This isn’t full federation with all competences moved to Brussels. It’s a federal-grade core: where the Union already acts, it acts with the political and institutional machinery of a normal advanced democracy, not of a committee of governments.

2. Fast Decision Rules and Anti-Veto Architecture

Goal: Remove structural paralysis. Keep member-state voice and protection, but redesign decision rules so one or two actors can’t routinely jam the system, especially as the Union enlarges.

2.1. The current problem: unanimity as a brake on power

Today the EU already uses qualified majority voting (QMV) for most internal laws. But crucial areas – foreign policy, some tax matters, parts of social/security, treaty revision – still require unanimity.

In Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), for instance, the default is unanimity in the Council; this has delayed or watered down sanctions, statements, and missions. An EPRS cost-of-non-Europe study explicitly quantifies the “cost of unanimity” in CFSP in terms of slower and weaker action. European Parliament

Think-tanks warn that with enlargement to 30+ members, maintaining vetoes will make the Union “unmanageable”; every serious move would require aligning 30 domestic political cycles. d1xp398qalq39s.cloudfront.net+1

So the anti-veto agenda is about rebalancing:

• Majority rule where collective action is needed.

• Safeguards where vital national interests are at stake.

• Flexibility for those who want to move faster (enhanced cooperation).

2.2. How the tools actually work

a) Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) basics

Under current rules, QMV means:

• At least 55% of member states (currently 15 of 27)

• Representing at least 65% of the EU population

This “double majority” protects both large and small states. There’s also a blocking minority requirement (at least 4 states representing more than 35% of the population) to prevent a couple of big states from dominating. Wikipedia

Extending QMV doesn’t change who decides (the Council and EP) but how hard it is to block. The system stays consensus-oriented in practice because most decisions are negotiated until a broad majority is comfortable, but the possibility to outvote a chronic blocker exists – and that changes behaviour.

b) Passerelle clauses: flipping unanimity to QMV without rewriting the Treaty

The Treaties already include “bridges” (passerelles) that allow the European Council, by unanimous decision, to switch some policy areas from unanimity to QMV and/or from special legislative procedures to the ordinary one. Epthinktank+1

Key points:

• General passerelle: Article 48(7) TEU – can move from unanimity to QMV, or from special to ordinary legislative procedure, in certain cases.

• CFSP-specific passerelle: Article 31(3) TEU – lets the European Council allow the Council to act by QMV for specific CFSP decisions.

Parliament has complained that these tools are underused and calls them “yet to be untapped” in their potential; it explicitly urges leaders to activate passerelles to strengthen capacity to act. European Parliament+1

So even without rewriting the Treaties, the EU could decide:

• “From now on, sanctions and human-rights declarations can be adopted by QMV.”

• “Certain tax measures relating to climate or the single market will be adopted by QMV.”

It’s a political choice, not a legal impossibility.

c) Emergency brakes and constructive abstention: safety valves for states

Critics fear that smaller or outvoted states might be forced into policies against vital interests. Existing and proposed safeguards address this:

• Emergency brake: In some areas today, if a state feels a proposal touches on vital social security or criminal justice systems, it can refer the issue to the European Council for discussion; decisions are paused. Similar “brake” ideas are floated for CFSP QMV: any state could escalate a decision it truly cannot accept. Epthinktank+1

• Constructive abstention: In CFSP, a state can abstain in a vote without blocking the others from acting, and can choose not to participate in an operation while accepting that the Union acts in its name. Epthinktank

These mechanisms maintain a political veto for existential concerns but prevent routine pettiness or domestic electoral posturing from killing collective moves.

d) Enhanced cooperation and variable geometry

Even now, if some states want to go further or faster, they can use enhanced cooperation: a group can integrate more deeply in a certain field while others stay out (examples include the European Public Prosecutor’s Office).

As decision rules become more majoritarian, this remains a useful tool:

• Those ready to adopt deeper tax coordination or defence integration can do so.

• Others can join later.

• The EU legal framework ensures these mini-clubs don’t undermine the single market or discriminate against others. EUR-Lex

This gives a release valve: rather than blocking everyone until the slowest is ready, you allow concentric circles of integration.

2.3. How current thinking backs moving away from vetoes

• The Parliament’s research services and multiple think-tanks argue that unanimity in CFSP in particular is a serious handicap. The EPRS cost-of-non-Europe report tracks how unanimity has slowed or weakened responses in foreign policy, sanctions, and crisis situations. European Parliament+1

• Policy briefs on enlargement stress that with Ukraine, Western Balkans, and others possibly joining, veto-ridden institutions will simply not cope. Authors argue that re-working the passerelle clauses (or using them more) is a minimum requirement to avoid paralysis in a Union of 30+. cer.eu+2d1xp398qalq39s.cloudfront.net+2

• The broader academic and policy consensus is that a multi-level, consensus-seeking system is fine – but systemic veto power on core public goods (sanctions, climate action, single market rules) is incompatible with being a serious geopolitical actor.

In short: the direction “less veto, more majority, with safeguards” is mainstream in legal and policy circles; the blockage is political fear of domestic backlash, not lack of design options.

2.4. Future state: what it looks like and why it’s beneficial

Picture a 2035 EU with ~32 members under an anti-veto architecture:

• Foreign policy & sanctions:

  • Sanctions, human-rights declarations, and many CFSP decisions are taken by QMV.

  • If a state feels a proposal crosses a red line, it can trigger an emergency brake, escalating to the European Council. There, leaders must either find a compromise or, if not, allow willing states to proceed through enhanced cooperation or constructive abstention.

  • Result: the Union can respond to invasions, cyber-attacks, or coups in days, not months.

• Tax and economic decisions:

  • Certain tax bases relevant for the single market or climate (e.g. minimum corporate tax, carbon border mechanisms) are under QMV.

  • States retain national tax sovereignty in areas not clearly EU-wide, but can’t endlessly veto measures needed to make common rules effective.

• Internal policies:

  • Most internal market, environmental, and digital regulation is already under QMV, so the change is more about culture: Council no longer hides behind the idea that “everyone must agree or nothing happens”.

  • Council debates are more transparent; states that routinely block without serious reasons incur reputational costs.

• Enhanced cooperation as normal:

  • Defence, migration compacts, or ambitious green programmes often start with a core group and expand. This becomes seen as normal: a “coalition of the willing” is a built-in feature of the system, not an exception.

Why this is beneficial for speed and strategy:

1. Crisis response becomes credible
   No more situations where one capital, for domestic reasons, holds up an entire sanctions package or joint diplomatic position. The Union can match the reaction speed of serious geopolitical actors, which is essential in security, cyber, and economic warfare contexts.

2. Strategic planning stops being hostage to the lowest common denominator
   When you know a single state can’t veto your entire climate package or AI regulatory overhaul, you can design policies based on what a broad majority considers necessary, not on what the most reluctant partner will tolerate.

3. Incentives for constructive behaviour improve
   Right now, a government can use vetoes as leverage to extract unrelated concessions. Under QMV with emergency brakes, that tactic is less effective; leveraging is limited to issues genuinely linked to vital interests. This cleans up Council bargaining dynamics.

4. Enlargement becomes realistic
   With more states, unanimity becomes exponentially harder. Anti-veto architecture is almost a precondition for integrating new members without killing effectiveness. Instead of choosing between being big or being functional, you create rules that allow both.

5. Democratic accountability improves
   It becomes clearer which coalition in Council supported a decision, and which parties at home are responsible. Citizens can see that majorities decide – a basic democratic intuition – and that national governments can’t endlessly hide behind “Brussels” or behind other member states’ vetoes.

6. Smaller states are still protected – but more intelligently
   Emergency brakes, constructive abstention, and blocking minorities ensure small or medium states are not steamrolled. But “protection” no longer means permanent paralysis; it means escalation, negotiation, and, at worst, sitting out while others move ahead.

3. AI-First, Digitised EU Administration

Goal: Turn the EU and member-state bureaucracies into high-throughput, low-friction machines: fewer dead PDFs and email chains, more real-time data, AI-assisted policy work, and smooth citizen/company interfaces.

This is not “add some chatbots”. It’s a stack:

1. A shared interoperable data + ID backbone.

2. AI embedded in core workflows of policy, administration, and service delivery.

3. Common platforms and building blocks instead of 27× duplication.

4. A civil service that is trained and re-shaped to work as “AI-native” professionals.

3.1. How the main levers actually work

a) Interoperable data backbone (so AI has something to work with)

Right now, one of the biggest frictions is that every administration runs its own siloed systems, with messy data standards and ad-hoc integrations.

The Interoperable Europe Act is basically the legal/scaffolding answer to that:

• It establishes an EU-level governance structure for interoperability, creating a cooperation framework for administrations to share data and digital solutions across borders. European Commission+2Consilium+2

• It aims to build an ecosystem of shared interoperability solutions (reference architectures, reusable components, open standards), backed by funding from the Digital Europe programme. PubAffairs Bruxelles+2NCP Flanders+2

The model is essentially:

“Let’s have an EU-wide ‘X-Road’ for the public sector.”

Estonia has already proved this at national scale: its X-Road data exchange layer allows public and private systems to talk to each other securely; it logs every data access and lets citizens see who viewed their records. It saves over 1,345 years of working time per year in public administration by eliminating redundant paperwork and providing instant access to reliable data. Invest in Estonia+4e-Estonia+4Frost & Sullivan Institute+4

Mechanics for the EU level:

• Core interoperability framework (data models, APIs, security rules) that all EU and national systems must respect when dealing with cross-border processes.

• Mandatory logging and auditability of data exchanges; citizens can see who accessed what and when.

• Regulatory sandboxes (explicitly included in the Interoperable Europe Act) where administrations can test new digital/AI solutions using real data under controlled conditions. PubAffairs Bruxelles+1

This backbone is pre-AI: without clean, interoperable data flows, AI at scale is just lipstick on a paper process.

b) AI embedded in core workflows, not as a bolt-on gadget

The European Commission has already adopted a strategy for internal use of AI:

• It sets guidelines for development, procurement and use of AI by Commission staff, including generative AI.

• It uses a risk-based AI register, classifying internal systems according to impact and legal risks.

• It commits to training staff to become competent AI users, explicitly stating AI must support human-centric policymaking and respect fundamental rights. Digital Strategy EU+3European Commission+3Digital Strategy EU+3

OECD’s large study on “Governing with AI” (200+ use cases in 11 core government functions) finds:

• About 57% of government AI use cases automate or streamline services;

• Another 45% support decision-making, sense-making, forecasting;

• Around 30% aim to improve accountability and anomaly detection. OECD+2OECD+2

So what does embedding AI in workflows actually look like?

Across the policy cycle:

• Agenda setting & analysis: LLMs and other models scan legal texts, scientific papers, consultations, and economic data to surface emerging issues, contradictions, and options.

• Drafting: Civil servants use AI copilots to draft impact assessments, explanatory memoranda, and legal provisions based on templates and knowledge bases, then edit.

• Negotiation support: AI systems generate comparison tables of national positions, track amendments across Council/Parliament, and simulate consequences of alternative compromise texts.

• Evaluation: AI analyses implementation data, inspection reports, citizen complaints, social media signals, etc., to detect what’s working or failing and where.

Concrete evidence that this isn’t sci-fi:

• A UK pilot with ~20,000 civil servants using an AI assistant (Copilot-style) showed average savings of about 26 minutes per day – roughly two weeks of working time per year per employee – primarily in drafting, summarizing, and information retrieval. Financial Times

• OECD reviews show AI in government is already heavily used for case triage, fraud detection, and personalised services, boosting productivity and responsiveness when properly governed. OECD+2OECD+2

In operations and services:

• High-volume back-office tasks: claims processing, eligibility checks, consistency checks between registries, document classification.

• Front-line services: multilingual virtual assistants answering citizen/company questions 24/7, integrated with case-management systems rather than being disconnected chat toys.

• Compliance & risk: anomaly detection in transactions (VAT, customs, subsidies), early warning for project delays or cost overruns.

All of this is constrained by the AI Act, which imposes a risk-based regime – higher requirements for high-risk uses, rights protections, transparency, human oversight. Digital Strategy EU+2JuLIA Project+2

So the logic is: AI is a standard tool in every desk job, but deployed under clear legal and ethical guardrails.

c) Common platforms and building blocks instead of 27× reinventing the wheel

One of the big drags today is fragmentation: each administration tends to build its own portals, case management, workflow engines, and even AI stacks.

The emerging EU logic (Interoperable Europe, Digital Decade, AI Continent plan) is: Eipa+3European Commission+3NCP Flanders+3

• Build shared components (eID, signature, payments, message broker, logging, data spaces, AI hosting) and make them reusable across institutions and countries.

• Use common frameworks like the European Interoperability Framework (EIF) and Interoperable Europe solutions as reference building blocks rather than guidelines nobody reads. Eipa+1

• Provide central AI and data infrastructure: EU-level “AI Factories” or platforms where administrations can deploy models in a compliant, secure way, instead of every ministry setting up its own mini-ML stack. Digital Strategy EU+1

If designed well, you get:

• One GovCloud / GovPlatform concept per country (or cluster of small countries), with EU-backed standards and components.

• Admins plug into that platform rather than building their own bespoke systems for each use case.

• Cross-border services (recognising professional qualifications, social security portability, digital company registration, etc.) ride on the same technical rails.

Estonia again is useful proof: digital ID + X-Road + a coherent platform strategy underpins e-tax, e-health, e-business, i-voting and more – and is now widely cited as the benchmark for digital state capacity. Invest in Estonia+3Apo Tokyo+3The World Bank+3

d) Skills and organisational redesign: the AI-native civil servant

Without changing the people and structures, AI remains “pilot theatre”.

The Commission’s internal AI strategy explicitly says staff must receive training to become skilled users of AI tools, while AI must remain subordinate to human judgement and rights. European Commission+2Digital Strategy EU+2

OECD also stresses that AI benefits (productivity, responsiveness, accountability) only materialise when governments invest in:

• Data governance and quality,

• Digital and AI skills,

• New roles (product owners, data stewards, algorithm auditors). OECD+2OECD+2

In practice, an AI-first administration would:

• Roll out mandatory basic AI literacy for all officials (understanding what models can/can’t do, how to prompt, how to verify).

• Create specialised roles: “policy engineers”, “AI product managers”, “algorithmic accountability officers”.

• Re-organise processes around digital/AI workflows (e.g. not “we draft policy in Word and then upload it”, but “we work in a versioned, structured environment from day one”).

• Build change programmes and incentives so managers actually adopt AI tools instead of clinging to old habits.

This is the “soft” side of AI-first, but it’s decisive. Without it, the hardware and laws are irrelevant.

3.2. How current thinking supports this direction

Across different sources, you see convergence:

• Digital government & interoperability:

  • The Interoperable Europe Act is explicitly about “creating a network of interconnected digital public administrations and accelerating digital transformation of Europe’s public sector” – acknowledging that shared standards and solutions are necessary for efficiency and cross-border services. NCP Flanders+3Consilium+3European Commission+3

• AI in administration:

  • The Commission’s internal AI strategy frames AI as an instrument to support staff and policy-making, with a risk-based internal register and training. It is deliberately aligned with the upcoming AI Act. European Commission+2Digital Strategy EU+2

  • The AI Act itself treats public authority AI systems as high-stakes in many cases (e.g. welfare, law enforcement), requiring risk management, transparency, human oversight – but does not forbid them. It is a framework for trustworthy use, not a ban. Digital Strategy EU+2JuLIA Project+2

• Productivity & service quality:

  • OECD’s “Governing with AI” shows that AI in government is already used to automate processes, support decisions, and improve accountability, and finds that AI can boost productivity, responsiveness, and user satisfaction when governance is well-designed. OECD+2OECD+2

  • National pilots (like the UK Copilot trial) show measurable time savings and high user satisfaction among civil servants using AI for drafting and analysis tasks. Financial Times

• Best-practice exemplars:

  • Estonia’s e-state experience is widely documented: digital ID + X-Road + interoperability has “revolutionized public administration and citizen engagement”, with huge time savings and international top rankings in e-government surveys. e-Estonia+4Apo Tokyo+4The World Bank+4

So the “AI-first, digitised administration” direction is not a speculative futurism; it’s where the leading edge is already going, just not yet systemically across the EU.

3.3. Future state: what an AI-first EU administration looks like and why it’s beneficial

Imagine the late-2030s EU, in a world where you have federal strategic leadership and anti-veto rules (areas 1 & 2), and the administration has been made AI-first:

What it looks like

• Single interface for citizens and companies:

  • You log in with your EU-recognised digital ID (national e-ID or EU wallet). Your personal and business data, as allowed by law, are already there; you don’t re-enter the same information 20 times.

  • You interact with a multilingual assistant that can explain rules, simulate scenarios (e.g. “If I move my business from A to B, what changes?”), and file applications for you.

• Internally, almost everything is digital-native:

  • There are no paper-born processes for anything above a trivial threshold. Workflows are modelled explicitly; AI monitors bottlenecks, predicts delays, and suggests optimisations.

  • Civil servants use AI copilots as standard – for legal drafting, comparative research, stakeholder mapping, impact analysis. AI systems flag inconsistencies and potential legal risks automatically.

  • Cross-border procedures (social security, qualifications, company registration) run via an EU interoperability layer; data is pulled where needed instead of asking citizens to carry it around.

• Policy and implementation are measured in real time:

  • Each major EU programme has a live dashboard that shows expenditures, milestones, and outcome indicators; AI highlights anomalies (e.g. under-absorption of funds, suspicious patterns).

  • Feedback from citizens, companies, and local administrators (through portals, hotlines, and monitoring) is aggregated and analysed by AI to generate early warning of policy failures.

• Trust and rights are structurally protected:

  • Every significant AI system used by an administration is in a public register stating purpose, data, risk classification, and oversight mechanisms (as foreseen by the AI Act logic). Digital Strategy EU+1

  • Citizens can see logs of who accessed their data, and can contest decisions supported by AI.

  • Dedicated algorithmic oversight bodies (within or alongside courts and data protection authorities) review systems with high rights impact.

Why this is beneficial – specifically for “power, action, innovation”

1. Massive productivity unlock → more policy per euro

   If an Estonian-style data backbone already saves >1,300 admin years annually in a country of 1.3 million, scaling similar efficiencies across the EU-27 would mean tens or hundreds of thousands of civil-servant years freed for higher-value tasks. e-Estonia+2Frost & Sullivan Institute+2

   Combine that with the ~2 weeks per year saved by AI assistants in drafting and analysis in the UK pilot, and you get an administration that can do more with the same headcount and budget – essential in a fiscally tight, ageing Europe. Financial Times+2OECD+2

2. Shorter policy cycle times

   Today, a lot of policy time is eaten by manual compilation of evidence, consultations, and legal alignment across 27 states. With interoperable data and AI summarisation/comparison, you can cut months from each stage:

   • Faster impact assessments and legal consistency checks.

   • Faster negotiations (AI builds consolidated views and “option packages”).

   • Faster implementation monitoring and corrective amendments.

   That means the EU can respond within political cycles (or crises) rather than always being one or two cycles behind.

3. Higher-quality decisions, fewer blind spots

   AI-augmented analysis (if properly governed) lets policymakers combine vastly more information: comparative law, scientific evidence, stakeholder inputs, local data. ● OECD emphasises that AI is particularly strong in “sense-making” and forecasting uses, which can significantly improve policy design and evaluation. OECD+1

   Better models → fewer unintended consequences → less political blowback and less need for emergency fixes.

4. More room for political choice

   When the machine room is efficient, politicians’ energy goes more into where to steer (missions, standards, investments) and less into firefighting administrative failure. That matches exactly your goal: a Union that is more strategic and actionable, not more tangled in paperwork.

5. Innovation flywheel

   A shared EU digital & AI stack (interoperability solutions, AI Factories, data spaces) lowers barriers for:

   • Member states to deploy advanced solutions (no need to build from scratch).

   • Startups and SMEs to create govtech products atop common APIs and standards.

   This is essentially turning the EU public sector into a platform that generates its own innovation ecosystem, which also benefits the private economy.

6. Democratic legitimacy through better experience

   When citizens experience the state as fast, competent, and intelligible – services that “just work”, clear interfaces, quick responses – trust and legitimacy increase. Digital government research consistently shows that smoother interactions correlate with higher trust in institutions. Apo Tokyo+2Frost & Sullivan Institute+2

   In a European context, an AI-first administration is how you make “Brussels” feel like a service people can see and use, not just a remote law factory.

4. Strategic, Mission-Driven Investment System

Goal: Turn EU money from a fragmented subsidy machine into a fast, mission-aligned investment engine that actually delivers visible transformation in member states.

Think: less “thousands of micro-projects because the regulation said so”, more “clear missions with measurable outcomes, backed by strong conditionality and data/AI-driven management”.

4.1. Diagnosis: what is wrong with the current funding architecture?

Several strands of evidence point to similar problems:

1. Fragmentation and complexity

   • Cohesion policy evaluations and ECA/OECD work repeatedly highlight overly complex rules, high administrative burden and red tape, which slow down project implementation and deter smaller beneficiaries. European Commission+2European Court of Auditors+2

   • The latest ex-post cohesion evaluation points to administrative complexity as a key obstacle to effective investment and a source of errors. European Commission+1

2. Weak strategic coherence

   • The system has many funds (Cohesion, CAP, Horizon, InvestEU, RRF, etc.) with partially overlapping objectives. The Committee of the Regions itself argues that post-2027 cohesion policy must be repositioned as the core EU investment tool for strategic priorities, not just a generic transfer mechanism. DotaceEU+1

3. Slow absorption & uneven performance

   • Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) spending is a good example: auditors and national watchdogs flag that large shares of funds remain unspent with deadlines approaching, e.g. Italy having used only about half of its RRF allocation by late 2025, with many projects in critical or late stages. Reuters+2European Commission+2

4. Limited transparency on results

   • The European Court of Auditors criticises the RRF for weak transparency and accountability: disbursements are tied to milestones and targets, but data on actual project costs and outcomes is scarce, leaving citizens unclear what they are getting for hundreds of billions of euros. Reuters+2European Commission+2

5. Insufficient linkage between funds and rule-of-law / governance quality

   • Cohesion and other funds have historically flowed even into settings with rule-of-law deterioration or high corruption risks. The new rule-of-law conditionality regime is a corrective, but still young and politically contested. European Papers+3European Commission+3European Parliament+3

Net effect: a huge amount of money, but not consistently aligned with missions, not fast enough, and not transparent enough in terms of real-world impact.

4.2. The mission-driven investment logic – how the key levers actually work

This area is where mission-oriented innovation thinking (Mazzucato and subsequent EU practice) directly connects to funding. 2pe-bretagne.eu+3evropskyvyzkum.cz+3Research and innovation+3

a) Missions as the spine: clear, time-bound goals with portfolio funding

The mission-oriented approach says: instead of broad, vague objectives (“support competitiveness”, “promote innovation”), define concrete, ambitious, time-bound missions and then align instruments around them.

The EU has already piloted this in Horizon Europe Missions, which are: 2pe-bretagne.eu+3Research and innovation+3Research and innovation+3

• Large-scale initiatives with clear goals by dates (e.g. 100 climate-neutral and smart cities by 2030; 150 regions resilient to climate change by 2030, cancer, oceans, soil health).

• Designed to mobilise multiple instruments (R&I, regulation, procurement, local action), not just research grants.

Mechanism in a funding-system context:

• Define 4–6 top-level EU missions (green industry, defence/security resilience, AI & digital infrastructure, healthy ageing, etc.).

• For each mission, create a cross-fund portfolio: cohesion money, RRF-type tools, InvestEU, Horizon, etc., explicitly mapped to that mission with a shared KPI framework.

• Require member states to design Mission Chapters in their national investment plans (similar to RRF national plans), with defined contributions to EU-level mission targets.

The Mazzucato reports and later mission policy studies emphasise that missions must be: specific, time-bound, measurable, and politically salient, with governance structures that cut across silos. 2pe-bretagne.eu+3evropskyvyzkum.cz+3Research and innovation+3

So the hidden logic is: one mission → many coordinated programmes, not “one fund, one silo objective”.

b) Performance-based disbursement – but redesigned

The RRF is already a performance-based instrument: payments are tied to the fulfilment of pre-agreed milestones and targets, not reimbursement of invoices. Kurzy News+3European Commission+3ieu-monitoring.com+3

Benefits of this model:

• It shifts focus from spending money to doing reforms/investments, allowing faster, more flexible implementation (in theory).

• It creates a contractual logic: each member state agrees on a reform/investment trajectory, and disbursements follow progress.

However, the Court of Auditors finds serious weaknesses in transparency and linkage to real outcomes: milestones do not always map cleanly to actual project completion or costs, and citizens cannot easily see what was delivered for the money. Reuters+2European Commission+2

A “Version 2.0” performance-based system for mission investment would therefore:

• Keep milestones & targets, but require that they be tied to observable outputs and outcomes, not just process steps (e.g. “X MW of installed renewables”, “Y% of buildings renovated”, “Z kilometres of cross-border rail upgraded”).

• Combine milestone-based tranches with ex-post outcome bonuses once verified impacts are achieved (e.g. additional funds for regions that overshoot decarbonisation or employment targets).

• Mandate full public dashboards of milestones, disbursements, and outcome indicators (per country, region, mission).

In short: keep the RRF logic of front-loaded, performance-linked funding, but hard-wire real-economy outcomes and full transparency.

c) Radical simplification and one-stop architectures

Cohesion policy evaluations and the OECD show that administrative burden and regulatory complexity are central obstacles to effective investment. European Commission+2European Court of Auditors+2

Practical simplification levers:

• Unified front-end portals for beneficiaries: one interface per country (or region) where cities, firms, universities see all mission-related calls and instruments, regardless of which EU fund they come from.

• Standardised templates and processes across funds (applications, reporting, auditing) so beneficiaries do not need to learn multiple incompatible systems.

• Wider use of simplified cost options and lump-sum grants where appropriate, reducing invoice-based bureaucracy.

• Regulatory design principle: every new mission instrument must either reuse an existing process or demonstrably replace an older one; no net growth in procedural layers.

The OECD study on governance of EU funds suggests that streamlining procedures and clarifying responsibilities are essential to reduce delays and errors in implementation. OECD+1

d) Rule-of-law and performance conditionality as core “wiring”

The Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation now allows the EU to suspend funds to states where rule-of-law breaches threaten the EU budget or sound financial management. European Papers+3European Commission+3European Parliament+3

In a mission-driven system, this becomes part of the performance wiring:

• States with serious systemic issues (judicial capture, corruption risks) face automatic brakes on disbursement until corrective measures are taken.

• The assessment draws on existing tools (annual rule-of-law report, ECA audits, OLAF/EPPO work). European Commission+2European Parliament+2

• At the same time, mechanisms must ensure final recipients (municipalities, NGOs, businesses) continue to receive support as far as possible, bypassing central governments where needed (this is already in the design of the conditionality regime). European Commission+2Wikipedia+2

Logic: missions are not just about technology and projects; they are also discipline mechanisms for governance quality.

e) AI-driven allocation, monitoring, and fraud detection

This connects directly with Area 3 (AI-first administration), but here at the investment system level:

• Allocation models: AI can analyse regional socio-economic indicators, emissions, innovation capacity, etc., to propose evidence-based allocation formulas for mission funds (subject to political decisions).

• Real-time monitoring: models detect anomalies in spending patterns (fraud red flags, chronic under-absorption, repeated delays) and trigger audits or technical assistance.

• Impact modelling: combining satellite data, energy statistics, administrative records, and beneficiary reports to estimate mission impact (e.g. emission reductions, productivity gains) and adjust programmes.

This is not yet fully standard, but elements exist in EU anti-fraud and evaluation systems, and the OECD explicitly recommends more data/AI-based oversight for EU funds. OECD+2horizontevropa.cz+2

f) Targeted participatory instruments, not open-ended consultation

As you noted, broad “participation infrastructure” can slow everything down. In a mission system, participation is:

• Focused on design and local selection, not on every procedural step.

• Used to co-design local portfolios (e.g. a city’s climate-neutrality roadmap) within EU mission constraints.

• Embedded through citizen monitoring and social audits of mission projects, feeding real feedback into the performance system without reopening every macro decision.

This keeps democratic legitimacy and local knowledge, but avoids participatory vetoes over system-level choices.

4.3. How current thinking supports this direction

You can see three clear intellectual and policy streams converging:

1. Mission-oriented policy as EU doctrine

   • The Commission invited Mariana Mazzucato to develop the mission-oriented framework for the next R&I programme; her 2018 report and related ESIR/RISE work explicitly propose missions as problem-oriented, cross-sectoral investment logics for the EU. 2pe-bretagne.eu+3evropskyvyzkum.cz+3Research and innovation+3

   • Horizon Europe Missions operationalise this at R&I level, showing that the EU is already comfortable with mission framing, portfolios, and clear targets. horizontevropa.cz+3Research and innovation+3Research and innovation+3

2. Performance-based, reform-linked funds (RRF) as prototype

   • The RRF demonstrates a large-scale performance-based mechanism: disbursements triggered by achievement of agreed milestones and targets, combining investments with structural reforms. Kurzy News+3European Commission+3ieu-monitoring.com+3

   • The Court of Auditors’ criticisms show where to improve: better linkage to real costs/outcomes, more transparency, and stronger safeguards. Reuters+1

   • Policy makers already frame RRF success as a test case for any future joint borrowing/investment schemes, so the conceptual door is open to a more permanent mission-based facility, if improved. Reuters+1

3. Governance and simplification of EU funds

   • OECD and ECA reports stress the need to simplify rules, reduce red tape, clarify responsibilities, and strengthen result-orientation for EU funds; they explicitly recommend streamlining procedures and investing in administrative capacity. OECD+2European Commission+2

   • The rule-of-law conditionality discourse emphasises that making disbursement conditional on sound governance and judicial independence improves not only values compliance but also budget efficiency and effectiveness. European Papers+3European Commission+3European Parliament+3

Together, these trends support the idea that the next generation of EU investment architecture should be:

• Mission-framed,

• Performance-based,

• Governance-conditional,

• Simplified and data/AI-driven.

4.4. Future state: what the mission-driven system looks like and why it’s beneficial

Imagine the EU around 2035, after a major reform of its investment system:

What it looks like

• 4–6 EU-wide missions are adopted by the European executive and Parliament: for example

  • Net-zero and energy security,

  • Strategic industrial and digital capacity (including AI),

  • Defence and democratic resilience,

  • Health and ageing,

  • Territorial cohesion in a climate-stressed Europe.

• Each mission has:

  • A clear 10–15 year goal and intermediate targets (2030, 2035).

  • A governance board combining EU institutions, member states, regions, experts, and citizen representation (for legitimacy and expertise).

  • A multi-fund portfolio: part of cohesion, RRF-successor, InvestEU windows, Horizon Europe-successor, etc., tagged and managed as one mission package.

• Member states submit Mission Investment and Reform Plans (like RRF plans, but longer-horizon), which:

  • Show how they contribute to each mission with reforms and investments.

  • Contain milestones/targets tied to disbursement and outcome indicators that feed into EU-wide dashboards.

• The Commission (and ECA) run a real-time monitoring system:

  • Administrative data from national/regional IT systems, satellite data, environmental monitoring, labour market statistics, etc., are integrated.

  • AI models flag under-performance, fraud risks, and success stories.

  • All major indicators and payment flows are visible in public dashboards (mission by mission, country by country, region by region).

• Rule-of-law and governance conditionality sits as a baseline filter:

  • Serious rule-of-law concerns → automatic partial suspension of mission funds until corrective measures are verified.

  • Final beneficiaries in affected countries can still access funds via direct management by the Commission or international organisations, bypassing captured institutions.

• Beneficiaries (cities, utilities, SMEs, universities):

  • Use one national or regional one-stop portal for all mission-related funding.

  • Deal with simplified procedures, standard templates, and digital reporting integrated with their own accounting/ERP systems.

Why this makes the EU more powerful, actionable, innovative

1. Strategic coherence across money, regulation, and politics
   With missions as the spine, you stop having separate conversations about “cohesion policy”, “innovation policy”, “industrial policy”, etc. Political debates around the EU budget become debates about mission priorities and performance, not horse-trading over envelopes.

2. Faster and more impactful deployment of capital

   • Performance-based disbursement plus simplified procedures mean investments are less tied up in paperwork and more in concrete projects and reforms.

   • AI-based monitoring and early warning reduce the risk of end-period panics where large sums must be rushed out or de-committed.

3. Better protection of financial interests and values

   • Strong rule-of-law conditionality, tied to mission funds, provides clear incentives for governments to maintain judicial independence and anti-corruption standards. European Commission+2European Parliament+2

   • Fraud and misuse become easier to detect via data analysis, reducing leakage and scandals and strengthening public trust.

4. Innovation in the real economy, not only in labs

   • Missions inherently push for system-level change (e.g. entire urban mobility systems, health systems, energy systems), which requires innovation in technology, business models, regulation, and citizen behaviour.

   • Portfolio logic encourages experimentation: some projects are expected to fail; the point is that the mission as a whole moves forward.

5. Visible, tangible outcomes for citizens

   • Because missions are defined in concrete outcome terms (100 climate-neutral cities, X% cancer mortality reduction, etc.), citizens can see whether Europe is delivering or not. 2pe-bretagne.eu+3Research and innovation+3Research and innovation+3

   • Transparent dashboards and local mission projects make “EU money” visible in daily life, which reinforces legitimacy and supports the broader federal/AI-first agenda.

6. A template for future joint borrowing and crisis tools

   • If this mission-driven, performance-based system works, it becomes much easier politically to make the case for new joint investment packages (climate, defence, digital infrastructure), because there is a credible governance model for their use. Reuters+2European Commission+2

5. Rule-of-Law & Anti-Corruption as Capacity Infrastructure

Goal: Make rule-of-law and anti-corruption mechanisms function as throughput capacity: they are what allows money, decisions, and trust to flow at scale without constantly leaking into fraud, capture, or impunity.

5.1. Diagnosis: why this is not just “values talk”

You can see the bottleneck very concretely:

• The Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation (in force since 2021) allows the EU to suspend or reduce funds where rule-of-law breaches create a direct risk to the EU budget or financial interests – with safeguards so final beneficiaries still get money where possible. European Commission+2Institut Jacques Delors+2

• Parliament’s 2025 assessment says this conditionality regime is being used, but not yet to its full potential; some breaches are under-addressed, and the Commission is cautious. European Parliament+1

• The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), fully operational since 2021, investigates and prosecutes crimes affecting the EU’s financial interests (fraud, corruption, cross-border VAT fraud, etc.), often involving multi-million-euro schemes. Consilium+2European Commission+2

Recent cases show what’s at stake:

• 2025: large-scale suspected fraud with EU funds at Motol University Hospital in Czechia (~€160m). Reuters+1

• 2025: Greek case with dozens of people posing as farmers to siphon off ~€20m in agricultural subsidies, exposing oversight failures. Financial Times+1

• 2025: EPPO-led raids involving former senior EU figures (College of Europe / EEAS procurement fraud allegations). Le Monde.fr+2AP News+2

These are not exceptions; they are the visible sign of a deeper issue:
if the governance layer is weak, no amount of mission-driven investment or AI makes the system performant. Money is lost, trust collapses, and the political space gets poisoned.

So the logic for Area 5 is:

Treat rule-of-law and anti-corruption as core infrastructure, like energy or digital networks, not as a side-chapter of “values”.

5.2. How the key levers actually work

a) Rule-of-Law Conditionality as an automatic circuit-breaker

Mechanics (simplified):

• The Conditionality Regulation allows measures (suspension of payments, financial corrections) when breaches of rule-of-law principles (e.g. judicial capture, non-prosecution of corruption) “affect or seriously risk affecting” the sound financial management of the EU budget. European Commission+2Institut Jacques Delors+2

• The Commission investigates, consults the member state, and proposes measures; Council approves by qualified majority.

• Crucially, the regulation says final recipients should still receive payments, via direct management or other channels, where possible – so citizens and SMEs are not collectively punished for government behaviour. European Commission+1

Design principle for the future:

• Make this as automatic and indicator-driven as possible:

  • Use data from rule-of-law reports, EPPO/OLAF/ECA findings, and corruption indices to define thresholds that automatically trigger reviews.

  • Clarify procedures so the Commission isn’t politically paralysed by fear of lawsuits every time it acts.

If done well, the conditionality mechanism becomes a hardwired safety valve: when governance breaks down, large-scale flows pause until repairs are made.

b) A complete “financial-interests protection stack”: EPPO, OLAF, ECA, national partners

At EU level, several actors form the anti-fraud layer: Eucrim+2European Commission+2

• EPPO – criminal investigations & prosecutions of offences affecting the EU’s financial interests (fraud, corruption, VAT fraud above thresholds).

• OLAF – administrative investigations into fraud, corruption, and other offences affecting EU finances; makes recommendations to national authorities.

• European Court of Auditors (ECA) – audits the legality and regularity of revenue and expenditure, and the performance of EU spending.

• National prosecutors / police / audit bodies – implement, co-investigate, and prosecute under national law.

But today:

• Not all member states participate in EPPO, limiting its reach. Consilium+2European Commission+2

• Cooperation between administrative and criminal investigations is uneven; data-sharing and case prioritisation are often sub-optimal. Eucrim+1

Future-proof stack:

• Universalise EPPO participation (or functionally equivalent cooperation) so the EU budget is protected across the whole Union.

• Build integrated case-management and data-sharing between EPPO, OLAF, ECA, and national bodies so anomalies flagged in one system automatically propagate as leads to the others.

• Use AI-based anomaly detection on procurement, grant, and agricultural data to generate fraud-risk signals that EPPO/OLAF triage. Eucrim+2Union of European Federalists+2

This makes anti-fraud enforcement systemic, not episodic.

c) Media freedom and independent watchdogs as functional tools

You can’t enforce rule-of-law if investigative journalists and watchdog NGOs are captured or harassed.

The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) – in force as of 2024–2025 – creates: CMPF+4European Commission+4media-freedom-act.com+4

• EU-wide rules on media ownership transparency and safeguards against state or oligarchic interference.

• Requirements that public service media have safeguards for editorial independence and adequate, stable funding.

• Protections for journalists (e.g. against spyware misuse and arbitrary political pressure).

The idea is not abstract: independent media reveal corruption and abuses earlier and more effectively than state bodies; they are part of the early warning and accountability system.

Future-oriented protocol:

• Treat EMFA enforcement as integral to anti-corruption and budget protection, not just cultural policy.

• Combine EMFA with EU-level support schemes for independent, local and cross-border investigative journalism, especially in high-risk contexts.

d) Whistle-blower, conflict-of-interest, and procurement protocols as standardised “micro-infrastructure”

Lots of corruption is not spectacular fraud; it’s systematic small distortions in procurement, appointments, and everyday decisions.

Best-practice protocols (some already in EU law, others needing deepening):

• Strong, usable whistle-blower protections, including anonymous reporting channels interoperable across EU bodies and member states.

• Mandatory conflict-of-interest declarations for officials and beneficiaries in high-risk areas (healthcare procurement, defence, IT, infrastructure), audited regularly.

• Standardised transparent e-procurement platforms with open data on tenders, bidders, and awards, enabling civil society and AI systems to detect patterns (e.g. same companies always winning, bid-rigging indicators).

EU procurement directives and transparency rules already go partly in this direction, but enforcement and data quality are uneven; harmonised platforms and AI-analysis would make them genuinely powerful.

5.3. Future state: how this makes the EU more powerful and actionable

Imagine the 2035 picture:

• Every euro of mission-driven EU investment flows through a landscape where:

  • Courts are independent,

  • Anti-fraud actors are connected and data-driven,

  • Media and NGOs can investigate freely,

  • Conditionality is a real deterrent, not theatre.

Concretely, this delivers:

1. Less leakage → more capacity
   Every prevented €1 of fraud is one more euro that can be used to actually build infrastructure, fund innovation, or support vulnerable people. EPPO’s own communication already points to billions in suspicious funds under investigation; scaling this up with AI and full participation directly expands effective capacity. iconnectblog.com+3Consilium+3European Commission+3

2. Faster decision-making because trust is higher
   When other member states and EU institutions trust that funds will not disappear into oligarchic networks, they are more willing to approve large, fast, joint investments (climate, defence, digital). Conditionality + strong enforcement is the price of political comfort with deep fiscal integration.

3. Political resilience against populism
   When corruption is systematically exposed and punished – including at the EU level – it undercuts the “all elites are corrupt and unaccountable” narrative. A visible EPPO case against high-level actors is painful in the short term but strengthens long-term legitimacy. Le Monde.fr+2AP News+2

4. Better domestic governance via EU leverage
   National reformers (judges, prosecutors, civil society) can leverage EU conditionality and anti-fraud mechanisms to push back against domestic capture:
   “We need to fix this, or we lose billions.” That’s a powerful incentive, especially in cohesion-receiving countries.

5. A competitive advantage vs. authoritarian or corrupt systems
   Globally, a polity that can credibly say: “Our money goes where we say it goes; our procurement is transparent; our courts are independent” is more attractive as a partner and investment destination.

In other words, you’re building clean pipes for everything else to flow through.

6. High-Resolution Representation & a European Political Space

Goal: Ensure that when the EU acts, it does so on the basis of clear, high-resolution mandates that reflect citizens’ preferences at the right scale – the European scale – not just 27 national angles stitched together.

This is about more than voting rules. It’s about building a political ecosystem where Europe is the natural level at which you think and compete politically.

6.1. Diagnosis: what’s broken today

Current situation:

• European elections are 27 national contests: different electoral laws, different thresholds, different dates. Campaigns focus mostly on national issues, and the “European” level is blurred. European Parliament+1

• The link between your vote and EU leadership is indirect. The Spitzenkandidaten experiment has been used inconsistently, and the Council often picks Commission Presidents through elite bargaining.

• European political parties exist, but mostly as loose federations of national parties, with weak direct membership and brand identity.

• There is no Union-wide constituency where all votes are counted together, and no pan-European competition for a meaningful block of seats.

Analyses from the European Parliament’s research service and democratic-reform groups converge: without a genuine European electoral space, people will always experience the EU as “others making decisions”, and the system will lack the political clarity needed for bold action. European Parliament+2Union of European Federalists+2

The Conference on the Future of Europe also produced citizen recommendations calling for: stronger European parties, more Europeanised elections, and better links between citizens and EU decision-making. European Movement - Join the movement!+4European Commission+4Consilium+4

6.2. How the core representation levers actually work

a) Union-wide constituency and transnational lists

Parliament has already adopted a legislative initiative to reform the European Electoral Act, including: European Parliament+2European Parliament+2

• A Union-wide constituency in addition to national ones.

• A second ballot where citizens vote for transnational lists presented by European political families.

• A proposed 28 seats for these transnational lists on top of the current 705, with geographic balance rules to ensure representation from large, medium, and small states.

Logic:

• You still vote for local/national MEPs, but you also cast a vote that counts exactly the same way in every member state.

• That second ballot elects a significant group of MEPs whose legitimacy derives from the entire European demos.

Many federalist and democracy-reform proposals argue for going further: giving the Union-wide constituency more seats over time, and using better apportionment methods (e.g. ranked or proportional allocation) to avoid domination by big states or large parties. eudemocracy.eu+1

b) Europeanising the rules: common minimum standards and voting day

The Parliament’s reform proposal also calls for: European Parliament+2European Parliament+2

• Common minimum electoral standards:

  • Same minimum voting age,

  • Maximum thresholds,

  • Deadlines for candidate lists,

  • Rules on postal/online voting, etc.

• A common European election day (e.g. 9 May).

This doesn’t erase national electoral traditions, but it reduces fragmentation and sends the signal:

“This is one election, not 27.”

Common standards also make it easier to experiment with preferential or ranked voting at the European level, which can produce winners with broader support and reduce polarisation.

c) Empowering European political parties and movements

Right now, “European political parties” receive public funding and exist legally, but:

• They are mostly confederations of national parties.

• Direct membership is rare; citizens primarily interact with national parties.

Reform ideas consistent with existing debates:

• Allow and incentivise direct individual membership in European parties, not just via national affiliates.

• Link public funding more strongly to European-level campaigning, internal democracy, and transparency.

• Require European parties to run coherent programmes and candidate lists across all member states (not different brands and lines everywhere).

Research on the Europeanisation of public spheres suggests that strong European parties competing on recognisable platforms are key to creating a genuine common political debate. European Parliament+2Union of European Federalists+2

d) Bridging representation and participation

The Conference on the Future of Europe was a large experiment in transnational citizen deliberation, with 49 proposals and 326 measures adopted in its final report. JEF Europe+3European Commission+3Consilium+3

Future-proof protocol:

• Institutionalise citizens’ panels/assemblies at EU level (like CoFoE panels) that feed into Parliament, Commission, and Council.

• Give these bodies defined roles (e.g. mandatory consultation on certain files, or the ability to trigger a parliamentary debate).

• Maintain their advisory (not veto) nature, to avoid slowing everything down, but ensure their outputs are systematically channelled into representative institutions.

This links “voice” (citizens) to “power” (representatives) in a structured way, without replacing one by the other.

6.3. Future state: what a high-resolution European political space looks like

Picture the mid-2030s outcome if these levers are actually used:

Elections & parties

• Every five years, Europeans go to the polls on the same day. They receive two ballots:

  1. One for their national/regional list,

  2. One for a pan-European list headed by the lead candidate for EU executive leadership.

• European parties are real membership organisations:

  • Citizens join them directly;

  • They hold internal primaries for their lead candidate;

  • They run consistent campaigning across languages and countries.

• Media and social platforms treat the elections as single European events: there are EU-wide debates between lead candidates, EU-level polling, and cross-border coverage.

Representation & mandates

• The European Parliament consists of:

  • MEPs elected in national or regional constituencies (anchoring local concerns),

  • A significant block (say 10–15%) elected from Union-wide lists, directly accountable to the European electorate as a whole.

• The European executive (Commission/President) is chosen based on the parliamentary majority formed after these elections, using clear coalition patterns (e.g. centre-left, centre-right, liberal-green alliances) like in national democracies.

• Citizens can see a clean causal link:

“If you vote for X and Y gets a majority, you get this leader, this coalition, this programme.”

Why this is good for power, speed, and innovation

1. Clearer mandates → bolder action

   When the centre has an unambiguous political mandate, it can propose and push through ambitious legislation (on AI, defence, climate, industrial policy) without constantly worrying that “no one actually voted for this at EU level”. When things go wrong, voters know who to punish. That is the core of strategic capacity.

2. Less structural blame-shifting

   Today, national leaders often attribute unpopular decisions to “Brussels”, and EU actors blame member states. In a high-resolution system where European elections genuinely choose European leaders and programmes, there is less room for diffuse blame; politics becomes more honest and thereby more functional.

3. Attracting better political talent to the EU level

   If EU politics offers real visibility, clear leadership roles, and meaningful competition, ambitious and competent political entrepreneurs will naturally invest their careers at that level. That raises the quality of decision-making and the ability to manage complexity and innovation.

4. A real European public sphere

   Transnational lists, harmonised rules, and a strong European party system create continuous demand for cross-border media coverage, think-tank work, and civic activism. This in turn helps solve the information problems (misinformation, fragmentation) that currently slow or distort decisions.

5. Making federalisation politically survivable

   Many of the functional reforms you care about (AI-first administration, mission-driven investment, anti-veto rules) involve de facto federalisation in key areas. A high-resolution representation system is how you make that politically acceptable: people can see and influence the centre; it looks and feels like a normal democracy, not a remote bureaucracy.

7. Smart, Targeted Citizen Input as a Problem-Solving Engine

Hidden logic:
Use citizens surgically where they unblock conflicts, improve designs, or stress-test ideas – not as a permanent brake on everything.

So instead of “more participation = better”, the logic is:

“Right people + right format + right moment = better, faster decisions.”

7.1 What this actually looks like (institutionally)

a) Representative deliberation for hard trade-offs, not for routine stuff

OECD’s big “innovative citizen participation” study mapped almost 300 serious deliberative processes (citizens’ assemblies, juries, panels). It finds they’re especially useful when: OECD+2OECD+2

• The issue is complex, value-laden, long-term (climate, migration, digital rights).

• There are real trade-offs and no easy win-win.

• Normal politics is stuck in slogans or vetoes.

In that world, you don’t run assemblies for bus timetables; you convene them for:

• “What’s a fair roadmap to phase out combustion engines?”

• “Under what conditions do we allow controversial AI uses?”

• “What level of EU solidarity on migration is legitimate and workable?”

The point is: they de-risk and de-polarise decisions that would otherwise blow up in Parliament or Council.

b) Permanent but small deliberative institutions

Ostbelgien (German-speaking Belgium) is the canonical case: since 2019 they have a permanent Citizens’ Council (24 people at a time, selected by lot for ~18 months) which: Medium+3oidp.net+3publicdeliberation.net+3

• Chooses topics,

• Mandates ad-hoc Citizens’ Assemblies (drawn by lot again),

• Tracks whether Parliament actually follows up.

The model’s key innovations:

• Standing body → you don’t re-invent a process each time; it’s routinised and cheaper.

• Agenda-setting power → citizens don’t just react to government topics; they can push issues onto the agenda.

• Formal follow-up → Parliament must respond, but retains final say, so you get influence without veto.

This has now inspired variants in other places (Paris, Brussels, etc.) and a wave of discussions about permanent citizens’ assemblies at European level. G1000+2Dokumen+2

Translate this logic up to the EU:

• A Permanent European Citizens’ Council of, say, 60 randomly selected citizens rotating every 1–2 years.

• It can:

  • Request that Parliament/Commission set up European Citizens’ Assemblies on specific hard issues;

  • Review major legislative packages from a citizen perspective;

  • Track institutional follow-up.

Again: advisory, not veto power. It’s like a “citizen R&D lab” feeding into the political core.

c) Digital + in-person hybrids to scale and speed up (vTaiwan logic)

Taiwan’s vTaiwan model is the archetype of fast, hybrid deliberation: nesta+5info.vtaiwan.tw+5participedia.net+5

• Use online tools (notably Pol.is) to map opinion clusters and identify statements that get broad agreement.

• Combine this with in-person meetings of stakeholders and officials.

• Aim for “rough consensus” on specific policy clauses (e.g. Uber regulation, online alcohol sales).

• Result: on 26 tech-related issues, ~80% resulted in concrete government action.

Mechanically:

• Citizens and stakeholders submit and vote on statements online.

• AI/ML (Pol.is) clusters opinions; you see where bridges exist.

• Facilitators use that structure to design in-person sessions that start from points of emerging convergence, not from maximum conflict.

For the EU, the logic is:

• Use EU-scale digital deliberation platforms (pol.is-style, AI-assisted summarisation) to process tens or hundreds of thousands of inputs.

• Combine them with sortition-based mini-publics (panels/assemblies) to deliberate deeply on a manageable set of options.

• Feed the outputs directly into Commission impact assessments and Parliament committee work.

Deliberation becomes an input compression mechanism, not a new veto layer.

d) From one-off experiments to embedded practice

Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) + subsequent European Citizens’ Panels were the EU’s proof-of-concept: 800 randomly selected citizens across the EU, structured deliberations, 49 proposals and 326 measures. Democracy International+5European Commission+5TEPSA+5

Follow-up analysis (EPC, others) basically says:

• This worked as a legitimacy + idea generator;

• But it was too ad-hoc; we now need permanent, institutionalised panels with real hooks into EU decision-making. Wiley Online Library+3Democracy Reform Observatory+3EPC+3

So the future design direction is:

• Treat citizens’ panels as standing instruments attached to the main institutions (EP, Commission, Council), not as one-off projects.

• Give them defined roles: e.g. mandatory hearing on certain law types; ability to request a formal response.

• Build administrative capacity for this (a “Participation Office” shared across institutions, with staff, tools, and budget).

7.2 Future state: how this helps with speed and power, not just “more democracy”

Imagine 2035:

• There is a Permanent EU Citizens’ Council and a standard toolbox of:

  • Issue-specific European Citizens’ Assemblies,

  • EU-wide digital consultations using AI to find consensus points,

  • Citizen review panels on big laws (migration pact, AI, climate).

These instruments:

1. De-risk politically explosive decisions
   Before Parliament votes on a controversial climate or tech package, a citizens’ assembly has already hammered out something that’s socially acceptable and internally coherent. That makes it easier for MEPs and ministers to take bold decisions without fear of total backlash.

2. Accelerate learning and correction
   Citizen monitoring panels (short, digital, or in-person) evaluate how big policies work on the ground and feed back practical fixes. That shortens the policy “debugging” cycle.

3. Reduce noise, increase signal
   Instead of 3 million emails to the Commission, you have structured input: digital platforms + mini-publics that produce clean, summarised preferences and trade-offs. Politicians spend less time guessing what “people want” and more time choosing between clearly articulated options.

4. Legitimise speed
   When big decisions have visible citizen fingerprints, moving fast is easier to justify. Political actors can credibly say:
   “We’re acting quickly, but we’re not bypassing citizens; they were in the room.”

So the core: targeted, institutionalised citizen input as accelerant for hard decisions – not a universal brake.

8. Multi-Level Governance that Routes Decisions to the Optimal Level

Hidden logic:
A powerful EU is not “do everything in Brussels”. It’s:

“Decide each issue at the lowest level that can handle it – and the highest level that must handle it.”

That’s classic subsidiarity, but implemented as concrete architecture, not rhetoric.

8.1 How multi-level governance works today (on paper vs practice)

The Committee of the Regions (CoR) defines multi-level governance (MLG) as coordinated action by the EU, member states, and regional/local authorities “based on partnership and aimed at drawing up and implementing EU policies,” with shared responsibility and democratic legitimacy at each level. Gary Marks+4EUR-Lex+4EU Portal+4

On paper we already have:

• Subsidiarity & proportionality in the Treaties (do at EU level only what can’t be done better by member states; keep laws no more intrusive than necessary).

• National parliaments and CoR can issue subsidiarity reasoned opinions on draft laws.

• A lot of EU implementation is already done by regions, cities, agencies.

But in practice:

• Subsidiarity checks are often formalistic and late.

• Local/regional actors complain they are involved too little, too late in policy design, but heavily burdened in implementation. Gary Marks+3eu2018+3Observatorio de Derecho Público+3

• This creates friction, “gold-plating” of rules, and slower implementation.

So the question is: how do you redesign protocols so each issue naturally falls to the right level, and coordination is systematic, not ad-hoc?

8.2 Concrete levers for “right-level routing”

a) A real subsidiarity/MLG pipeline, not just opinions

The 2018 Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and “Doing Less More Efficiently” already recommended: eu2018+2Observatorio de Derecho Público+2

• Better ex-ante and ex-post subsidiarity checks,

• Closer involvement of national parliaments and local/regional authorities,

• Better implementation planning.

Turn this into a hard protocol:

1. Issue triage at the start

   • Every major initiative must pass a “level test”:

     • Is this a cross-border public good (climate, migration, defence, digital single market)? → EU level.

     • Is it predominantly local/territorial (schools, housing, local transport)? → national/region/city, with maybe EU funding, benchmarks, or soft law.

2. Joint implementation plans

   • For EU-level laws, you attach a multi-level implementation plan: what the EU does, what member states do, what regions/cities do, and how they coordinate.

3. Ex-post evaluation by all levels

   • After X years, EU + member states + CoR jointly review whether the allocation of tasks made sense; they can recommend re-allocation (more EU, less EU, more local, etc.).

This is subsidiarity as an engineering discipline, not a sermon.

b) Strengthening parliaments and regions in EU decision-making

MLG only works if the local/national levels can push back intelligently when the EU over-reaches or under-reaches.

Existing and emerging pieces:

• National parliaments already can issue reasoned opinions; the Task Force wants them more involved, earlier, and via direct digital channels. eu2018+1

• The CoR has developed detailed mappings of division of powers, subsidiarity mechanisms, and has long argued for systematic inclusion of regions and cities in EU law-making, especially where they implement EU rules. Gary Marks+4EU Portal+4EUR-Lex+4

Future-proof protocol:

• Give national parliaments and CoR a joint digital portal to scrutinise draft EU laws in real time, with AI support that:

  • Flags where competences may be mis-aligned;

  • Compares draft measures with existing national/regional laws;

  • Suggests where more flexibility or local variation is needed.

• Allow a “yellow/orange card+”: if a significant number of national parliaments and regional chambers raise subsidiarity concerns, the Commission must re-work the proposal or justify staying the course, and Parliament/Council must explicitly vote on the revised design.

This is not a veto, but a structured feedback loop from lower levels.

c) Empowered cities and regions as implementation engines

Empirical work on MLG shows that regions and cities are often where EU policies become real – in transport, environment, social inclusion, innovation. Tribuna Juridica+1

To exploit this:

• Many missions (climate-neutral cities, resilient regions, etc.) already position cities/regions as “mission platforms” – with their own governance, funding, and experimentation capacity. OECD+3publicdeliberation.net+3oidp.net+3

• The mission logic says:

  • EU sets targets and frameworks,

  • Regions/cities design context-specific portfolios within those frameworks,

  • EU and member states support with funding, standards, and peer learning.

Combine with AI-first administration (Area 3): local authorities plug into the same interoperability and AI stack, but build localised implementations (urban mobility AI, local climate dashboards, etc.) tuned to their reality.

d) Cross-border “functional regions” where reality ignores borders

Modern economy and ecology don’t respect borders:

• Cross-border labour markets, transport corridors, river basins, energy grids, etc.

MLG needs Euroregions / macro-regions with:

• Some level of joint governance,

• Shared data and planning,

• A role in EU funding and policy (e.g. Danube Strategy, Baltic Sea Strategy, etc.).

The Commission and CoR already have macro-regional strategies; next step is to tie them more tightly to missions and funding so they become genuine cross-border execution units, not just coordination platforms. Observatorio de Derecho Público+3Tribuna Juridica+3Gary Marks+3

8.3 Future state: how “right-level routing” makes the EU faster and more powerful

Picture the architecture in 2035, combined with federal core + anti-veto + AI-first:

1. Less pointless fighting over competences
   Because each major law went through a serious level test and joint implementation planning with national parliaments + CoR, there’s less “Brussels is overreaching” shouting later. Disputes are handled at design time, not at implementation time.

2. Faster implementation, fewer bottlenecks

   • Cities/regions know early what’s expected and what flexibility they have.

   • They’re part of designing mission roadmaps, so they own them.

   • EU/national rules are written with their reality in mind, reducing later delays and derogation battles.

3. Better match between problem scale and decision scale

   • Genuine cross-border issues (climate, energy grid, defence, AI markets) are decisively handled at EU level with majority voting and a political mandate.

   • Genuinely local issues are left to local/national levels, maybe with EU guidance or co-financing, but not micromanaged.

4. More political stability for federalisation
   When citizens see that some things moved “upward” to Europe (because they clearly need to be) and other things remain local – and that lower levels still have weight in EU law-making – federalisation stops being felt as a zero-sum competence grab.

5. A laboratory effect
   With strong cities/regions and cross-border macro-regions, the system becomes a network of policy labs:

   • Local experiments;

   • Horizontal diffusion via CoR, networks, and missions;

   • Vertical scaling when something works particularly well.

This is multi-level governance as architecture for speed and learning – not as everyone doing everything, but as a routing system that sends each problem to the level where it can be solved fastest and best.

9. Information Ecosystem that Supports High-Quality Decisions

Hidden logic:
You can’t have fast, strategic, powerful democracy if the information layer is (a) polluted and (b) opaque.
So the aim is:

Make the default flow of information more accurate, transparent and intelligible for citizens, parties, media, and institutions.

Not by censoring opinions, but by re-wiring infrastructure, incentives, and skills.

9.1 Structural guardrails on platforms (DSA + codes + enforcement)

The Digital Services Act is already the spine of this. It:

• Imposes tiered obligations on online services, with Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and search engines facing the strictest regime. Digital Strategy+1

• Requires VLOPs to assess and mitigate systemic risks, including impacts on civic discourse, electoral processes and fundamental rights. Digital Strategy+2Digital Strategy+2

• Forces transparency: content moderation reports, ad libraries, recommender-system explanation, and researcher data access. Digital Strategy+2jipitec.eu+2

On top of that, there are codes of conduct under the DSA (on disinformation, on hate speech, etc.), where platforms and stakeholders agree on extra commitments such as:

• Collaboration with fact-checkers,

• Measures against bots and deepfakes,

• Better labelling and down-ranking of deceptive content. Digital Strategy+2The Verge+2

Recent moves – like Poland asking the Commission to investigate TikTok for AI-generated “Polexit” propaganda – show the DSA is now being used as a hard instrument against foreign interference via AI-driven content. Reuters+1

Principle: don’t micromanage every post – change the systemic behaviour of platforms that shape attention and information exposure at scale.

9.2 Public-interest infrastructure: EDMO, research access, fact-checking

If platforms are the highways, you also need public service traffic control:

• The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) and its national hubs bring together fact-checkers, media-literacy experts and researchers to detect and analyse disinformation, run media-literacy projects and map vulnerabilities of the media ecosystem across 28 countries. EDMO+2Digital Strategy+2

• EDMO led EU-wide campaigns like “Be Election Smart” for the 2024 EP elections, raising awareness of disinformation risks in all EU languages. Digital Strategy+1

Under the DSA, vetted researchers get data access to VLOPs to study systemic risks – algorithmic amplification, foreign interference, online harms – and feed insights into regulation. Digital Strategy+2jipitec.eu+2

Hidden logic: build an “observatory layer” that sees across platforms and countries, and can warn both regulators and the public – instead of relying only on whatever platforms choose to publish.

9.3 Media literacy & digital citizenship as core civic skills

Even with better platforms, people still need skills to navigate the mess.

The EU and Council of Europe are converging on a very explicit stance:
media literacy and digital citizenship are core democratic competences, not add-ons.

• EP’s research service stresses that media literacy – understanding how information is produced, distributed and monetised – is central to resilience against mis- and disinformation, and to informed democratic participation. European Parliament+1

• The Commission’s media-literacy policy and EDMO explicitly frame media literacy as a civic skill for the digital age, with cross-border campaigns and knowledge exchange. Digital Strategy+2Digital Strategy+2

• The Digital Education Action Plan 2021–2027 aims at high-quality, inclusive digital education in Europe, including critical use of digital technologies and safe online participation. European Education Area+1

• The Council of Europe’s Reference Framework of Competences for Democratic Culture (RFCDC) gives a detailed model of values, skills and knowledge needed for democratic citizenship, and has been extended to digital citizenship education – integrating critical thinking, rights, responsibilities and online participation. SALTO+3Portal+3Council of Europe+3

• 2025 has been declared the European Year of Digital Citizenship Education, explicitly to foster skills to participate safely, responsibly and effectively in digital democracy. Portal+1

On the ground, the European School Education Platform and eTwinning showcase projects on “living democracy at school”, creative citizenship education, and digital civic practice. European School Education Platform+2European School Education Platform+2

Principle: treat media/digital literacy as math-level basic, embedded across curricula and life-long learning – because the quality of decisions depends heavily on the quality of mental models people build from the information stream.

9.4 Future state: what a “decision-ready” information ecosystem looks like

Imagine mid-2030s Europe under this logic:

• Platforms:

  • All VLOPs run continuous risk assessments on election integrity, disinformation, hate speech and civic harms, update mitigation measures, and open their systems to EU audits.

  • Political advertising is fully transparent: public ad libraries, clear labels, origin information, and strict rules against opaque targeting.

  • Recommendation systems expose user-controlled settings (chronological vs personalised, etc.) with clear explanations of trade-offs.

• Public infrastructure:

  • EDMO hubs plus other observatories form a European “radar array” for information threats, working with national regulators and electoral authorities.

  • Researchers have standardised, privacy-safe data access under the DSA, so we can empirically track manipulation patterns, AI-generated propaganda, and changes in opinion dynamics.

• People:

  • Digital citizenship and media literacy are part of every school and teacher-training programme, based on the RFCDC and EU digital education frameworks.

  • Adults have access to short, targeted learning (through public broadcasters, libraries, online academies) on fact-checking, algorithmic literacy and safe political engagement online.

Why this makes the EU more powerful and actionable:

1. Better signal-to-noise for voters and leaders
   Parties, institutions and citizens can see more clearly what is actually happening (facts, trends, public sentiment) versus what is astroturfed, botted or manipulated. That reduces over-reaction to noise and under-reaction to real risks.

2. Lower vulnerability to foreign interference and AI-driven manipulation
   DSA enforcement on AI-generated content + EDMO + media-literacy campaigns means that coordinated disinfo campaigns get detected faster and have less impact – especially important with generative AI, as the TikTok Polexit case shows. EDMO+3Reuters+3Digital Strategy+3

3. Higher trust in decisions
   People are more willing to accept bold policy moves if they believe the information environment wasn’t rigged and that their media and institutions acted transparently.

4. Better feedback loops
   With transparent platform data and citizen skills, you can monitor how policies are discussed, misunderstood or weaponised online, and fix communication and design faster.

So Area 9 is about giving the whole system a cleaner, more intelligible cognitive field to operate in.

10. Civic & Administrative Capability for Execution

Hidden logic:
You can redesign institutions perfectly on paper – but if people inside and outside the state can’t understand, use, and drive them, nothing moves.

So Area 10 is:

Equip citizens to navigate and shape the system, and civil servants to actually implement complex, AI-heavy, mission-driven governance.

Think: civic competence + state capacity as two sides of the same coin.

10.1 Civic capability: democratic + digital competences at scale

We already touched the frameworks in Area 9. Here the emphasis is: system-literacy + agency.

Key building blocks:

• The Reference Framework of Competences for Democratic Culture (RFCDC) – 20 competences (values, attitudes, skills, knowledge) for democratic participation, endorsed by European education ministers. SALTO+3Portal+3Council of Europe+3

• Council of Europe’s digital citizenship education concept, which extends RFCDC into the online sphere: understanding digital rights, responsibilities, and participation modes in a highly digital democracy. Council of Europe+1

• EU’s Digital Education Action Plan and related initiatives, which explicitly aim to equip learners with digital and data literacy, critical thinking and safe online behaviour. European Education Area+2Epthinktank+2

On the implementation side:

• The European School Education Platform/eTwinning projects show ways to embed democracy into everyday school practice (“living democracy at school”, student councils, school-level decision-making, etc.). European School Education Platform+2European School Education Platform+2

• Civil society work on global citizenship and democracy education emphasises that teachers’ competences (not just curricula) are crucial, especially for digital participation and dealing with polarisation. solidar.org+1

Principle: over a decade, build a generation of Europeans who:

• Understand what the EU and their state actually do,

• Can read basic data and policy arguments,

• Know how to use digital tools to participate, monitor, and hold power accountable,

• Are resilient to manipulation and conspiracy ecosystems.

This is the social substrate on which all your federal, AI-first, mission-driven reforms sit.

10.2 Administrative capability: AI-ready, mission-ready civil service

For the state side, the decisive question is:
“Can our public workforce design and run what we’re proposing?”

The OECD has done a lot of work here:

• Skills for a High-Performing Civil Service identifies three families of skills:

  • Professional expertise,

  • Strategic skills (foresight, evidence-based problem solving, working with data),

  • Innovation skills (experimentation, co-design, collaboration). OECD+2OECD+2

• The OECD Framework for Digital Talent and Skills in the Public Sector says digital government needs:

  • The right environment (tools, culture),

  • The right skills (data, design, agile, user-centricity),

  • The right workforce (recruitment, career paths for digital and data roles). Observatory of Public Sector Innovation+3OECD+3OECD+3

The EU is starting to operationalise this:

• The Advanced Digital Skills Training Programme for civil servants (RRF / Digital Europe) aims to train tens of thousands of officials – including senior staff – in areas like databases, system management, business/data analysis and cybersecurity, explicitly to support public-service digitalisation. European Commission+2oecd.ai+2

• The Digital Europe Programme is allocating significant funding (e.g. €1.3–1.4bn 2025–27) to AI, cybersecurity and digital skills, including AI-skills academies for GenAI and sectoral digital skills (health, industry, etc.). Financial Times+3Reuters+3EIT Deep Tech Talent Initiative+3

In your AI-first EU, that translates into:

• Mandatory baseline training for all civil servants in:

  • Using AI assistants safely (prompting, verification, bias awareness),

  • Interpreting basic data/metrics,

  • Understanding EU decision-making and mission logics.

• Specialised tracks for:

  • Policy engineers / AI product owners,

  • Data stewards and architects,

  • Algorithmic auditors / ethics officers.

• Organisational reforms so teams are built around:

  • Mission portfolios,

  • Cross-disciplinary squads (legal + policy + data + UX + ops),

  • Continuous iteration, not once-per-decade reforms.

Essentially, you’re turning the civil service into a permanent, AI-augmented problem-solving organism, not a rule-processing machine.

10.3 Future state: what “capable citizens + capable administration” actually look like

Mid-2030s snapshot:

• Citizens

  • 18-year-olds leaving school in any member state have had:

    • Years of practice with school-level democracy (student councils, participatory budgeting, etc.),

    • Structured exposure to RFCDC-style competences and digital citizenship,

    • Media-literacy training on deepfakes, algorithms and information sources.

  • Adults have access to short courses and micro-credentials on EU institutions, digital participation, AI use in everyday life and work.

• Civil servants

  • Every policy desk officer has an AI copilot integrated into their workflow and knows how to use it.

  • Each ministry / DG has a digital talent strategy aligned with the OECD framework: clear roles, career paths, hiring from tech/data backgrounds, and continuous re-skilling. OECD+2OECD+2

  • Senior leadership is trained in mission governance, AI-informed strategy, and multi-level coordination, not just in classic law and economics.

• Cross-sector spread

  • Similar patterns appear in healthcare (digital-skills programmes like Susa), education, and other sectors, amplifying the system effect. Financial Times+2European Education Area+2

Why this is crucial for a powerful, fast EU:

1. You can actually implement the ambitious architecture
   Federal core + anti-veto + AI-first + mission funding is complex. Without skilled people, it collapses into performative paperwork. With them, it becomes routine high-throughput governance.

2. Less political drag from “capacity gaps”
   A lot of slow implementation comes from local or national administrations simply not being able to deliver (skills, systems, coordination). Upgrading admin capacity removes that as an excuse and as a bottleneck.

3. Higher-quality contestation
   If citizens and civil servants understand the system and the data, political arguments move from slogans to serious, high-resolution disagreements. That’s healthy pluralism and makes course-correction faster.

4. Talent competition advantage
   A polity that trains millions of citizens and tens of thousands of civil servants to operate fluently with AI, data and complex institutions will almost automatically become a global centre for governance innovation – which then feeds back into economic and geopolitical strength.

11. Performance, Metrics & Implementation Oversight

Hidden logic:
If you want a fast, powerful EU, you need an operating system that can constantly answer:

“Are we actually delivering what we said – where, how fast, at what cost, and with what side-effects?”

So Area 11 is about hard-wiring monitoring, evaluation, and delivery management into the system – not as an afterthought, but as a core democratic function.

11.1 Diagnosis: where the current system falls short

Across EU and OECD work you see recurring problems:

1. Ex-post evaluation is weak compared to ex-ante tools

   • The OECD’s 2025 review of Better Regulation practices in the EU finds that while tools like impact assessment (RIA) and stakeholder engagement at the drafting stage are fairly widespread, ex-post evaluation of existing laws seriously lags behind; reforms have slowed since 2018–2021 and focus remains on new rules rather than reviewing what already exists. OECD+1

2. Performance frameworks exist, but are fragmented and often technocratic

   • Structural funds and cohesion policy have required performance frameworks (result indicators, milestones, performance reserve) for years, but guidance documents themselves show how hard it is to pick good indicators and to link them tightly to interventions. mmr.gov.cz

   • Programmes like Digital Europe have detailed monitoring and evaluation frameworks (outputs, outcomes, data collection plans), but they are mostly internal to programme management – not part of a visible, political “EU scoreboard” citizens can read. data.consilium.europa.eu

3. Governance performance data is scattered

   • OECD’s Government at a Glance provides a broad, comparable dashboard of how public administrations perform (trust, budgeting, HR, digital services, etc.). OECD+2OECD+2

   • OECD’s Policy Framework on Sound Public Governance stresses that monitoring governance performance is essential to track implementation and adjust course. OECD+2OECD+2

   • But at EU level, this kind of dashboard logic is not yet tightly integrated with everyday politics and decision cycles.

4. Weak link between Better Regulation and strategic priorities

   • The Commission’s Better Regulation system (guidelines + toolbox) is conceptually strong – IA, public consultations, evaluations, fitness checks. European Commission+1

   • In practice, the OECD notes that many member states (and the EU) still underuse ex-post tools and don’t consistently connect regulatory quality indicators to high-level strategic governance. OECD+2Digital Government+2

Net effect: the EU has many indicators and reports, but not yet a single, brutal, politically salient answer to:

• “Are we on track?”

• “Where are we failing?”

• “Who fixes what, by when?”

11.2 Core levers: from scattered metrics to a real “governance cockpit”

a) A mission-linked, public “EU Performance Dashboard”

OECD’s dashboard approach (Government at a Glance, public integrity indicators, etc.) is explicitly about grouping indicators into readable, policy-relevant clusters instead of one composite index. OECD+3OECD+3ResearchGate+3

At EU level, you can use that logic to build:

• A Mission Dashboard for each EU-level mission (climate-neutral cities, defence & security, AI & digital, health, etc.), with:

  • A small set of headline indicators (e.g. GHG emissions, resilience metrics, productivity or employment effects, infrastructure deployed),

  • Implementation indicators (projects completed, money disbursed, reforms enacted),

  • Governance indicators (rule-of-law status, administrative capacity, integrity risks).

• A cross-cutting Governance Dashboard for:

  • Regulatory quality (strength of IA, evaluation coverage, stakeholder engagement), OECD+2ria.vlada.cz+2

  • Integrity / corruption risk (using OECD public integrity indicators, EPPO/OLAF/ECA data), oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org+2OECD+2

  • Digital government maturity, AI use in administration, HR capabilities. OECD+2OECD+2

This isn’t another PDF; it is a live public data interface the executive must constantly answer to.

b) Hard-wiring monitoring & evaluation into law and budget cycles

OECD’s policy-monitoring work is blunt: M&E must be built into the policy cycle if you want policies rooted in evidence and capable of mid-course correction. OECD+2OECD+2

At EU level, that means:

• Every major piece of legislation and every mission-level programme must have:

  • A clearly defined intervention logic (inputs → activities → outputs → outcomes),

  • A set of result indicators and milestones agreed with Parliament and Council,

  • A legal obligation for mid-term and ex-post evaluation at fixed dates with explicit follow-up mechanisms.

• Evaluations are not just Commission self-assessments; they:

  • Draw on independent evaluation units, national authorities, OECD and other external bodies,

  • Are debated in Parliament with the same seriousness as new proposals,

  • Can trigger a “re-open or repeal” clause if policies are clearly underperforming.

This is an explicit upgrade of the existing Better Regulation agenda into a constitutional habit: nothing big is permanent without proof.

c) AI-enabled implementation oversight

The M&E layer becomes truly powerful when combined with AI and the interoperable data backbone from Area 3:

• Real-time monitoring of key indicators:

  • Integrate administrative data, satellite and sensor data, and programme reporting into AI-driven dashboards that can flag anomalies, delays, or likely failure to hit targets. OECD+2data.consilium.europa.eu+2

• Risk scoring for projects and policies:

  • Models highlight where cost overruns, governance risks, or non-delivery are most likely, allowing the Commission, ECA, and national authorities to focus audits and support.

• Policy simulation:

  • Before changing a regulation or mission mix, AI-based models using OECD/EU indicators can simulate likely impacts on emissions, growth, inequality, etc., giving policymakers more than just narrative arguments. ResearchGate+3OECD+3OECD+3

The OECD already uses sophisticated policy dashboards and data tools; making these part of EU’s internal cockpit is a relatively small conceptual jump. ResearchGate+3OECD+3OECD+3

d) Delivery units and escalation protocols

Raw metrics do nothing unless someone is mandated to fix the red lights.

Inspired by national “delivery units”, Area 11 would institutionalise:

• Mission Delivery Units at EU and national level:

  • Small, high-skill teams tracking mission dashboards,

  • Authority to escalate problems, coordinate across DGs/ministries, and deploy technical assistance.

• Escalation protocols:

  • If a mission KPI is off-track by an agreed margin, a pre-defined response kicks in:

    • Extra support,

    • Programme redesign, or

    • In extreme cases, re-allocation of funds away from chronic non-performers.

This connects metrics → responsibility → action.

11.3 Future state: how this makes the EU more powerful and fast

Imagine 2035:

• For each mission, you have a public dashboard that shows:

  • Targets,

  • Progress by country/region,

  • Money spent vs outcomes,

  • Implementation bottlenecks.

• Parliament holds annual “Mission Hearings” where the executive must explain which KPIs are off track and what they are doing about it.

• The Commission and member states operate joint delivery units, using AI tools to prioritise intervention.

The impact on “power and action”:

1. Radically shorter error cycles
   You see failure early (indicators go red), you understand where, and you have a mechanism to correct. That’s the opposite of the current pattern where issues are discovered at the end of a budget period.

2. More credible commitments
   When the EU promises something (e.g. a certain decarbonisation level, AI infrastructure, defence capacity), it can actually track and demonstrate delivery – which increases trust internally and externally.

3. Less room for bullshit and symbolic politics
   Politicians can’t hide behind vague claims; dashboards linked to evaluations and hearings make it obvious who is performing and who is not.

4. Better use of money and political time
   Resources (and attention) can be shifted from zombie programmes to what actually works, based on evidence rather than inertia.

Area 11 is how the EU becomes not just ambitious on paper, but reliably self-correcting in practice.

12. Continuous Democratic R&D & Importing Best Practice

Hidden logic:
You don’t design “the perfect democratic system” once. Reality changes (tech, information, geopolitics, social norms), and democracy must be iterated like any complex product.

Area 12 is:

Build a permanent democratic R&D ecosystem – labs, networks, data – that continuously tests, evaluates and scales innovations in how we decide and govern.

12.1 Evidence: democratic innovation is happening – but fragmented

We already have a global wave of “democratic innovation”:

• Local democratic labs and pilots

  • OECD and academic work emphasize that cities are “laboratories” for deliberative and participatory instruments – citizens’ assemblies, participatory budgeting, digital participation – driven by local governance styles and open government agendas. ECPR+2Council of Europe+2

  • The Innovation in Democracy Programme in the UK piloted local citizens’ assemblies and produced a substantive evaluation of design, impact, and scaling barriers. involve.org.uk

  • Barcelona’s Democracy Lab serves as a platform for local officials and practitioners to co-design democratic innovations around digital transformation. nets4dem.eu

• Dedicated democratic innovation labs

  • The Democratic Innovations Lab at the University of Groningen studies and tests mini-publics, participatory budgeting and tech for inclusive decision-making. University of Groningen

  • The Democracy Innovation Lab at American University explores the relationship between technology and democratic resilience. CSINT

  • The Portulans Democracy Project is building an AI-enabled lab to map worldwide democratic innovations using NLP, explicitly to understand what works and under what conditions. Portulans Institute+1

• Knowledge networks on specific innovations

  • KNOCA (Knowledge Network on Climate Assemblies) diffuses best practice on climate citizens’ assemblies, bringing together policymakers, practitioners and researchers, and curating case studies, guidance and evaluations. greendealnet.eu+4knoca.eu+4knoca.eu+4

  • The Democracy R&D network connects organisations worldwide that design and run deliberative processes for hard decisions. democracyrd.org

• Comparative knowledge on innovations

  • Council of Europe and others have mapped democratic innovations, noting a “major transformation of democracy” with new channels of citizen involvement (mini-publics, digital platforms, participatory budgeting). Council of Europe+2ECPR+2

  • Reports like “Making democratic innovations stick” (Nesta) highlight common barriers: funding, bureaucratic resistance, lack of evaluation and institutionalisation. media.nesta.org.uk

  • Comparative work on Asia and other regions shows a wide variety of democratic innovations (e.g. participatory budgeting in Brazil, Taiwan’s vTaiwan, Korean and Japanese experiments), with lessons about design, inclusion and impact. European Democracy Hub

The pattern is clear: tons of experiments, but:

• Learning is fragmented;

• Scaling is rare;

• Many good pilots die after the grant ends.

12.2 What a serious democratic R&D ecosystem looks like

a) An EU-level “Democratic Systems Lab”

Think about a Democratic Systems Lab as the equivalent of a public R&D institute for democracy itself.

Functions:

• Scanning & mapping

  • Continuously map worldwide democratic innovations (processes, institutions, tech) using:

    • Classical research,

    • AI/NLP tools to mine documents, media, and grey literature (very close to what the Portulans project is building). Portulans Institute+1

• Experiment design & evaluation

  • Co-design pilots with EU institutions, member states, regions and cities: citizens’ assemblies, AI-supported participation, new representation models, participatory budgeting, etc.

  • Set up rigorous evaluation frameworks (quantitative + qualitative) to measure impact on:

    • Decision quality,

    • Trust and legitimacy,

    • Inclusion,

    • Implementation outcomes. media.nesta.org.uk+3European Parliament+3Council of Europe+3

• Protocol library

  • Develop and maintain a library of open protocols for democratic processes:

    • Design templates for assemblies, panels, PB, digital deliberation;

    • Guidance on recruitment, facilitation, information provision, integration into institutions (like KNOCA does for climate assemblies). greendealnet.eu+4knoca.eu+4knoca.eu+4

• Advisory and training centre

  • Train officials, facilitators, and civil society in running high-quality processes;

  • Provide design advisory services to EU and national/local bodies.

This consolidates what currently exists in scattered labs and networks into a systemic capability.

b) Dedicated funding lines for democratic experimentation

Nesta’s research on “making democratic innovations stick” is blunt: lack of sustained funding and bureaucratic obstacles are core barriers to scaling. media.nesta.org.uk+1

A serious EU programme would:

• Create a stable budget line for democratic innovation, distinct from ad-hoc project funding.

• Require:

  • Clear evaluation design;

  • Plans for institutionalisation if pilots prove successful;

  • Knowledge-sharing obligations (data, documentation, open tools).

• Specifically support:

  • Cities and regions as primary labs (where most innovations already happen), ECPR+2oidp.net+2

  • Cross-border pilots (e.g. Euroregions running joint assemblies or online platforms),

  • Experiments linking AI tools with democratic processes (AI-assisted summarisation, translation, agenda-setting, etc.).

c) Standard mechanisms for scaling & embedding

Current pattern: nice pilot → report → nothing.

Area 12 standardises a pathway from pilot to system:

1. Pilot & evaluate

   • Run experiment with clear metrics (participation, satisfaction, influence on decisions, etc.). involve.org.uk+2Council of Europe+2

2. Peer review & meta-analysis

   • Labs and networks (KNOCA, Democracy R&D, etc.) review the design and results, comparing with similar cases. Citizens’ Democracy+3democracyrd.org+3knoca.eu+3

3. Institutional offer

   • If results are good, the EU Democratic Systems Lab publishes a “replication pack” (protocol, cost model, risk analysis).

   • EU institutions and member states are formally invited to adopt the instrument in a specific domain (e.g. climate, digital, local budgeting).

4. Formalisation

   • Successful instruments move from “experiment” to “standard tool” in the EU democratic toolbox: e.g. mandatory citizen panels on X-type laws, regular climate assemblies, participatory budgeting quota for certain funds.

This is how you go from islands of innovation to architecture-level change.

d) Global import/export of democratic technology

Democratic innovation is not Western-European by default:

• Asia has produced significant innovations in digital participation (vTaiwan), participatory budgeting, and anti-corruption transparency. European Democracy Hub

• Latin America has decades of participatory budgeting practice. oidp.net+1

Area 12 explicitly:

• Treats the EU as part of a global democratic innovation ecosystem, not a closed bubble.

• Establishes partnership programmes with labs and networks beyond Europe to import and adapt their best practices. CSINT+3democracyrd.org+3European Democracy Hub+3

The Portulans-style AI mapping projects become tools for this: scanning global practices and suggesting candidates for EU piloting. Portulans Institute+1

12.3 Future state: what continuous democratic R&D gives you

By mid-2030s, under this logic:

• There is a European Democratic Systems Lab working with:

  • National democratic innovation units,

  • City-level democracy labs,

  • Global networks (Democracy R&D, KNOCA, etc.). Teknologirådet+4University of Groningen+4knoca.eu+4

• Democratic processes (assemblies, PB, digital deliberation, transnational lists, hybrid models) are:

  • Evaluated systematically,

  • Stored as protocols,

  • Updated as new evidence and tech come in.

• AI/NLP tools continuously map and cluster new innovations, flagging promising ones for piloting. Portulans Institute+1

Why this makes the EU more powerful, not just more “experimental”:

1. Permanent adaptation to tech and social change
   When AI, platforms, geopolitics or social norms shift, the EU doesn’t wait for a constitutional crisis; it already has machinery to rapid-prototype institutional responses and test them.

2. Reduced risk of institutional ossification
   Democracies tend to solidify around outdated procedures. A standing R&D architecture keeps experimentation legitimate and routinised, so you can update protocols of democracy without burning everything down.

3. Cheaper, smarter failures
   Bad ideas are tried in small, well-designed pilots and killed early with data, rather than being rolled out at EU scale by political accident.

4. Exportable “democracy tech”
   A Union that systematically develops and proves new democratic methods can share them internationally, strengthening Europe’s soft power and giving it a role as a global democracy innovator, not just a defender.

5. Internal culture shift
   If politicians and officials know that institutional design itself is a field of continuous experimentation, they become less defensive about procedural reforms and more open to re-writing rules in service of performance.

Area 12 is essentially how you put “agile, AI-aware, evidence-driven product thinking” around democracy itself – so the system can keep evolving in the direction you care about: more strategic, faster, more capable Europe.