Czechia’s institutions work on paper. Elections are held, parties compete, courts function, ministries administer, EU funds are absorbed. Yet when the country faces problems that require deep, coordinated change – from digitalisation and climate policy to education, health and security – the state repeatedly proves slow, fragmented and fragile. The gap between formal functionality and real problem-solving capacity is growing wider.

This article starts from that gap and asks a deliberately pragmatic question: if we take the current system as it is, with its constitutions, parties and basic structures, what would actually have to change for the state to become capable of sustained, cross-cutting action? Instead of adding another list of complaints, it looks for “leverage points” – places in the architecture where targeted reform can shift how the whole system behaves.

The diagnosis behind this is relatively clear. Czechia does not primarily suffer from a lack of laws or strategies. It suffers from weak long-term direction, from an administrative culture that rewards formal compliance rather than outcomes, from a civil service and territorial system underpowered for complex missions, from spending and procurement that are more defensive than strategic, and from a democratic and information environment that makes it hard to build legitimacy for difficult reforms. These are structural patterns, not isolated pathologies.

To address them, the article proposes eight leverage clusters. They are not detailed bills or ready-made reform packages, but conceptual “handles” for policymakers, experts and citizens who want to think systematically about state capacity. They start with the centre of government – the absence of a true “brain” that can define national missions and align ministries and budgets – and then move through culture and incentives inside the administration, the quality of people and skills, and the way multi-level governance actually works in practice.

From there, the focus shifts to money, democracy and knowledge. Clean, intelligent public finance and procurement are treated as a strategic tool, not just a legal obligation. Democratic participation is reimagined so that citizens can shape decisions meaningfully between elections, not only react to them after the fact. The information environment and media literacy are approached as core infrastructure without which no reform can be properly understood or defended. Evidence, experimentation and data are positioned as the default way the state learns, rather than as decorative extras.

Crucially, these eight levers are meant to be read as a system. A stronger strategic centre without a learning culture and professional civil service becomes just another strategy silo. A more capable civil service without clear missions and clean money risks managing the status quo more efficiently instead of changing it. Participation without information resilience and evidence can be captured by misinformation and short-term moods. Integrity measures without missions and local capacity can prevent theft but not deliver real value. The levers reinforce or undermine each other depending on how they are combined.

The article therefore does not promise a magic key or a single “big reform”. It offers a map. For each leverage cluster, it explains what problem it addresses, what kind of institutional and cultural changes would be needed, how these changes interact with other parts of the system, and what risks and trade-offs would arise. The intention is to give reformers – inside the state and outside it – a shared language and structure for thinking about state capacity that goes beyond slogans and one-off fixes.

Ultimately, the underlying claim is modest but radical: Czechia does not need to be resigned to a state that formally functions yet perennially underdelivers. By deliberately rewiring how it sets direction, organises its people, moves its money, listens to its citizens, protects its information space and learns from reality, it can become a democracy that not only represents its society, but is actually able to act in its long-term interest. The eight leverage points are an invitation to imagine and design such a state with open eyes.

Summary

L1 – A real “brain” at the centre of government

Purpose: Turn scattered strategies and political promises into a small set of national missions, and then organise the whole state around them.

L1 recognises that Czechia has no strong, institutional centre that can define a few long-term priorities (e.g. digital state, climate and energy, health and ageing, education and skills, housing, security) and then align ministries, budgets, EU funds and oversight around them. Instead, every ministry runs its own agenda and every government cycle partially resets priorities.

The centre of government that L1 proposes is not another layer of bureaucracy but a mission control system: it sets missions; designs cross-ministerial programme maps; runs delivery boards; escalates and unblocks bottlenecks; houses a central analytical and foresight unit; and orchestrates strategic communication. Its authority stems from its formal location (directly under the prime minister), its control over strategic processes (budget, EU funds, impact assessment), and its visibility (public mission dashboards).

Without this “brain”, other reforms risk degenerating into parallel improvements with no joint direction. With it, the state can repeatedly answer the question: “Given our limited capacity, what really matters for Czechia over the next 10–20 years?” – and organise itself accordingly.

L2 – From formalism to outcomes and learning

Purpose: Change the everyday operating logic from “avoid blame, follow the rules” to “deliver outcomes, learn and improve”.

L2 directly attacks the culture of alibism and legalistic risk-avoidance. In the current system, officials are rewarded for formal compliance and punished for visible mistakes, so they rationally prefer inaction, incrementalism and procedure over impact. Audits and controls often reinforce this by focusing on micro-irregularities instead of systemic design and performance.

The leverage here is to redesign the basic unit of action – the programme – and the incentives and protections around it. Programmes must have explicit theories of change, results frameworks, evaluation plans and learning questions. Senior managers are assessed partly on outcomes and on whether they use evidence and evaluation to adjust. Safe-harbour rules and experimentation sandboxes protect those who take documented, agreed risks in order to achieve mission goals.

Oversight bodies are integrated into this logic: part of their work shifts from catching procedural errors to evaluating effectiveness and enabling learning. Experiments and pilots become standard tools to de-risk transformation. Over time, this creates a state where doing the smart thing is professionally safer than hiding behind procedure.

L1 and L2 are tightly coupled: L1 defines missions and cross-cutting outcomes; L2 ensures that the machine actually behaves in a way consistent with them.

L3 – Civil service as a high-performing profession

Purpose: Give the state the people it needs to design and deliver complex change.

L3 recognises that you cannot run 21st-century missions with a staffing system optimised for 20th-century routine administration. The Czech civil service is relatively stable and competent in handling everyday tasks, but underpowered in areas that matter most for transformation: analysis, digitalisation, AI, data, complex project delivery, and change management. On top of that, politicisation at the top and rigid, seniority-driven pay structures push talent away or into conformist behaviour.

The leverage is threefold:

• Depoliticisation and stabilisation of senior management (independent appointments, fixed overlapping terms, transparent removal rules), so that long-term reforms are not destroyed by each electoral cycle.

• Modern, differentiated careers and pay, including professional tracks (policy analysis, digital/data/AI, project management) and market-informed supplements for critical skills, linked to performance and mission contribution.

• HR transformed into strategic workforce management, with data-driven planning, modern recruitment, leadership academies, internal and external mobility, and a shared professional identity across the state.

Together with L2, this builds a corps of public servants who are both protected from arbitrary politics and accountable for performance – capable of powering missions instead of merely administering statutes.

L4 – Rational multi-level governance and local capacity

Purpose: Ensure that national missions do not die in a swamp of local fragmentation and capacity gaps.

L4 addresses the territorial dimension: thousands of municipalities, uneven capabilities, complicated competence allocation between centre, regions and municipalities, and funding systems that often reward grant-hunting over strategic delivery. Many of the most important missions (housing, climate, social services, infrastructure, education) depend on actors that vary enormously in capacity.

The leverage consists of:

• clarifying end-to-end responsibility for key policy domains (who does what, from legislation through planning to front-line delivery);

• building shared services and regional “delivery hubs” for key functions (procurement, IT, planning, project management, specialised services), so tiny municipalities are not left alone;

• reforming inter-municipal cooperation frameworks and incentives, so that pooling capacity becomes the rational choice;

• aligning funding and responsibilities through mission-oriented, multi-year programmes and capacity-based differentiation (smaller municipalities rely more on shared services and receive tailored support).

Properly implemented, L4 turns a patchwork of weak units into a network of stronger delivery platforms, without necessarily erasing local autonomy. It is L1–L3 translated into territorial reality: a capable, mission-oriented state “on the ground”.

L5 – Clean, intelligent money and strategic procurement

Purpose: Make public money an ally of transformation, not a source of corruption, waste and distrust.

L5 focuses on the financial bloodstream of the state: budgeting, grants, EU funds and procurement. Currently, the system often prioritises formal legality (especially in procurement) and uses “lowest price” as a default criterion even in complex projects. Oversight has blind spots (local governments, public enterprises), whistleblowing is fragile, and the public strongly suspects that “someone will always steal a part anyway”.

The leverage strategy is to attack this on two fronts:

• Integrity and transparency: close audit gaps, modernise oversight to focus on systemic risks and effectiveness, strengthen whistleblower channels and real sanctions (blacklists, debarment), and radically open up data on spending, contracts and subsidies.

• Strategic, mission-oriented finance: categorise procurement by complexity; reserve lowest price for simple commodities; require multi-criteria, life-cycle evaluation for complex contracts; professionalise procurement as a career; and reorganise major spending into mission envelopes and programmes with performance elements.

In effect, L5 converts public finance from a risk-avoidance machine into a strategic investment instrument. Money begins to pull the system towards agreed missions and high-quality solutions, rather than simply feeding existing structures and local patronage networks. This in turn supports L1 (missions), L2 (outcomes), L3 (professionalism) and L4 (local capacity) simultaneously.

L6 – Democracy with teeth: participation that actually shapes decisions

Purpose: Give democracy real influence between elections and build societal ownership of difficult reforms.

L6 addresses the legitimacy and participation side. Formal institutions are intact, but citizens’ trust is low; they feel they have little influence, and complex reforms are often perceived as top-down impositions. Participation channels (consultations, petitions) are often symbolic, and populist actors exploit this gap.

The leverage is to build a parallel layer of structured participation and deliberation that complements representative democracy:

• institutionalised citizens’ assemblies and deliberative panels on long-term, contentious issues (climate, pensions, education, AI, health), with random selection, learning phases, facilitated deliberation, and clear rules on how their recommendations feed into laws and strategies;

• robust, transparent consultation frameworks around major laws and strategies, with obligatory feedback explaining how input affected final texts;

• institutional youth participation through councils and project-based civic education, so younger generations actually experience the system as something they can influence;

• participatory budgeting and local forums to anchor democracy in everyday life;

• civic tech infrastructure that makes all this visible and traceable.

By giving citizens structured roles in agenda-setting and problem-solving, L6 both improves policy quality (more information, more perspectives) and builds the political space needed for L1–L5 reforms. A state that seriously listens and explains can take harder decisions and sustain them longer.

L7 – Information resilience and media/digital literacy as infrastructure

Purpose: Protect the decision-making ecosystem from information chaos, manipulation and fragmentation.

L7 recognises that even a well-designed, participatory, mission-oriented state will struggle if the information environment is poisoned. Misinformation, hybrid operations, polarised media, and low media literacy make it difficult to build any shared understanding of reality. That in turn undermines trust in institutions and makes reforms easy to attack.

The leverage is to treat information resilience as critical national infrastructure with several pillars:

• School system: integrate practical media and digital literacy (including AI literacy) into curricula, and equip teachers with materials and training to work with real-world content and platforms;

• Public service media: secure stable, depoliticised funding and governance, with a strong mandate for explanatory journalism, youth content and media literacy;

• Hybrid threat and strategic communication units: monitor information operations, coordinate fact-based responses, and prepare communication strategies for reforms and crises;

• Platform governance and civic tech: cooperate with platforms under EU frameworks, push for transparency and data access, and support independent fact-checking, investigative journalism and civic tech tools that help citizens navigate information.

L7 does not aim to police opinions; it aims to raise competence, increase transparency, and strengthen trusted intermediaries. It is a precondition for L6 (deliberation based on facts) and supports L1–L5 by making it possible to explain and defend complex reforms in a noisy world.

L8 – Evidence and experimentation as the default

Purpose: Turn the state into an organisation that learns systematically from reality.

Finally, L8 addresses the epistemic core: how the state generates, uses and updates knowledge. At present, evidence is often used symbolically; evaluations are patchy and underutilised; experiments are rare and poorly structured; and data is fragmented and under-exploited.

The leverage comes from building a knowledge architecture:

• a central evidence and evaluation unit at the centre of government that sets standards, reviews impact assessments, supports ministries and coordinates foresight;

• meaningful impact assessments for major laws and programmes, published and quality-checked, tying political proposals to explicit problem definitions and expected effects;

• mandatory evaluation cycles for significant programmes, with budget for evaluation and decision rules based on findings (redesign, termination, scaling);

• policy labs and experimental frameworks inside ministries, with sandbox provisions that allow controlled pilots and structured learning;

• robust data infrastructure (administrative data integration, standards, open data) and long-term science–policy partnerships, including embedded researchers and fellowships.

L8 ensures that the state does not rely solely on ideology, intuition or international fashion, but repeatedly asks: “What actually works here, for our conditions, and how do we know?” It closes the loop for L1–L7: missions are not just declared, but iteratively tested and refined; failures become inputs for redesign rather than sources of shame to be buried.

The Leverage Points

L1 – Building a real “brain” at the centre of government

1. What problem L1 is actually solving

Right now, Czech governments:

• produce many strategies,

• negotiate many coalition compromises,

• manage many EU and national programmes,

…but no single institution is responsible for turning all of this into:

1. a small set of national missions (5–7 big, long-horizon goals),

2. a coherent implementation architecture across ministries and levels of government,

3. and continuous monitoring and course-correction.

Instead, strategy is fragmented:

• PM’s office does some coordination,

• individual ministries have their own strategies,

• EU funds are run as separate universes,

• there’s no single “mission owner” for cross-cutting transformations (digital state, climate, housing, ageing, AI, defence).

L1 = fix this by creating a real centre: a “brain” that can think over 10–20 years, not just one electoral cycle.

2. Core functions of the centre of government

The strengthened centre should do at least six things, systematically:

a) Mission setting

• Translate political programmes + external constraints (EU, NATO, climate, demographics) into 5–7 national missions, for example:

  • Digital and data-driven state

  • Climate and energy transition

  • Healthy ageing and health system resilience

  • Housing and infrastructure for productivity

  • Education, skills and AI-ready workforce

  • Security, defence and hybrid resilience

• For each mission:

  • define target outcomes (what must be true in 2035 or 2040),

  • identify key constraints and trade-offs,

  • set “guardrails” (e.g. fiscal, legal, international commitments).

b) Strategic alignment

• Ensure all major sectoral strategies clearly show how they contribute to the missions.

• Require ministries to:

  • map their existing policies and programmes to missions,

  • flag conflicting or obsolete measures,

  • propose adjustments or terminations.

• Align medium-term expenditure frameworks and EU programmes with missions:

  • missions get indicative multi-year envelopes,

  • each envelope is broken down into cross-ministry and multi-level packages.

c) Programme architecture and portfolio management

• Design and maintain a programme map:

  • which programmes (laws, subsidies, investments, regulatory reforms) belong to which mission,

  • how they interact,

  • where there are gaps, overlaps, conflicts.

• Manage a central portfolio review process:

  • periodically review all major programmes for each mission,

  • recommend mergers, phase-outs, redesigns, and new initiatives.

d) Delivery oversight and bottleneck resolution

• Run mission delivery boards:

  • regular meetings where mission leads from ministries and key agencies report on progress, risks and obstacles.

• Maintain a cross-ministerial escalation channel:

  • if a ministry faces obstacles outside its control (e.g. conflicting regulations, local resistance, capacity gaps), it can escalate to the centre,

  • the centre convenes the relevant actors and coordinates a solution.

• Use delivery dashboards:

  • key milestones, indicators, risk registers,

  • shareable with government, parliament, and public.

e) Analytical and foresight capacity

• Host a central analytical unit that:

  • synthesises data from ministries, statistics, research, EU sources,

  • runs modelling and scenario analysis for missions,

  • supports impact assessments and evaluations for cross-cutting reforms.

• Maintain a foresight function:

  • horizon scanning (technology, demographics, geopolitical risks),

  • periodic strategic reviews (e.g. every 2–3 years updating assumptions and missions).

f) Strategic communication

• Work with relevant ministries and public media to design coherent communication strategies for missions:

  • clear narratives (why this mission, what it changes, what pain is unavoidable, what gains are expected),

  • consistent messaging across government,

  • transparent progress updates and honest acknowledgement of problems.

3. Institutional design: where this centre sits and how it’s built

Location

• Legally anchored within or directly under the Office of the Government / Prime Minister, with:

  • a clear statute,

  • defined powers to coordinate, request data, and issue binding or semi-binding guidance.

Leadership

• A Minister for Strategic Affairs or Director-General for Government Strategy with:

  • cabinet-level status or equivalent,

  • a fixed (not purely political) term that overlaps electoral cycles,

  • appointment requiring at least some cross-party support (e.g. confirmation by parliament committee).

Internal structure

You can imagine four main directorates:

1. Missions & Strategy Directorate

   • mission design, strategic integration, programme map, cross-ministerial coordination.

2. Delivery & Performance Directorate

   • dashboards, mission boards, escalation, cross-cutting bottleneck resolution, project and programme management expertise.

3. Evidence, Foresight & Evaluation Directorate

   • data integration, modelling, foresight, evaluation standards, central support to ministries for impact assessments and evaluations.

4. Strategic Communication & Participation Directorate

   • narrative building for missions, public reporting, linkages to participatory processes (citizens’ assemblies, consultations).

Staffing profile

• Senior civil servants with:

  • strong policy skills,

  • experience in ministries and agencies.

• Specialists in:

  • data science,

  • economics and public finance,

  • systems thinking and complex programme design,

  • behavioural science,

  • strategic communications.

• Secondments from:

  • line ministries (to ensure buy-in),

  • municipalities/regions (to keep territorial realities in view),

  • research institutions or think-tanks (for fresh expertise).

4. Relationship with ministries and other institutions

This is crucial. The centre must not become a parallel government or a “strategy bunker”. It should function as a mission orchestrator, not a micro-manager.

Principles:

• Ministries remain policy owners in their sectors.

• The centre becomes mission owner for cross-cutting outcomes.

Mechanisms:

• For each mission, designate:

  • a lead ministry (e.g. environment for climate, interior for digital state, health for healthy ageing),

  • supporting ministries and agencies,

  • and one or more mission managers at the centre with convening power.

• Mission contracts:

  • centre and lead ministry agree on mission objectives, key metrics, funding envelope, milestones, governance structure.

  • these contracts are endorsed by government as a whole.

• Joint teams:

  • for major reforms, create joint task forces with staff from centre + relevant ministries + key agencies,

  • the centre provides methods and coordination; ministries bring subject matter expertise and implementation tools.

• Regular reviews:

  • annual mission review at cabinet level, based on the centre’s reporting,

  • mid-term review at half-cycle of a government to adjust missions to reality.

5. Implementation roadmap for L1

Phase 1 – Design and political mandate (6–12 months)

• Conduct a diagnostic of existing strategic and analytical capacities in the PM’s office and key ministries.

• Draft legislation or government resolutions to establish the centre’s mandate, structure, and relationship with existing bodies.

• Secure political agreement (coalition + at least partial opposition acceptance) that missions and a central strategic unit are needed regardless of which party is in power.

Phase 2 – Building the core (12–24 months)

• Appoint leadership and recruit key staff.

• Start with a limited number of missions (e.g. 3–4 instead of 7):

  • pilot the approach on some obvious national priorities (e.g. digital state, climate/energy, health).

• Develop initial mission maps, dashboards, and delivery boards.

• Begin to coordinate EU funding and national investment programmes around these missions.

Phase 3 – Mainstreaming and institutionalisation (2–5 years)

• Expand to full set of missions once methods are tested.

• Formalise links to:

  • the budget process,

  • regulatory impact assessment processes,

  • evaluation requirements.

• Introduce legal obligations for ministries to:

  • align strategies with missions,

  • provide data for mission dashboards,

  • participate in mission boards.

Phase 4 – Guarding against reversal

• Design the centre so that abolishing it would be politically costly:

  • strong public identity and visibility,

  • clear track record of successes,

  • cross-party representation in oversight (e.g. parliamentary committee or advisory council).

• Codify key elements in law, not just government decrees.

6. Risks and how to manage them

Risk: Centre becomes a symbolic unit producing glossy strategy documents with no real power.
Mitigation:

• tie its work directly to budget and EU programming decisions;

• give it explicit gatekeeping roles (e.g. major reforms must pass through impact/evidence review);

• measure and publicise mission progress.

Risk: Ministries perceive it as a rival and resist cooperation.
Mitigation:

• build joint teams, not parallel review;

• second staff back and forth;

• ensure leadership spends time on internal diplomacy and trust-building.

Risk: Politicisation and “winner-takes-all” control after each election.
Mitigation:

• secure cross-party agreement on mandate;

• fixed terms for leadership with qualified appointment procedures;

• strong professional standards for staff.

L2 – Turning formalism into outcome-driven, learning administration

If L1 is the brain, L2 is about changing the nervous system and habits. Without this, even the best centre will be suffocated by everyday behaviour in ministries, agencies and municipalities.

1. What problem L2 is solving

Right now, the default operating mode is:

• success = “no audit findings, no scandal, funds spent on time”,

• mindset = “if I follow the rules exactly, I am safe; if I innovate, I am exposed”.

Results:

• preference for procedural safety over solving real problems,

• little experimentation, almost no deliberate learning from failure,

• programmes designed for ease of control, not for impact.

L2 aims to flip this equation:

• success = “real-world outcomes for citizens and society”,

• mindset = “if I pursue agreed outcomes transparently and use evidence, the system supports me even if some risks materialise”.

2. Re-designing the basic unit: the “programme”

We need to reinterpret what a “programme” is. Instead of being mainly a legal-financial container (budget chapter + eligibility criteria), a programme becomes a structured attempt to change reality.

Each significant programme should be required to have:

1. Problem and context analysis

   • What concrete problem is being solved? For whom? With what root causes?

   • How does this programme fit into the relevant mission(s)?

2. Theory of change

   • If we do X (inputs, activities), we expect Y (outputs, intermediate outcomes), which should lead to Z (final outcomes).

   • What assumptions must hold? What could go wrong?

3. Results framework

   • Clear, manageable set of indicators:

     • output indicators (what is delivered),

     • outcome indicators (what changes in reality),

     • possibly impact indicators for longer term.

4. Evaluation plan

   • What will be evaluated (process, outcomes, cost-effectiveness, distributional effects)?

   • When and by whom (internal vs independent)?

   • How will results be used (explicit decision rules for redesign, scaling, or termination)?

5. Risk and learning plan

   • Key risks (legal, financial, reputational, operational),

   • mitigation measures,

   • explicit learning questions: what do we most need to learn from this programme?

This structure should be embedded in guidance from:

• the centre of government (L1)

• and the Ministry of Finance / control bodies.

3. Changing the incentives: how people are judged and protected

The culture shifts only if what is rewarded and punished changes.

Performance assessments of senior managers

• Introduce outcome-related criteria:

  • progress on programme results,

  • quality of evidence and evaluation usage,

  • ability to identify and address structural problems.

• Reduce over-weighting of:

  • pure compliance with process,

  • superficial “activity levels” (number of projects, calls, meetings).

Recognition and career progression

• Create recognition schemes for teams that:

  • redesign programmes based on evidence,

  • transparently admit failure and implement stronger alternatives,

  • pioneer new models (e.g. outcome-based funding, integrated services).

• Link such behaviour to:

  • accelerated promotions,

  • access to leadership training,

  • public recognition (within the administration and, when appropriate, externally).

Protection for responsible risk-takers

• Develop “safe harbour” rules:

  • if a programme has a clear theory of change, risk assessment, legal review, and an approved experimental design, then failures within that design are not treated as personal misconduct, but as learning events.

• Clarify in law and internal directives:

  • the distinction between negligence or abuse vs. good-faith, documented experimentation within approved parameters.

This requires close coordination with:

• internal audit units,

• the Supreme Audit Office,

• inspection bodies,

• and even prosecutors, so that interpretations are aligned.

4. Aligning oversight with outcomes and learning

Oversight bodies can either lock in formalism or enable learning.

Recalibrating audit and control

• In cooperation with NKÚ and internal auditors, shift emphasis towards:

  • examining whether programmes have clear objectives and plausible theories of change,

  • reviewing whether evaluation findings are acted upon,

  • identifying systemic design flaws, not just individual irregularities.

• Introduce “learning-oriented audits”:

  • targeted reviews that look at a cluster of similar programmes across ministries or regions,

  • focus on what works and what doesn’t,

  • produce recommendations for redesign, not just blame and sanctions.

Integrating evaluation and audit cycles

• Create a joint cycle:

  • programme → mid-term evaluation → corrective measures → late-term evaluation → audit of both performance and use of evidence.

• Require audited entities to:

  • show not only compliance,

  • but also how they used analysis and evaluation to improve.

5. Embedding experimentation in law and practice

Innovation cannot rely only on brave individuals; it needs institutionalised experimentation.

Policy labs and pilots

• Each major ministry should have access to:

  • a policy lab: small team with skills in design, behavioural insights, prototyping, experimentation.

• For selected problems, design:

  • pilot projects in a limited number of regions/municipalities,

  • randomised or quasi-experimental evaluations where feasible,

  • a clear plan for scaling successful models and abandoning failures.

Experimental clauses and derogations

• Introduce legal provisions for temporary experimental regimes:

  • allow deviations from some rules or procedures in a controlled, time-limited way,

  • require ex-ante approval, monitoring, evaluation, and ex-post decision on whether to generalise or terminate the experimental arrangement.

Learning infrastructure

• Create a central repository of evaluations and experimental results:

  • accessible summaries,

  • searchable by topic, ministry, region, target group.

• Organise cross-administration learning events:

  • regular conferences and workshops where officials present lessons from reforms and experiments,

  • cross-pollination of ideas between sectors (e.g. health learning from education, social policy from labour market programmes).

6. Daily work practices: micro-level change

Culture isn’t only changed by law; it changes through daily routines.

Some practical shifts:

• Decision templates:

  • require each important decision memo to include:

    • what evidence was considered,

    • what alternatives were evaluated,

    • what risks are recognised,

    • how outcomes will be tracked.

• Meetings and reporting:

  • replace part of the classic “round of status updates” with structured discussions on:

    • what we learned since the last meeting,

    • what’s not working and why,

    • what experiments we are trying next.

• Language and framing:

  • leaders at all levels consistently talk about:

    • solving real problems for citizens,

    • evidence and learning,

    • honest acknowledgement of mistakes.

  • this gradually shifts what people perceive as “normal” and “professional”.

7. Implementation roadmap for L2

This reform is more cultural, but still needs a sequence.

Step 1 – Standards and pilots

• The centre of government (L1) issues:

  • new guidance on programme design (theory of change, results framework, evaluation plans),

  • with pilots in a few ministries and selected regions/municipalities.

• Design training programmes for mid- and senior-level officials on outcomes, evaluation, and experimentation.

Step 2 – Oversight alignment

• Convene a joint working group with NKÚ, internal auditors, MoF, justice ministry and prosecutors to:

  • clarify safe-harbour rules,

  • adjust methodologies to incorporate effectiveness and learning.

• Start with a few learning-oriented audits as demonstration projects.

Step 3 – Legal and HR changes

• Introduce legal changes where needed:

  • experimental clauses,

  • explicit references to evaluation in key laws,

  • adjustments to civil service evaluation criteria.

• Update HR frameworks to:

  • include outcome and learning metrics in performance reviews,

  • create recognition schemes for innovative and evidence-driven work.

Step 4 – Scaling and institutionalisation

• Gradually make the new programme design and evaluation standards mandatory for all major programmes.

• Embed outcome and evaluation requirements in:

  • budget process,

  • EU fund programming,

  • strategic planning cycles.

• Build a public-facing evaluation portal to make results visible and create external pressure for learning.

8. Risks and counter-risks

Risk: Everyone adopts the new language (theory of change, outcomes) but not the substance – “old formalism in new words”.
Counter-risk:

• require at least some independent quality checks of programme logic (by the centre or external experts);

• use audits and evaluations to expose purely cosmetic compliance;

• publicly highlight examples where real learning leads to redesign.

Risk: Experimentation produces some visible failures, causing political backlash.
Counter-risk:

• prepare the public narrative upfront: experimentation is how we avoid huge, nationwide failures;

• be transparent about selection of pilots and protection mechanisms;

• make sure some early pilots produce visible, positive results to build credibility.

Risk: Officials fear that “safe harbour” won’t protect them if prosecutors or media attack.
Counter-risk:

• align legal and oversight interpretations as much as possible;

• back brave officials publicly when they have followed agreed procedures;

• ensure top political leadership consistently supports “responsible risk” rhetoric.

L3 – Making the civil service a high-performing profession

1. What problem L3 is really solving

Right now, the Czech civil service is:

• reasonably capable for routine administration,

• but systematically underpowered for complex transformation.

Root problems:

• Politicisation and instability at the top: senior managers are too dependent on political cycles.

• Rigid, flat pay and career structures that don’t reward performance or scarce skills.

• HR as admin, not as strategic workforce management.

• Weak capability in the very areas needed for transformation:

  • complex policy design,

  • data and analytics,

  • digital & AI,

  • project, portfolio and change management.

L3 aims to turn the civil service into a mission-driven, high-performing profession that can actually power the missions defined under L1.

2. Strategic principles for civil service reform

Four guiding ideas:

1. Insulation from partisan politics, not from reality
   Senior officials should be protected from arbitrary political interference, but not from performance expectations.

2. Differentiated, competitive rewards
   The state cannot compete with the private sector on everything, but it must be competitive on purpose + learning + reasonable pay, especially for critical roles.

3. Mobility and shared culture
   People should move within the system (between ministries, regions, agencies) to build a shared professional ethos and circulate know-how.

4. Capability-building focused on missions
   Training and development must be aligned with the concrete missions and reform agendas, not generic one-size-fits-all courses.

3. De-politicising and stabilising top management

You don’t get a high-performing service if senior roles are reshuffled with each election.

Key measures:

• Independent appointments commission for top posts

  • Define a tier of positions (e.g. directors of departments, heads of agencies, regional directors) that require competitive selection.

  • Establish a commission with:

    • senior civil servants,

    • external experts,

    • perhaps a limited role for cross-party parliamentary representatives.

  • The commission runs or supervises selection processes and proposes shortlists; ministers choose from the shortlist, with written justification if they deviate.

• Fixed, overlapping terms

  • Fix terms (e.g. 5–7 years) for key management posts, not aligned perfectly with electoral cycles.

  • Removal before term:

    • only for specified reasons (poor performance, misconduct, restructuring),

    • with clear, transparent procedures and appeal mechanisms.

• Transparent reporting on appointments

  • Publish appointment and dismissal decisions and basic justifications.

  • Regularly report statistics on:

    • how many contests had only one candidate,

    • how often political appointees moved into senior civil service roles,

    • gender and diversity metrics.

This doesn’t de-politicise policy choices, but stabilises execution leadership.

4. Modernising pay and career structures

A transformation-capable state can’t pay everyone the same.

a) Create differentiated “professional tracks”

• Define several key tracks:

  • General management & coordination,

  • Policy analysis & design,

  • Digital, data & AI,

  • Project and portfolio management,

  • Regulatory design & oversight,

  • Specialised technical areas (health, environment, defence, etc.).

• For each track, specify:

  • competency profiles,

  • progression path (junior → senior → expert/lead → director),

  • salary bands that reflect market realities (especially for digital and data).

b) Introduce market-informed supplements for critical skills

• Within a regulated framework, allow ministries to pay supplements for:

  • scarce digital, data, AI roles,

  • highly specialised technical roles.

• Conditions:

  • transparent criteria (skill type, level, responsibilities),

  • capped but flexible ranges,

  • regular benchmarking with labour market data.

c) Link part of remuneration to performance and mission contribution

• For senior managers:

  • part of pay linked to performance on mission-related indicators and reform milestones (not just process metrics).

• For teams:

  • introduce team-based bonuses or recognition for achieving significant improvements or delivering complex reforms.

The goal isn’t to create huge pay disparities, but to allow differentiation where it matters and to signal that performance and scarce skills are valued.

5. Reinventing HR as strategic workforce management

HR should stop being primarily a rules-and-forms shop and become a strategic function.

Strategic workforce planning

• Each ministry and major agency should maintain a multi-year workforce plan:

  • expected retirements and turnover,

  • critical roles and skills,

  • hiring and development priorities.

• The centre of government should aggregate and analyse these plans:

  • identify cross-government skill shortages,

  • coordinate recruitment campaigns,

  • design shared training programmes.

Modern recruitment and branding

• Introduce:

  • streamlined, user-friendly recruitment portals,

  • proactive outreach (career fairs, universities, online campaigns) with a clear narrative:

“Come work on missions: climate, digital state, health, security – not just paperwork.”

• Allow:

  • more flexible use of probation periods and try-before-hire mechanisms (internships, fellowships).

HR analytics

• Start systematically collecting and analysing data on:

  • time-to-hire,

  • retention rates,

  • reasons for turnover,

  • internal mobility,

  • training effectiveness.

• Use these insights to:

  • identify units with chronic staffing problems,

  • adjust pay and working conditions,

  • target interventions.

6. Building leadership, analytic and delivery capability

The transformation agenda needs people who can design, lead and deliver complex change.

National leadership academy

• Create a Leadership Academy for Public Service:

  • mandatory training for new senior managers,

  • advanced programmes for mid-level leaders,

  • thematic tracks (e.g. leading digital transformation, leading in crisis, leading cross-sector missions).

• Pedagogy:

  • case-based learning using Czech and international examples,

  • simulations and role-playing (negotiation, crisis management),

  • mentorship by experienced leaders.

Policy analysis and data

• Develop a cadre of policy analysts:

  • train them in problem diagnosis, theory of change, cost–benefit analysis, distributional impacts, behavioural insights.

• Build data science roles within ministries:

  • analysts who can work with administrative data, run models, and support evidence-informed decisions (linked to L8).

Project and portfolio management

• Introduce standardised project management frameworks:

  • require major reforms to have project charters, risk registers, milestones, stakeholder maps.

• Train and certify project managers within the civil service:

  • give them career paths and authority,

  • ensure key missions always have professional project leadership, not just ad hoc coordination.

7. Mobility and cross-fertilisation

A siloed bureaucracy learns slowly. Mobility accelerates learning.

Internal mobility

• Make it easy and attractive for civil servants to:

  • move between ministries,

  • take temporary assignments at regions or municipalities (and vice versa),

  • work in cross-government teams for missions.

External mobility

• Create fellowship programmes:

  • civil servants spend 6–18 months in:

    • academia,

    • NGOs,

    • international organisations,

    • private sector (under ethical rules).

  • bring back new perspectives and methods.

• Allow limited inflow of lateral hires:

  • mid- and senior-level roles opened to external candidates with sector expertise,

  • with transparent processes and orientation programmes to integrate them into public sector culture.

Mobility, if structured well, builds a common professional identity: “I am a public service leader working on national missions”, not “I am a department lifer”.

8. Implementation roadmap for L3

Short term (1–2 years)

• Map current senior civil service: roles, turnover, politicisation patterns.

• Establish an interim Senior Appointments Board with advisory powers.

• Pilot:

  • differentiated professional tracks in some ministries,

  • new recruitment campaigns for critical skills,

  • a basic leadership programme.

Medium term (3–5 years)

• Enact legislation for:

  • more independent, merit-based senior appointments,

  • flexible pay bands for critical roles,

  • HR data reporting and workforce planning obligations.

• Fully launch the Leadership Academy and embed it into career progression.

• Roll out project and policy analysis training widely.

Long term (5–10 years)

• Normalise cross-government and external mobility programmes.

• Consolidate HR analytics and adjust policies based on data.

• Build a recognisable “Czech Public Service” brand with strong identity and values.

9. Risks and mitigations

• Risk: Reform captured by existing insiders, used to lock in current elites.
  Mitigation: Transparent criteria, external members on appointment panels, public reporting, regular audits of appointment practices.

• Risk: Pay differentiation creates resentment.
  Mitigation: Clear communication of criteria; ensure base conditions improve for all; focus supplements on roles that clearly deliver system-wide benefits.

• Risk: Politicians resist loss of control over top appointments.
  Mitigation: Offer greater confidence in quality of execution; ensure some structured political input remains (shortlisting vs final choice); build cross-party consensus around depoliticisation.

L4 – Rational multi-level governance & local capacity

1. What problem L4 is solving

Czechia’s multi-level governance is characterised by:

• Very high municipal fragmentation (thousands of small municipalities),

• uneven administrative and technical capacity,

• complex and sometimes overlapping competence allocation between central administration, regions and municipalities,

• fiscal and grant systems that often reward project chasing, not strategic delivery.

As a result:

• national missions (climate, digital state, social services, education, housing) depend on actors that vary wildly in capability,

• the centre faces huge coordination costs,

• implementation is uneven and often slow.

L4 aims to make the territorial governance system capable of delivering national missions consistently, without violating local autonomy.

2. Clarifying roles: who is responsible for what, end-to-end

The first step is to clarify end-to-end responsibility for major policy areas.

For each mission-relevant domain (e.g. primary healthcare, primary education, social services, local transport, housing, digital services), define:

• What is the state’s role (legislation, funding, standards, oversight)?

• What is the region’s role (planning, coordination, specialised services)?

• What is the municipality’s role (front-line delivery, local adaptation)?

This should be:

• written down in a coherent, public framework,

• cross-checked for contradiction with existing laws,

• used to adjust legislation and contractual arrangements over time.

The aim is not necessarily to change constitutional structures, but to:

• remove grey zones where nobody is truly responsible,

• avoid overlapping duties that create blame games.

3. Building shared services and “delivery hubs”

Fragmentation by itself is not fatal if small units can share capacity.

Shared services model

• Identify key functions where small municipalities struggle:

  • specialised procurement,

  • IT and digital infrastructure,

  • strategic planning and project management,

  • analysis and evaluation,

  • specialised social and education support services.

• Encourage or mandate creation of shared service centres:

  • at regional level,

  • or as voluntary/inter-municipal associations with legal personality.

• Typical services:

  • centralised tendering and framework contracts,

  • shared IT platforms and support,

  • “flying squads” of planners and project managers that assist municipalities.

Delivery hubs for missions

• For specific missions (e.g. energy retrofit of buildings, digitalisation of municipal services, community-based care), designate regional or supra-regional delivery hubs:

  • these hubs receive direct support (funding, expertise, tools) from the centre,

  • they work with clusters of municipalities to implement programmes.

Example logic:

• You don’t expect every tiny municipality to design its own complex social care architecture. Instead, the region (or hub) coordinates the model and supports municipalities in implementing and adapting it.

4. Reforming inter-municipal cooperation frameworks

Czechia already has various inter-municipal structures, but they are often:

• underpowered,

• narrowly focused (e.g. waste management, water),

• not fully integrated into national strategies.

Reforms:

• Simplify legal frameworks for inter-municipal cooperation, making it easier to:

  • establish multi-purpose associations,

  • define clear governance and accountability,

  • manage shared budgets and staff.

• Provide financial incentives:

  • extra support or higher co-financing rates for municipalities that join robust cooperation structures aligned with missions,

  • access to specialised grants only through recognised cooperation frameworks (e.g. digitalisation funds only via certified regional IT hubs).

5. Aligning funding with capacity and missions

Money can either reinforce fragmentation or help overcome it.

Mission-oriented, multi-year programmes

• Instead of dozens of small project calls, create large, multi-year programmes for missions:

  • e.g. “Green & Efficient Municipal Buildings 2030”,

  • “Digital Municipal Services”,

  • “Integrated Social Care Networks”.

• In these programmes:

  • municipalities apply through or with their regional delivery hubs or cooperation structures,

  • funding is tied to outcome targets and adherence to shared standards,

  • there is built-in support for weaker municipalities (templates, technical assistance).

Capacity-based differentiation

• Introduce capacity tiers for municipalities:

  • smallest with minimal administrative staff,

  • mid-size,

  • large cities and statutory towns.

• Match responsibilities and co-financing expectations to these tiers:

  • smallest rely more on shared services and hubs, with lower co-financing obligations,

  • largest bear more responsibility and can access more flexible funding.

Predictability over “grant-hunting”

• Shift from one-off calls toward:

  • predictable envelopes for regions/municipalities based on transparent formulas,

  • performance-based top-ups for those that achieve agreed milestones,

  • fewer, larger, simpler funding streams focused on missions.

6. Strengthening regional role as integrators

Regions are natural candidates to be integrators and capacity carriers between central ministries and municipalities.

Regional strategic capacity

• Equip regional offices with:

  • strategic planning and analytics teams,

  • strong project management units,

  • IT and digital specialists,

  • experts on social and health systems, education, mobility.

• Require regions to develop regional mission strategies aligned with national missions:

  • concretise how national goals will translate into regional project pipelines,

  • coordinate with municipalities and other stakeholders (hospitals, schools, NGOs).

Regional–central contracts

• Sign mission contracts between centre and each region:

  • define outcome targets and milestones for the region,

  • agree on funding envelopes and support,

  • clarify mutual obligations (data reporting, cooperation, evaluation).

Regions thus become co-owners of implementation, not just passive recipients.

7. Capacity-building and peer learning at local level

Not all improvements have to come from the top.

Local leadership programmes

• Develop programmes for mayors, councillors and senior municipal staff:

  • leadership in multi-level governance,

  • financial management and procurement,

  • digital transition,

  • community engagement and participatory planning.

Peer learning networks

• Support networks of municipalities around specific themes:

  • small towns on social inclusion,

  • cities on smart mobility,

  • rural communities on renewable energy.

• Facilitate:

  • joint projects,

  • study visits,

  • communities of practice,

  • shared toolkits.

8. Implementation roadmap for L4

Short term (1–2 years)

• Conduct a mapping exercise:

  • who does what, where are overlaps and gaps,

  • where are the biggest capacity deficits.

• Identify pilot regions and policy domains where:

  • shared services and mission delivery hubs can be tested quickly (e.g. digitalisation, building renovation).

• Adjust a small number of grant schemes to require or reward cooperation structures.

Medium term (3–5 years)

• Update legal frameworks for:

  • inter-municipal cooperation,

  • competencies and delegated tasks,

  • shared services.

• Scale successful pilots of:

  • shared procurement,

  • shared project management units,

  • regional mission strategies.

• Embed mission contracts and funding models into multiannual financial planning.

Long term (5–10 years)

• Consider voluntary municipal mergers supported by generous transitional funding.

• Expand the role of regions as:

  • data and analytics hubs,

  • integrators of health, social, education and transport planning.

9. Risks and mitigations

• Risk: Municipalities perceive reforms as centralisation and loss of autonomy.
  Mitigation:

  • emphasise that shared services support, not replace, elected councils;

  • design governance of hubs to include municipal representation;

  • keep local political accountability for decisions, while pooling technical and administrative capacity.

• Risk: Stronger regions overshadow smaller municipalities politically.
  Mitigation:

  • clear division of responsibilities,

  • transparent participation rules for municipalities in regional planning,

  • regular regional–municipal conferences and joint committees.

• Risk: Shared services become new bureaucratic layers without adding real capability.
  Mitigation:

  • tie funding and existence of shared centres to clear performance metrics,

  • allow restructuring or termination of underperforming centres,

  • regularly assess cost–benefit of shared arrangements.

L5 – Clean, intelligent money: integrity & strategic procurement

1. What L5 is solving

L5 is about how money moves through the system and what it incentivises.

Today, Czech public finances and procurement often:

• treat formal legality as the main success criterion;

• rely heavily on lowest price in tenders, even for complex projects;

• separate anti-corruption from strategic investment thinking;

• and leave large flows (especially at local level and in public companies) in audit or transparency grey zones.

This produces three core problems:

1. Integrity risks (waste, capture, collusion, outright corruption).

2. Systematic underuse of the state’s purchasing power as a strategic tool.

3. A pervasive sense that “they’ll steal it anyway”, which kills political will for large reforms.

L5 aims to rewire the financial and procurement architecture so that:

• honest, high-quality, mission-aligned spending is the easiest option,

• high-risk, low-value, corrupt behaviour is systematically squeezed out.

2. Strategic principles for L5

Four principles should shape the reform:

1. Transparency and traceability of money end-to-end
   Anyone (internally, and often publicly) should be able to see what money is spent, by whom, on what, and with what results.

2. Risk-proportionate controls
   Heavy controls where risk and value are high, lighter where risk is low, instead of blanket bureaucracy.

3. Value and outcomes, not just price and compliance
   For complex contracts, evaluation should favour quality, performance and life-cycle cost, not just lowest bid.

4. Alignment with missions and integrity
   Funding and procurement should channel energy toward agreed national missions, while embedding anti-corruption and integrity in design, not just punishment.

3. Extending and modernising oversight

You cannot control what you cannot see.

a) Complete the audit map

• Extend the remit of supreme or supreme-like audit over:

  • municipalities above a certain size or risk profile,

  • state- and municipality-owned enterprises (transport, utilities, hospitals, development companies),

  • entities heavily dependent on public funds or EU money.

It doesn’t necessarily have to be one institution, but there must be no large blind zones in the public finance ecosystem.

b) Shift part of the focus from micro-errors to systemic design

• Redesign audit methodology so that a significant portion of work looks at:

  • whether programmes have clear objectives and indicators,

  • whether procurement models are suitable for the type of project,

  • whether repeated failures are being addressed.

c) Integrate oversight data

• Build a central data platform where:

  • findings from various audits (supreme audit, internal audits, inspectorates) are standardised and pooled,

  • recurring patterns can be spotted (e.g., similar procurement issues across sectors),

  • ministries and the centre of government can see where structural fixes are needed.

4. Rewiring procurement: from “lowest price” to “best value”

Procurement is where a huge chunk of state capacity actually lives.

a) Categorise procurement by complexity and strategic importance

• Separate procurement into at least three categories:

  1. Simple, commoditised purchases (office supplies, basic goods).

  2. Standardised but significant (typical construction, standard services).

  3. Complex, strategic or innovation-intensive (IT systems, hospitals, integrated services, long-term concessions).

Each category gets different rules and expectations.

b) Keep “lowest price” for simple commoditised items only

• For category (1), lowest price can be appropriate if:

  • quality is easily specified and verifiable,

  • the market is competitive,

  • switching costs are low.

Even there, use framework agreements and centralised purchasing to get economies of scale.

c) Require multi-criteria, life-cycle evaluation for complex contracts

• For categories (2) and (3), require MEAT-type evaluation:

  • quality, performance, maintainability, life-cycle costs, environmental and social criteria where relevant.

• Introduce standard templates and guidance so smaller contracting authorities don’t have to reinvent evaluation criteria.

d) Professionalise procurement as a career

• Create professional procurement roles:

  • clear job profiles and career paths,

  • mandatory training and certification,

  • mobility across ministries, regions and large municipalities.

• Establish central centres of excellence:

  • units that support the design and running of complex tenders,

  • repositories of model contracts and criteria,

  • advisory hotlines for smaller authorities.

5. Anti-corruption architecture that is built in, not bolted on

Integrity must sit inside spending design, not just in police files.

a) Risk-based integrity plans

• For high-risk sectors (construction, healthcare, IT, regional development), require integrity plans that cover:

  • risk mapping,

  • staff rotation policies,

  • conflict-of-interest management,

  • rules on gift, hospitality and secondary employment,

  • reporting channels and whistleblower protection.

b) Whistleblowing tied to money flows

• Connect whistleblowing systems to procurement and budgeting:

  • explicit, safe channels for reporting manipulation of tenders, grant allocation, or budgetary “fixing”,

  • clear obligations to investigate and report back,

  • tracking of follow-up actions (disciplinary, criminal, institutional).

c) Blacklists and real consequences

• Maintain and share nationally:

  • lists of companies and individuals sanctioned for corruption, bid rigging, or serious conflicts of interest,

  • rules for exclusion from future tenders for a given period.

• Tie public funding eligibility to basic integrity standards (beneficiaries without basic compliance cannot receive funds).

6. Mission-oriented public finance and EU funds

Even clean money can be strategically stupid if it’s fragmented and misaligned.

a) Design mission envelopes

• For each national mission (from L1), set up multi-year financial envelopes:

  • combine domestic budget allocations and EU funds,

  • earmark them to clearly defined mission components (e.g. “energy efficiency in public buildings”, “digital services at local level”, “primary healthcare networks”).

b) Replace scattered calls with coherent programmes

• Instead of dozens of separate calls, structure fewer, larger mission programmes:

  • stable rules over several years,

  • clear pipelines of expected projects,

  • technical assistance for municipalities/regions.

c) Introduce performance-based components

• Attach part of funding to results:

  • number of citizens served with digital services,

  • energy saved,

  • reduction in specific waiting times,

  • improvements in access to care.

• Use milestone-based disbursement:

  • early tranches for setup and capacity-building,

  • later tranches conditional on verified progress.

This forces money to pull behaviour towards national missions instead of just feeding existing structures.

7. Data, transparency and public scrutiny

Public pressure is a powerful integrity tool.

a) Radical transparency of contracts and spending

• Publish all contracts above a modest threshold:

  • contract text,

  • winning bid price and evaluation report,

  • key milestones and amendments.

• Standardise formats so they are machine-readable for civic tech and watchdogs.

b) Open data on grants and subsidies

• A central portal listing:

  • all grants and subsidies,

  • recipients, amounts, purposes,

  • progress reports and final outcomes,

  • links to evaluations where available.

c) Analytical tools for detection

• Develop or procure systems that:

  • analyse procurement and financial data for red flags (bid patterns, repeated winners, high share of negotiated procedures without publication, price anomalies),

  • feed signals to oversight bodies and investigative units,

  • can be partially open for researchers and civil society (with anonymisation where needed).

8. Implementation roadmap for L5

Short term (1–2 years)

• Map current oversight gaps across local governments and public companies.

• Tighten transparency requirements for all public entities receiving significant public funding.

• Define categories of procurement and develop initial guidance for multi-criteria evaluation.

• Launch pilot “procurement excellence hubs” in a few ministries/regions.

Medium term (3–5 years)

• Legally extend audit coverage or create complementary supervisory mechanisms.

• Professionalise procurement:

  • certification schemes,

  • standardised training modules,

  • career paths.

• Reconfigure selected EU and national funding streams into mission programmes with clear envelopes and performance components.

Long term (5–10 years)

• Consolidate integrity systems:

  • mature whistleblowing culture,

  • robust blacklists,

  • data-driven red-flag detection.

• Expand mission-oriented finance to most major investment areas.

• Regularly evaluate whether the new arrangements deliver better value and lower corruption risk.

9. Risks and mitigations

• Risk: Over-bureaucratisation – adding layers of compliance without strategic gain.
  Mitigation: Keep risk-based approach; simplify where risk is low; use digital tools to automate controls.

• Risk: Resistance from entrenched interests (local barons, captured companies).
  Mitigation: Combine transparency, enforcement, and positive incentives (easier access to funds and support for those who cooperate).

• Risk: Procurement professionals become a conservative veto point, blocking innovation.
  Mitigation: Train and reward them for enabling strategic procurement, not just preventing risk.

L6 – Democracy with teeth: participation that actually shapes decisions

1. What L6 is solving

L6 addresses a core paradox:

• Formal democracy in Czechia works: multi-party elections, alternation of power, basic rights.

• Substantive democracy often feels weak:

  • citizens have low trust and feel they have little influence;

  • participation channels are either symbolic or ad hoc;

  • complex reforms are made “over people’s heads” and then meet instant resistance.

The result: politics is a sequence of electoral shocks and symbolic fights, not a continuous, constructive process of dealing with collective problems.

L6 aims to build permanent, institutionally grounded participation and deliberation that:

• improves the quality of policy,

• increases ownership of reforms,

• extends the political space for difficult decisions.

2. Strategic principles for L6

Four guiding ideas:

1. Participation must have visible consequences
   People should see clear links from their input → options considered → decisions → outcomes.

2. Deliberation, not just aggregation
   It’s not enough to collect opinions; we need structured deliberation where people learn, discuss trade-offs, and refine preferences.

3. Institutionalisation over one-off projects
   Mechanisms must be recurring, predictable and embedded in law or standing rules, not just “nice experiments”.

4. Inclusion and representation
   Participation should reflect society, not just the loudest or best-resourced groups.

3. Citizens’ assemblies and deliberative panels

These are the backbone for dealing with complex, long-term issues.

Design elements:

• Random selection with stratification

  • participants chosen by lot, corrected for age, gender, region, education, etc.,

  • to approximate the wider population.

• Structured learning phase

  • participants receive balanced information from experts and stakeholders,

  • can question and cross-examine them.

• Facilitated deliberation

  • trained facilitators help small groups discuss respectfully and systematically,

  • participants work through disagreements and trade-offs.

• Collective recommendations

  • assembly produces recommendations, often with documented levels of consensus.

Institutional role:

• Anchored in law or parliamentary rules as advisory bodies on specific topics:

  • climate policy,

  • pension reform,

  • education reform,

  • AI and digital rights,

  • health system transformation.

• Government and parliament must:

  • respond formally within a set time,

  • state which recommendations are followed and why,

  • explain deviations publicly.

The point is not to replace elections, but to add a deliberative layer that can tackle issues regular politics mishandles.

4. Structured consultation and co-creation around laws and strategies

Beyond assemblies, everyday lawmaking needs better participation.

a) Open, transparent consultation process

• For major laws, strategies and mission programmes:

  • publish drafts early,

  • invite written submissions from citizens, NGOs, business, municipalities, academia.

• Provide:

  • clear timelines,

  • structured templates (what problem, what evidence, what alternative),

  • support for smaller organisations to participate (e.g. guides, webinars).

b) Obligatory feedback and reasoning

• Authorities must publish:

  • a summary of consultation input,

  • how it affected the final text,

  • reasons for rejecting major proposals.

• This closes the loop and signals that participation matters, even when suggestions are not adopted.

c) Thematic co-creation forums

• For complex issues, establish multi-stakeholder forums:

  • regular working groups including ministries, local governments, experts, NGOs, industry reps, user groups.

• Their output:

  • practical implementation proposals,

  • guidelines, tools, pilots.

5. Youth participation and civic learning

Czech democracy’s long-term resilience depends on how younger generations are integrated.

a) Institutional youth councils

• Create or strengthen youth councils at:

  • municipal level (linked to councils and mayors),

  • regional level,

  • national level (linked to parliament or government).

• Give them:

  • agenda-setting rights on youth-relevant topics (education, climate, housing, digital),

  • the right to be heard in committees,

  • modest budgets for projects and outreach.

b) Project-based civic education

• Make schools places of real democratic practice, not just theory:

  • students work on real problems of their school or municipality,

  • present solutions to local councils or ministries,

  • get feedback and see whether anything changes.

• Combine with media/digital literacy (L7) so students learn:

  • how to critically assess information,

  • how to argue, negotiate and compromise,

  • how institutions work in reality.

6. Participatory budgets and local-level mechanisms

Democracy with teeth must be felt locally.

Participatory budgeting (PB)

• Municipalities and, where appropriate, regions:

  • allocate a portion of their budget (even 1–5%) to participatory processes,

  • citizens propose projects and vote on them.

• To avoid superficiality:

  • involve citizens in project design and feasibility assessments,

  • integrate participatory projects into long-term planning, not as random extras.

Neighbourhood forums and assemblies

• Regular local meetings where:

  • citizens discuss specific issues (transport, safety, public spaces, services),

  • municipal officials present plans and constraints,

  • possible compromises are explored on the spot.

Online platforms

• Use digital platforms to:

  • submit ideas and complaints,

  • follow their processing,

  • participate in surveys and consultations.

• But integrate them with offline processes to avoid reinforcing participation gaps.

7. Civic tech and feedback loops

Participation must be traceable and visible.

Civic tech infrastructure

• A national or shared platform that:

  • lists all ongoing consultations, assemblies, PB processes and forums,

  • allows citizens to track issues and provide input,

  • provides accessible summaries of complex topics.

Feedback on impact

• For each major participation process, publish:

  • what was asked,

  • what input was received,

  • what decisions followed,

  • what outcomes were observed.

• Over time, these become case studies:

  • “Here is how this citizens’ assembly influenced climate law X.”

  • “Here is how PB changed mobility in city Y.”

This builds a meta-narrative: participation is not theatre; it changes things.

8. Integration with representative institutions

Participation mechanisms must strengthen, not weaken, parliament and elected bodies.

Parliamentary committees and assemblies

• Committees receive:

  • citizens’ assembly reports,

  • summaries of consultations,

  • analysis of PB outcomes.

• They:

  • debate them publicly,

  • invite participants to hearings,

  • incorporate them into legislative reports.

Formal status for outputs

• Recognise certain participatory outputs as:

  • official advisory opinions,

  • triggers for mandatory government response,

  • or, in some cases, as direct inputs into secondary regulations or guidelines.

This ensures participation is not just “around” the system, but inside it.

9. Implementation roadmap for L6

Short term (1–2 years)

• Pilot one or two national citizens’ assemblies on clearly defined topics, with strong communication and transparent follow-up.

• Map existing consultation and participation practices; identify good examples and gaps.

• Support more municipalities in adopting PB and simple local forums.

Medium term (3–5 years)

• Enact a participation framework law or set of binding rules:

  • minimum consultation and participation standards,

  • rules for citizens’ assemblies and youth councils,

  • requirements for government responses.

• Integrate participatory outputs into parliamentary procedures.

• Develop the national civic tech platform.

Long term (5–10 years)

• Normalise citizens’ assemblies as a regular tool, not a novelty.

• Expand PB and local participation into most municipalities above a certain size.

• Evaluate and fine-tune mechanisms based on experience and research.

10. Risks and mitigations

• Risk: Participation captured by organised minorities, not representative of broader society.
  Mitigation: Use random selection for deliberative bodies; design outreach that targets underrepresented groups; mix open participation with representative mechanisms.

• Risk: Participatory outputs are systematically ignored, leading to more cynicism.
  Mitigation: Legally require formal responses; communicate clearly when recommendations are not accepted and why; ensure some early cases show tangible impact.

• Risk: Participation slows decision-making and adds complexity.
  Mitigation: Use participation primarily for big, long-term choices where delay is acceptable and beneficial; set clear timelines; design processes that feed into, not block, institutional decision cycles.

L7 – Information resilience & media/digital literacy as infrastructure

1. What L7 is solving

L7 tackles the fact that:

• The information environment is chaotic: social platforms, algorithmic feeds, AI content, disinformation, propaganda, clickbait.

• Citizens’ ability to navigate this environment is very uneven.

• Institutions (media, schools, government) are not yet organised to systematically strengthen information resilience.

Consequences:

• It is hard to build shared factual baselines for any serious reform (climate, pensions, health, EU, defence, AI).

• Foreign and domestic actors can weaponise grievances and erode trust.

• Policy debates get stuck in conspiracies, tribal narratives, and misinformation.

L7 is about treating information resilience like critical infrastructure – not a side project for NGOs and “awareness campaigns”, but a coordinated, state-level system.

2. Strategic principles for L7

Four core principles:

1. Pluralism and freedom, not censorship
   The aim is to increase citizens’ competence and strengthen trustworthy institutions – not to suppress dissenting views.

2. Systemic, not ad hoc
   Media literacy, public media, counter-disinformation, and strategic communication must form one architecture, not scattered initiatives.

3. Co-production with independent actors
   The state cannot and should not do this alone. Public service media, universities, NGOs, civic tech, and platforms must be part of the design.

4. Resilience-by-design
   Build resilience into:

   • school curricula,

   • media funding models,

   • platform governance,

   • crisis management plans.

3. School system as the backbone of media & digital literacy

Schools are the only universal, structured place where future citizens can be reached.

Curriculum integration

• Include media and digital literacy as a transversal competency across:

  • language and literature,

  • social sciences,

  • ICT,

  • civic education.

• Key components:

  • how information is produced and distributed,

  • how algorithms shape feeds and visibility,

  • recognising manipulation, emotional triggers, and cognitive biases,

  • reading statistics and charts critically,

  • understanding AI-generated content and its limits.

Pedagogical approach

• Move beyond theoretical “media education” to practical, context-rich work:

  • analyse real posts, videos, memes, influencers, conspiracy theories, AI outputs;

  • run classroom simulations of misinformation campaigns and fact-checking;

  • let students create their own media content and reflect on its impact.

Teacher support

• Design specialised modules and materials for teachers:

  • ready-made lesson plans adaptable to different ages;

  • curated examples (periodically updated);

  • guidance on managing sensitive topics (politics, war, health, conspiracy theories).

• Provide:

  • continuous professional development courses,

  • online communities where teachers exchange practices,

  • partnerships with journalists, fact-checkers and researchers.

Without teacher support, curriculum changes are cosmetic. With it, schools can become systematic resilience factories.

4. Strengthening and de-politicising public service media (PSM)

Public service media are a key piece of democratic infrastructure.

Funding model

• Ensure stable, predictable, multi-year funding:

  • ideally tied to an independent mechanism (e.g. licence fee, indexed transfers) rather than year-to-year political bargaining.

• Link part of funding to:

  • quality and diversity indicators,

  • investment in digital formats and youth-oriented content,

  • collaboration with other public-interest media.

Governance and independence

• Design governance to minimise partisan capture:

  • plural, staggered appointments to supervisory boards,

  • clear, transparent criteria and procedures,

  • explicit legal duties to impartiality, pluralism and editorial independence.

• Introduce:

  • transparent performance reports,

  • codes of ethics,

  • complaint and ombuds mechanisms accessible to the public.

Mandate

• Explicitly task PSM with:

  • in-depth, explanatory journalism on public policy;

  • coverage of missions (climate, digital, health, etc.) in ways understandable to non-experts;

  • media literacy content for different age groups, including children and teenagers;

  • collaboration with schools (content, workshops, educational series).

They become a bridge between government, experts and citizens, without serving as government mouthpieces.

5. Counter-disinformation and hybrid threat units

Information resilience also has a security dimension.

Integrated threat analysis units

• Create or strengthen units that:

  • monitor information operations (foreign and domestic),

  • analyse narratives and networks,

  • identify vulnerabilities in specific groups (e.g. veterans, minorities, regions).

• They should be:

  • connected to security agencies and ministries;

  • but also able to cooperate with researchers, civil society and platforms.

Strategic communication capability

• Develop a strategic communication team at the centre of government that:

  • coordinates messaging on key issues across ministries;

  • prepares proactive narratives, not only reactive rebuttals;

  • uses insights from behavioural science and data on how people actually consume information.

Ethical red lines

• Clear legal and ethical rules to:

  • prevent propaganda by the state;

  • protect civil liberties;

  • ensure transparency when the state communicates or cooperates with platforms.

Goal: increase transparency and resilience rather than manipulate citizens.

6. Platform governance and cooperation

The state cannot control global platforms, but it can:

Frameworks and agreements

• Engage systematically with major platforms:

  • share analysis of malign campaigns, hate speech spikes, coordinated inauthentic behaviour;

  • request transparency on political advertising, recommendation algorithms, and enforcement of their own rules.

• Prefer:

  • structured agreements (e.g. codes of conduct, MoUs),

  • aligned with EU digital regulations (Digital Services Act, etc).

Transparency and accountability

• Advocate for:

  • data access for vetted researchers;

  • greater transparency on content moderation decisions;

  • clear labelling of state-controlled and AI-generated content.

The aim is not for the Czech state to “control algorithms”, but to ensure some accountability and visibility into the systems that shape public discourse.

7. Civic tech, fact-checking and independent intermediaries

Information resilience is stronger when multiple independent actors are involved.

Support for fact-checking and investigative journalism

• Provide:

  • stable, transparent funding mechanisms (e.g. media funds, grants) that are insulated from political discretion;

  • training and collaboration opportunities for journalists covering complex topics like climate, AI, defence, health.

Civic tech ecosystems

• Encourage projects that:

  • visualise public data (spending, procurement, lobbying, media ownership, misinformation narratives);

  • help citizens verify claims (browser plugins, bots, verification tools);

  • track political promises and their implementation.

Research and monitoring

• Support universities and think tanks to:

  • monitor information ecosystems;

  • evaluate the effectiveness of interventions (media literacy programmes, fact-checks, platform changes);

  • provide independent analysis to policy-makers and the public.

8. Crisis information resilience

Crisis situations (pandemics, wars, energy shocks) are stress tests.

Pre-crisis planning

• Integrate communication and information strategies into:

  • national crisis management plans,

  • sectoral emergency protocols (health, energy, defence).

• Use scenario-based exercises:

  • simulate disinformation campaigns during crises;

  • test coordination across ministries, PSM, security services, platforms.

Crisis communication principles

• Rapid, consistent, transparent communication:

  • admit uncertainty and unknowns;

  • correct mistakes openly;

  • use trusted third-party voices (scientists, professional bodies, NGOs) as amplifiers.

• Multi-channel approach:

  • TV, radio, online platforms, SMS or app alerts, local-level communication.

A state that communicates well in crises earns trust that it can later spend on long-term reforms.

9. Implementation roadmap for L7

Short term (1–2 years)

• Develop a national information resilience strategy aligning education, media policy, security and platform governance.

• Start revising school curricula and teacher training programmes for media/digital literacy.

• Set up or strengthen an integrated hybrid threat and strategic communication unit at the centre.

Medium term (3–5 years)

• Reform PSM funding and governance; clarify mandate.

• Establish long-term funding for fact-checking, investigative journalism and civic tech projects.

• Run nationwide media literacy campaigns linked to school initiatives and PSM content.

Long term (5–10 years)

• Regularly evaluate resilience (trust levels, misinformation vulnerability, performance in crises).

• Adjust strategies based on new technologies (generative AI, deepfakes, new platforms).

• Normalise cooperation between state, PSM, platforms, civil society and research as a permanent ecosystem.

10. Risks and mitigations

• Risk: Measures are perceived as censorship or propaganda.
  Mitigation:

  • focus on literacy and independent intermediaries;

  • keep PSM independent;

  • ensure transparency and legal safeguards.

• Risk: Politicisation of PSM and strategic communication units.
  Mitigation:

  • robust, cross-party governance models;

  • independent oversight;

  • professional codes and accountability.

• Risk: Fragmentation of efforts across ministries and actors.
  Mitigation:

  • central strategy and coordination;

  • clear division of roles;

  • shared data and evaluation.

L8 – Evidence & experimentation as the default

1. What L8 is solving

L8 is about the knowledge engine of the state.

Current problems:

• Evidence is used selectively and ad hoc, often to justify decisions already made.

• Evaluations are:

  • rare,

  • underutilised,

  • or commissioned as rituals with little impact on design.

• Experiments and pilots happen, but:

  • without rigorous design,

  • without systematic learning or scaling.

• Data are fragmented, hard to access, and not used strategically.

L8 aims to make evidence and experimentation the default at every major stage of policy-making.

2. Strategic principles for L8

Four guiding ideas:

1. Evidence is a process, not a magic paper
   It’s about how you define problems, test solutions, and learn – not just about one “impact study”.

2. Experimentation to reduce risk, not increase it
   Pilots and experiments are tools to avoid big, expensive failures, not to play with citizens’ lives.

3. Institutional architecture > heroic individuals
   Evidence use must be built into structures, rules, and routines – not depend on a few motivated people.

4. Transparency and external scrutiny
   Evidence used (or ignored) should be visible to parliament, media and society.

3. Central evidence & evaluation unit

At the core, you need a central unit that sets standards and supports ministries.

Mandate

• Set government-wide guidelines for:

  • problem diagnosis,

  • impact assessment,

  • evaluation design,

  • use of administrative data.

• Provide:

  • methodological support to ministries and regions,

  • quality review of major assessments and evaluations,

  • synthesis of evidence across sectors.

• Coordinate:

  • foresight exercises,

  • cross-government research priorities,

  • partnerships with academia and think tanks.

Positioning

• Located within or closely linked to:

  • centre of government (L1),

  • Ministry of Finance (budget and spending decisions),

  • possibly with dual reporting lines.

Staffing

• Economists, statisticians, social scientists, data scientists, policy analysts.

• People with experience in:

  • evaluation methods (RCTs, quasi-experimental designs, cost–benefit analysis),

  • working with administrative data,

  • communicating findings to non-experts.

4. Impact assessments that are real, not ritual

Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) and ex-ante impact analysis are often formalistic.

Reforms:

• Require impact assessments for:

  • major laws,

  • large spending programmes,

  • mission-critical strategies.

• Content:

  • clear articulation of the problem and baseline;

  • options considered (including “do nothing”);

  • expected impacts (economic, social, environmental, distributional);

  • risks and uncertainties;

  • how evidence and stakeholder input were used.

• Quality control:

  • central unit reviews major assessments,

  • returns weak ones for revision,

  • publishes its review comments.

• Transparency:

  • make impact assessments public when laws are proposed;

  • allow external critique from researchers, NGOs, business, etc.

Impact assessments become the place where politics meets analysis, instead of a post-hoc justification.

5. Evaluation culture across the policy cycle

Evaluation must be part of a continuous loop:

1. Ex-ante (design)

2. Mid-term (formative)

3. Ex-post (summative)

4. Meta-evaluation (across programmes)

Standardising evaluation practice

• Require each significant programme to include:

  • an evaluation plan with budget allocation (e.g. 1–3% of programme cost),

  • defined evaluation questions aligned with theory of change,

  • a timeline (mid-term, ex-post).

• Encourage:

  • a mix of external and internal evaluations,

  • peer review of major evaluations.

Using evaluation results

• Set decision rules:

  • programmes with consistently negative evaluations must be redesigned or terminated;

  • programmes with positive evaluations can be scaled or used as models.

• Present evaluation outcomes to:

  • parliament (committees),

  • the public (accessible summaries),

  • internal learning forums across ministries.

This creates a feedback loop where programmes are not static; they evolve.

6. Policy labs and experimentation

Experiments are how you learn what really works.

Policy labs

• Establish policy labs in key ministries:

  • small teams with skills in design thinking, behavioural insights, experimentation, data analysis.

• Their tasks:

  • transform vague political goals into testable interventions;

  • design pilots with control groups or comparison conditions;

  • run and evaluate experiments;

  • translate results into policy recommendations.

Experimental frameworks

• Legal provisions for sandboxing:

  • allow temporary derogations from some rules in defined pilots (e.g. alternative benefit delivery, new digital processes, new service models).

• Conditions for experiments:

  • informed consent where needed,

  • risk assessment,

  • ethical review for sensitive areas (health, social policy, justice),

  • clear exit strategy.

Scaling and mainstreaming

• Create mechanisms for:

  • scaling successful pilots into regulations and programmes;

  • capturing knowledge from failed experiments to prevent repetition.

Experiments thus become a normal part of improvement, not rare exceptions.

7. Data infrastructure and access

Evidence is impossible without good data.

Administrative data integration

• Identify key datasets needed for missions:

  • health records (properly anonymised),

  • education outcomes,

  • labour market data,

  • social services usage,

  • environmental and infrastructure data.

• Create:

  • secure, privacy-respecting data integration platforms;

  • clear governance (who can access what, under which conditions).

Data sharing and standards

• Develop:

  • data standards for interoperability between ministries, regions, municipalities and public enterprises;

  • guidelines on anonymisation and re-use for research and evaluation.

Open data for society

• Publish high-value datasets (with protections) as open data so that:

  • researchers, NGOs, journalists and businesses can build analyses and tools;

  • the state is not the only actor who can create evidence.

8. Science–policy partnerships

The state cannot generate all necessary knowledge internally.

Long-term partnerships

• Framework contracts between ministries and:

  • universities,

  • research institutes,

  • think tanks.

• Purpose:

  • commissioned research and evaluations,

  • modelling and forecasting,

  • expert input into impact assessments and missions.

Embedded researchers and fellows

• Programmes where:

  • researchers spend 6–24 months embedded in ministries or agencies;

  • civil servants spend time in research centres working on relevant projects.

This builds a shared epistemic community: people who speak both “science” and “policy”.

9. Embedding evidence and experimentation in political routines

Even a perfect technical system fails if politics ignores it.

Parliamentary scrutiny

• Committees require:

  • impact assessments and key evidence summaries for major laws,

  • evaluation reports for renewal of large programmes.

• Use:

  • hearings with evaluators and researchers,

  • independent expert panels.

Government routines

• Cabinet rules:

  • submissions for major decisions must include evidence sections;

  • where strong evidence is lacking, reasons must be explained along with plans to fill gaps (via pilots, data collection, etc.).

Public communication

• Government, PSM and others:

  • explain not only what decisions are made, but why and with what evidence;

  • highlight when policies are changed because evidence showed they didn’t work.

Over time, this creates a political norm: ignoring evidence is something you must publicly justify.

10. Implementation roadmap for L8

Short term (1–2 years)

• Create or empower a central evidence and evaluation unit.

• Issue updated guidelines for impact assessment and evaluation; pilot them on selected laws/programmes.

• Start building one or two policy labs in priority ministries (e.g. health, education, digitalisation).

Medium term (3–5 years)

• Make impact assessment and evaluation requirements mandatory for major initiatives.

• Develop data integration infrastructure and standards.

• Launch embedded researcher and fellowship programmes.

• Train a critical mass of civil servants in evidence use and experimentation methods.

Long term (5–10 years)

• Normalise experimentation and evaluation in all major policy domains.

• Integrate evidence cycles with budget cycles and mission reviews.

• Build a culture where “what does the evidence say?” is a default question in political debate.

11. Risks and mitigations

• Risk: Evidence is weaponised politically (cherry-picking, attacks on inconvenient results).
  Mitigation:

  • strong independence of evaluation processes;

  • transparent publishing of methods and data;

  • building a community of respected evaluators and researchers.

• Risk: Over-bureaucratisation – evidence processes slow everything down.
  Mitigation:

  • proportionate requirements (more for big reforms, less for small tweaks);

  • streamlined templates and support from the central unit;

  • pre-agreed “fast lanes” for urgent decisions with post-hoc evaluation.

• Risk: Evaluation fatigue and cynicism (“we evaluate but nothing changes”).
  Mitigation:

  • hard decision rules (terminate or redesign failing programmes);

  • public and parliamentary scrutiny;

  • clear examples of policies changed because of evidence.