and a small number of offers shown give agent operators “increased power over the allocation of demand”.

3. The connector layer: MCP, apps and the agent’s app store

Agents do not only browse. They increasingly call tools directly through connectors, so the connector directory becomes a shop window.

How it works. Anthropic open-sourced the Model Context Protocol in November 2024 as “a universal, open standard for connecting AI systems with data sources”. Services expose MCP servers and agents act as clients. OpenAI’s Apps SDK, built on MCP, offers developers access to “over 800 million ChatGPT users”. ChatGPT can “suggest apps when they’re relevant to the conversation”, and apps meeting “higher design and functionality standards may be featured more prominently”. The official MCP Registry is designed as one neutral upstream catalogue, with client-owned “marketplaces” built on top of it.

What the evidence shows.

  • The catalogue is mostly noise. A measurement study across six markets collected 17,630 entries, of which only 8,401 were valid projects. More than half the ecosystem is placeholders, forks or abandoned code, and only 6.9% of projects appear in four or more markets.

  • Vetting is weak. A University of Delaware study of 67,057 servers found that 99.16% are hosted on public GitHub repositories with no continuous ownership checks. It demonstrated an attack in which malicious tool metadata made the model swap an email recipient for the attacker’s address, without the malicious tool ever being called. A Queen’s University audit found 7.2% of 1,899 servers vulnerable and 5.5% showing tool poisoning.

  • Agents choose tools by their descriptions, and descriptions are advertising. Three independent groups found the same thing:

    • A Maryland study across 17 models found that edited descriptions “receive over 10 times more usage” (Faghih et al.). Assertive wording beat the original 79.1% to 11.9%.

    • ToolTweak (Oxford and Microsoft) lifted a tool’s selection rate from about 20% to 81% by automated rewriting, and the effect transferred across open and closed models.

    • MPMA reached 100% attack success in most settings by inserting manipulative words. Its optimised “authority” variant had a 0% detection rate under an LLM judge.

Weak point. The connector layer combines a storefront, an advertising surface and an attack surface, and so far it has no regulation of claims. Whoever controls in-conversation suggestion holds the agent era’s equivalent of shelf placement. The Autorité has already floated designating AI-model marketplaces as DMA core platform services.

4. Checkout protocols: how an agent actually buys

There are two ways for an agent to buy. It can drive a browser through a site built for humans, or it can talk to the merchant through a protocol. Browser agents reach any site without the merchant’s cooperation. Protocol checkout requires the merchant to participate, but it removes the many-to-many integration problem (Activant). The protocol landscape changed several times between September 2025 and autumn 2026. The library reads as a layered stack, not a single standard.

  • Communication layers. MCP links agents to tools. Its specification says hosts “must obtain explicit user consent before invoking any tool” and that tool descriptions “should be considered untrusted”. It also concedes that “MCP itself cannot enforce these security principles”. Google’s A2A (version 1.0) links agents to agents through Agent Cards that declare identity, skills and authentication.

  • Commerce layers.

    • ACP, from OpenAI and Stripe, is an “open standard for connecting buyers, their AI agents, and businesses”, released in dated versions from September 2025 to April 2026 (ACP repository). In ChatGPT’s Instant Checkout the merchant sends a product feed and exposes checkout endpoints. OpenAI prepares “a one-time delegated payment request” with “a maximum chargeable amount and expiry”. The merchant “accepts or declines the order”, and “OpenAI is not the merchant of record”.

    • UCP, from Google with Shopify, has businesses publish a profile at /.well-known/ucp (UCP specification). The agent and the merchant negotiate one protocol version, then the intersection of their capabilities. Payment runs through handlers in which the platform obtains an opaque token from the credential provider. “Raw data never touches the business’s frontend”, and the platform “is not the ‘owner’ of the funds”.

  • The security layer. AP2 proves authorisation with signed mandates. Its starting assumption is unusual for a commercial standard: “when either role is agentic, then the Agent itself is a potential attacker”, so all validation “MUST happen in deterministic code”. In autonomous mode, an agent may not present a new open mandate without a rejection receipt for the previous one. This stops one permission from approving several purchases. Receipts give “a non-repudiable picture of the transaction”, but dispute rules are “outside the scope” (AP2 specification). AP2’s September 2025 launch blog described a different set of mandates, Intent, Cart and Payment, so it matters which version a source cites.

  • Card-network programmes.

    • Mastercard’s Agent Pay (vendor release) introduces “Agentic Tokens”, requires agents to be “registered and verified”, and promised that all US cardholders would be enabled by the 2025 holiday season.

    • Visa Intelligent Commerce issues network tokens to requestors typed AI_AGENT. It binds consent to a passkey-signed “purchase instruction” and requires onboarding to the Visa Agent Registry. This is the card-network equivalent of an AP2 mandate.

  • Wallets and merchant platforms. PayPal says “merchants remain the merchant of record” for agent-initiated transactions. Shopify runs UCP-compliant MCP servers in tiers. Untrusted agents build a cart and hand the buyer to the storefront. “Trusted agents can complete checkouts directly.” Stripe’s shared payment tokens let the agent cap currency, amount and expiry, and are offered under both ACP and UCP.

The common pattern. Read side by side, the protocols agree on far more than their branding suggests:

  1. The user grants a scoped permission.

  2. The agent carries a single-use, capped, expiring token rather than a card number.

  3. The merchant receives the order through its own payment processor and stays the merchant of record.

  4. The merchant therefore keeps the fraud exposure and the chargebacks.

No major platform in the library takes on the money or the liability. That is a deliberate choice: it lets agent operators scale without becoming regulated payment institutions. It also means the risk of agent error lands on merchants and card issuers, who have the least visibility into the agent’s reasoning.

Weak point. Multiple standards and a cold start. The Clifford Chance notes list four competing standards (x402, AP2, ACP and MPP) and describe “a cold-start problem … with closed vertically integrated systems winning commercially in the interim”.

5. Payment rails: reversible cards versus final stablecoins

Once authorised, the payment needs a rail, and the choice of rail decides whether a mistake can be undone.